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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the biological and economic consequences of modifying the
species selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies context. The objective is
to examine whether modifying the species selectivity properties can contribute to
rebuild overexploited stocks. To meet this objective, conceptual and empirical
bioeconomic models were constructed. The conceptual model was used to investigate
the qualitative impacts and the empirical model was used to derive the quantitative
impacts of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gear.

In the conceptual part of this study, a stylized model was developed to analyze the long-

run equilibrium bioeconomic properties of modifying the species selectivity properties
of the gears. The study examined two polar cases, namely when the gears were perfectly
non-selective and perfectly selective.

The analysis showed that there was a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the
impact of technological improvement. Policy prescriptions for rebuilding stocks varied
dramatically depending on the type of technology employed and the presence of
biological interrelationships. In the perfectly non-selective gear case, rebuilding
strategies would benefit from decreasing the catchability of the overexploited species as
long as the stocks were biologically independent. In the presence of biological
interrelationships, decreasing the catchability yielded ambiguous results. Other policies,
such as increasing the catchability of accompanying species, and simultaneously

decreasing the catchability of the target species and increasing the catchability of the
accompanying species also generated ambiguous results.

In the empirical part of the study, a bioeconomic model of the Georges Bank

multispecies fishery was constructed. The model had four species groups (roundfish,
flatfish, elasmobranchs, and pelagics) and three gears types (otter trawl, gillnet and
longline). The model evaluated the long-term biological and economic implications of
changing the gear design or configuration (technology-based changes) and the creation
of a tax-subsidy program (market-based changes).

Model results suggested that technological and market-based programs could aid in the
rebuilding process; however, by themselves they are insufficient to recover the stocks.
Rebuilding the overexploited roundfish and flatfish stocks requires significant reduction
in fishing effort.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Problem statement

The development of marine fishing technology has long been recognized to be a
double-edged sword (Bell, 1978, Cunningham et al, 1985). Technological advancement,
while allowing for factors of production to be used more efficiently, also tends to
deplete open access resources.

The reasoning and dynamics are identical to the open access paradigm. The adoption of
new technology by fishermen raises productivity and improves profitability but also
acts as an incentive for newcomers to adopt new technology and enter the fishery. The
absence of property rights breeds competition among fishermen to harvest the fish
before others do. Fishermen have no incentive to conserve the resource for their own
use nor to invest in the resource, for instance, by allowing it to grow larger since
someone else can harvest any un-caught fish. This competition leads to a race to fish,
which in aggregate, not only depletes the resource but also decreases each fisherman's
economic performance. Decreasing economic returns, in tum, create an additional
incentive for fishermen to continue to improve their gear's efficiency in pursuit of
higher profits.

This cycle repeats itself until the fishery becomes overexploited and over-capitalized. In
short, technological improvement sets forth two opposing forces. On one hand, it raises
the productivity of factors of production, but on the other hand, by exhausting the fish

stocks, it lowers overall productivity. Not surprisingly, Whitmarsh (1990) points out that
"Perhaps, the most fundamental issue as far as policy is concerned is the need to
monitor the advance of fisheries technology and, where possible, to forecast its future
time path."

Clearly understanding the impact of the technological change on harvesting practices
and on the environment is instrumental to improving fisheries management. The
management of multispecies fisheries is notoriously complex because managers not
only have to understand the impact technological change has on the selectivity
properties of fishing gears but also on the biological characteristics of the fishery.

Changes in a multiproduct firm's technology can modify the species selectivity
properties affecting transformation and substitution possibilities. Many species occur in
mixed-species aggregations, resulting in significant by-catch interactions among
fisheries directed towards a particular target species or species group. Similarly,
technological improvements can yield excessive fishing pressure that may disrupt
predatory and competitive interactions. While these changes may not necessarily lead to
loss of species diversity and ecosystem resilience, they may stress fishing communities
(Gudmundsson and Sutinen, 1998). The Georges Bank ecosystem, for example, has
undergone dramatic changes in species composition and abundance. Following the
overexploitation of the valuable groundfish resources, low value elasmobranch
resources flourished. Trawl survey indexes from Georges Bank show that dogfish and
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skates abundance increased from roughly 25 percent in weight in 1963 to almost 75
percent in weight in recent years.

Despite the growing recognition of the need to understand the impacts of technological
advancement, the fisheries economics literature has given little attention to this issue.
Whitmarsh (1990) studied the factors influencing technological diffusion. Whitmarsh
(1998) explained how the technological progress in the presence of free access
conditions leads to the "fisheries treadmill'', where fishermen in spite of adopting new
efficient technology, are unable to obtain a lasting increase in profits. Cunninghan et al
(1985) and Anderson (1986) examined the long-run effects of improving the
catchability coefficient in an open access, single species fishery. Remarkably, little
attention has been paid to the impact of technological change in a broader ecological
context.
1.2. Goal, objective, approach and methods

The goal of this work is to understand the biological and economic consequences of
modifying the species selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies context.
The objective is to investigate whether modifying the species selectivity properties can
contribute to rebuilding overexploited stocks. To meet this objective, a conceptual and
an applied bioeconomic model were constructed. The theoretical model was used to
investigate the qualitative impacts whereas the empirical model was used to derive the
quantitative impacts of changing the species selectivity properties of the gear.

3

Comparative statics method was used to describe the marginal impacts of three different
policies. The first policy considers reducing the catchability of the overexploited target
species while the second policy considers increasing the catchability of the
underexploited accompanying species. The third policy considers a simultaneous
combination of both. For expository purposes, the analysis focuses on perfectly
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies in the presence and absence of
biological interactions.

Later, a bioeconomic model that couples the salient ecological and economic features of
the Georges Bank multispecies fishery is constructed. A numerical simulation model
that incorporates multiproduct firm technology with a biomass dynamic model is used
to evaluate the long-term biological and economic implications of selected policies.
These policies include changes in the gear design or configuration (technology-based
changes) and the creation of a tax-subsidy program (market-based changes). Under a
tax-subsidy program, taxes would discourage fishermen from targeting overexploited
species while subsidies would encourage fishermen to target underexploited species.
After conducting a range of policy simulations, the main results are discussed. Finally,
conclusions and policy implications of this research are presented.
1.3. Organization of dissertation

The remainder of this piece has six chapters. Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the
structure of the Georges Bank fishery. This chapter provides a background on the
resource, industry structure and recent management history. Chapter 3 introduces the
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conceptual model, which investigates the bioeconomic impacts of modifying the species
selectivity properties of fishing gears in a multispecies fishery. The conceptual model
evaluates rebuilding strategies in the presence of perfectly selective and perfectly nonselective technologies, including the cases where the stocks are biologically
independent and interrelated. Chapter 4 describes the specification and estimation of the
components needed to develop a bioeconomic model. Chapter 5 describes the
bioeconomic model and discusses the main results. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions
and policy implications of the research.

5

Chapter 2: Overview of the Fishery
2.1.

Introduction

The development of management policies requires an understanding the relationships
between the ecosystem and human activities. The status of the resource, structure of the
industry, and management history are integral components of the fishery, which need to
be accounted for in the formulation of policy. The objective of this chapter is to review
the recent changes in the marine ecosystem and the experiences in regulating the New
England groundfish fishery as the backdrop for our study. The following section
describes the recent changes in the Northwest Atlantic ecosystem. Next, an account of
the harvesting sector is provided. The last section reviews the management history.
2.2. Overview of Fishery Resources
The Northwest Atlantic shelve have supported many commercially important fisheries
for centuries. Within this region, the Georges Bank area supports one of the highest fish
production rates in the world. The high primary and secondary production rates are
linked to the topographic and hydro graphic features of the Bank. The water mass over
the Georges Bank plateau is well mixed and isothermal throughout the year allowing
continuous nutrient regeneration (Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). Scientists have
observed that even though Georges Bank is an open system, production is tightly
bound, with most of the fish production being consumed by other fish species
(Sissenwine et al., 1984, Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). This feature has maintained
overall biomass and production levels relatively constant, even though significant
fluctuations on the species level. While fisheries management often requires
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information at the species level, aggregating species into species groups provides a
synoptic illustration of the dynamics of the marine ecosystem which otherwise may be
overlooked (NMFS, 1998).

Since the 1960's, the Georges Bank ecosystem has undergone significant changes in
species composition and yield (Figure 1). The increased distant water and domestic
fishing pressure disrupted the existing trophic interactions (i.e., competition and
predation) and changed the structure of the exploited marine assemblages. 1 The heavy
exploitation of valuable groundfish resources (gadoids, and flatfish) in the 1960's and
1970's resulted in record high catches and record low abundance. The aggregate index
for this group declined by almost 70% between 1963 and 1974. Sharp declines were
observed in the haddock, silver and red hake, and most of the flatfish stocks. In the mid
and late 1970's, the stocks appeared to increase following stricter management regime
imposed by ICNAF and the Magnuson Act. Haddock and cod showed a sharp increase
in biomass. The abundance and recruitment of flatfish also increased substantially.
Consequently, the aggregate index showed an increasing trend peaking in 1978. In the
early eighties, the aggregate index dropped again following a sharp increase in fishing
effort and recruitment overfishing. In 1987 and 1988 the index reached the lowest
values since 1963 (NMFS, 1998).

Meanwhile, the elasmobranch population (spiny dogfish and skates) rapidly grew.
Standardized trawl surveys show that dogfish and skates catches increased from 25
1

Assemblage refers to a group of species which are distributed in the same geographic areas and habitat type for

most of the year, sharing common environmental regimes and feeding areas (Overholtz and Tyler, 1986)
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percent (by weight) in 1963 to nearly 75 percent in the late 1980's (NMFS, 1996).

2

Since the early 1990' s, the elasmobranch biomass index declined reflecting the
increased fishing pressure on this resource. NMFS scientists have noted that while
minimum biomass estimates for the spiny dogfish stocks are high, mature females may
already be overexploited. This may threaten the stock in the future given the low birth
rates and long gestation period of this specie. Herring and mackerel stocks were
overexploited in the 1960's and 1970's but since have recovered to record levels. The
pelagic index has markedly increased since 1983, peaking in 1994.

Collie and DeLong (1999) note that while these shifts are attributed to high harvest
rates, predation is an important factor controlling the dynamics of the fish community.
Several studies have studied the impact of species interactions in the dynamics of fish
communities. Grosslein et al (1980) documented moderate to high dietary overlap
between spiny dogfish and gadoids, and silver and white hakes, and between little skate
and haddock, yellowtail flounder and winter flounders.

2

Since 1963 the Northeast Fishery Science Center has conducted surveys to generate abundance indexes and monitor

resource trends. Survey data is very valuable for monitoring trends in population size since unlike catch-per-uniteffort data from commercial or recreational fisheries, its catchability does not change markedly over time.
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Figure 1: Trends in aggregate biomass indexes for major fish assemblages.
Indexes of aggregate abundance
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Overholtz and Tyler (1986) proposed a model where juvenile haddock competitive
pressure on food resources kept the growth rate of other species at low levels.
Following intense harvesting pressure on haddock and poor haddock recruitment, a
competitive release mechanism allowed other species to increase in number and
biomass. Initally, yellowtail flounder and longhorn sculpin populations dominated.
Thereafter, skates and windowpane flounder dominated the system. Spencer and Collie
(1996) proposed a stochastic predator-prey model, which incorporated an alternative
prey. Their study examined how fishing mortality rates, predation rates and
environmental variability affected the equilibrium and dynamics of the Georges Bank
haddock and spiny dogfish system. More recently, Collie and DeLong (1999)
constructed a dynamic production model to examine species interaction between four
species groups, which included gadoids, flatfish, elasmobranch, and pelagics. They
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found that the most important interactions were predation of gadoids and elasmobranchs
on pelagics. They also found some evidence to support apparent competition between
elasmobranchs and gadoids.
2.3. Overview of Fishing Industry

The Northeast region's commercial oceanic and estuarine fisheries generated US$ 869
million (ex-vessel) worth of seafood in 1993. Of this total, finfish generated 35% the
revenue for the region (NMFS, 1994). The New England groundfish fishery is
characterized by the diversity of its fishing operations, gear types, vessel sizes and
prosecuted species. The New England fleet employs several gears including otter
trawls, gill nets, longlines, pots and traps, among others. 3

In 1993, there were 1,347 vessels in the fishing fleet. Otter trawl is dominant gear in

fleet. One thousand and forty otter trawls were in operation in 1993 landing 129.7
thousand tons of seafood valued at US$ 187 million. Most of revenue was derived from
cod (20%), Loligo squid (12%), winter flounder (8%), American plaice (8%), yellowtail
flounder (7%) and monkfish (7%). During the same year, the gillnet and longline fleet
had 244 and 229 vessels, respectively. The gillnet fleet landed 22.7 thousand tons of
seafood valued at US$ 24.8 million while longline fleet landed 7.66 thousand tons of
seafood valued at US$ 29.7 million. Most of gillnet revenue was derived from cod
(33%), pollock (14%), and monkfish (10%) whereas most of the longline revenue was

3

The New England fleet consists of those vessels based in the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
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attributed to swordfish (31 %), tilefish (16%), bigeye tuna (16%), and cod (13%)
(NMFS , 1994).

The New England fleet is divided into inshore and offshore sectors. The inshore sector
consists of small vessels (5-50 tons) and employ 2-3 crew. In 1993, their average
revenue per day absent was US$ 886. Due to their small size, these vessels usually fish
close to shore and rarely go to offshore grounds. The effort of these boats is
concentrated in summer months since they tend not to fish in rough weather. Their
fishing trips usually last one day, but they can go on 2-3 day trips. Since the inshore
vessels' trips are short, smaller vessels tend to be opportunistic, ready to profit from
price changes and species availability (Doeringer and Terl<la, 1995). Vessels correspond
to some extent with port size; that is, smaller vessels tend to be housed in smaller ports
spread throughout New England. For instance, Chatham's geography (narrow inlet and
distance from major ports) discourages larger vessels from operating from this port.

The offshore sector consists oflarger vessels (51-150+ tons) that employ between 3 and
15 crew. The number of crew has declined sharply following reductions of days at sea
brought about by Amendments# 5 and 7. These larger boats tend to fish year around.
The continuing poor condition of the groundfish stock forced captains to thin their
crews and begin targeting other fisheries like dogfish, herring, mackerel, shrimp, and
other species that do not fall under groundfish rules (Canfield,1997). The larger vessels
tend to based in the ports of New Bedford, Gloucester, Boston, Pt. Judith, Portland, and
Rockland. The species composition varies significantly with port. This situation not
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only reflects species abundance in the different grounds but also the degree of fleet
specialization among the different ports. For example, in New Bedford, scallops and the
main groundfish (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) account for most of the
landings, whereas in Pt. Judith lobster, Loligo squid, silver hake, monkfish, scup and
butterfish accounted for most of the landings.
2.4. History of the New England Groundfish Fishery

2.4.1. Early Times

The harvesting of groundfish has a long tradition in North America dating back to
colonial times. The development of the cod fishery was a leading factor of the European
settlement in North America. Cod fishing was not only a source of food for the locals,
but was also an important commodity. Dried salted cod was an internationally traded
commodity. Dried salted cod production peaked in the 1880's and then declined due to
advent of steam-powered boats, competition among other food products, and the
appearance of fresh fish outlets (Parsons, 1993, Murawski, 1996). 4

Prior to the development of a formal system of collecting fishery statistics in the 1930's
and 1940's, fluctuations in stock abundance were assessed from anecdotal reports and/or
from trends in landings (Serchuk, and Wigley, 1992). In the early 1870's, the short
supply of Gulf of Maine cod led to the first study of the impact of human activities on
fishery resources (Baird, 1874 as reported by Serchuk and Wigley, 1992). In 1913, the
first study on the impact of otter trawl fishing on the abundance of fish stocks of
4

Steam-powered trawlers were able to deliver a steady year-around supply of fresh fish.
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Georges Banks was conducted. The analysis revealed that cod, haddock, and hake in
Georges Bank were not being overfished (Alexander et al., 1915 as reported by
Serchuk, and Wigley, 1992). The study, however, did raise concerns about excessive
discards if the otter trawl fleet expanded significantly. Scientific evidence indicated that
the new gear was extremely destructive and discarding was prevalent.

During the tum of the century, new technologies rapidly changed the fishery. Schooners
were soon replaced by steam-powered trawlers. By the 1930's, there were over 300
trawlers in the fishery (Murawski, 1996). 5 The development of refrigeration, filleting
and canning in 1920's contributed to the fast development of the groundfish resources
and eventually led to the demise of the haddock stock in the 1930's (Hoagland, KitePowell and Schumacker, 1996).

Prior to the 1900's, haddock landings had been relatively low since it did not preserve
well when salted. However, improved cold storage, marketing, and distribution made
the industry switch from salt dried cod to haddock. Haddock landings continued to
increase as the demand grew (Murawski, 1996). Unfortunately, the increased fishing
pressure soon collapsed the haddock resource as landings dramatically fell from
120,000 tons in 1929 to 28,000 tons in 1934. During this time, cod landings decreased
and haddock, redfish, and other species commanded higher prices in the domestic
market.

5

Interestingly, the Canadian trawl fleet never exceed 4 vessels by the J930's because of the opposition of the inshore

sector, and Canadian policy to maintain the largest possible labor force employed in the fishery (Parsons, 1993).
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The collapse of the haddock fishery prompted new research to investigate causes of the
crises and recommend potential solutions. Scientists confirmed earlier work by
Alexander, which showed the negative impact of discarding of juvenile haddock. One
study estimated that for the 37 million pounds of haddock landed in Boston, 70-90
million juvenile haddock were discarded dead at sea. Although no estimates are
available, large quantities of cod are believed to have been discarded (Serchuk and
Wigley, 1992). Scientists recommended increasing trawl mesh size, but the industry
rejected this proposal.

In the 1930's, the redfish fishery was initiated. The U.S. landings peaked in the 1942 at

60,000 metric tons, and then declined as the fishery expanded to the Scotian Shelf,
peaking at 120,000 metric tons in the 1950's. Murawski (1996) notes that the fishery
was fished down to moderate levels in the Gulf of Maine during the 1930'and 1940's,
and the stock collapsed in the mid-1970's following the return of the fleet from Canada.
U.S. redfish catches oscillated between 14,000 to 15,000 metric tons in 1978-79, and
dropped to 530 metric tons in 1991.

Until the 1940's, flatfish landings were dominated by winter flounder, witch founder
and American plaice. Subsequently, yellowtail flounder became the most important
flatfish. Y ellowtail landings and abundance however decreased substantially during the
1940's and 1950's. Although, the reasons for the decline are not known, warm water
temperatures are believed to have affected recruitment. In the 1960's, when the water
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temperatures were cooler and increased m yellowtail abundance and landings was
observed (Muraswki, 1996).

Prior to the Second World War, the New England fleet was large and not very
profitable. Thereafter, it became very prosperous as the war effort required the supply
of large amounts of protein, and rationing increased the consumption of fish. The fleet
became more active as many large fishing vessels were used in the military activities
such as mine-sweeping.
2.4.2. ICNAF Era

During the l 940's, the United States and Canada began expressing concern about the
conservation of marine fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and the potential impact of
foreign fleets on domestic fishermen. This concern led to the establishment of the
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in 1949, and
effectively came into force in 1951 (Table 1). ICNAF's objective was to investigate,
protect, and conserve fisheries of the NW Atlantic in order to maintain maximum
sustainable catch from each species. Originally Canada, the United States, and a few
European nations were its only members. Fishing effort initially was moderate and
ICNAF managed the fishery by controlling the size of first capture. Mesh size
regulations were first imposed in 1953.

In late 1950's, Northwest Atlantic fisheries underwent a dramatic and uncontrolled
expansion. The arrival of new distant water fleets led to a precipitous increase in
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landings. The USSR factory fleet engaged in "pulse fishing", a practice where a large
amount of fishing effort is directed to a particular species in a given area until its
abundance is reduced to a low level. USSR catches increased from 17,000 metric tons
in 1956 to 370,000 metric tons in 1962, to 853,000 metric tons in 1965, finally peaking
at 1,357 ,000 metric tons in 1973. During the same period, the tonnage of fishing vessels
increased form 400,000 metric tons to a peak of 1,500,000 tons in 1974 (Parsons,
6

1993).

In the early 1960s, ICNAF recognized that mesh size regulations were not sufficient to

control fishing mortality as long as fishing effort continued to increase (Anthony and
Garrod, 1986). Attempts to discuss effort regulation failed in 1965, 1966, and 1967. In
1968, it was reported that cod in subarea one and haddock in subarea five were
'demonstrably overexploited', and by-catch problems were recognized from the very
beginning in some fisheries.

Rapid changes in technology continued to improve the fishing efficiency resulting in a
tremendous increase in fishing effort and capacity. The total tonnage of vessels fishing
in the NW Atlantic (excluding boats less than 50 feet) went from 400,000 tons in 1959s
to a peak of 1,500,000 tons in 1974. Despite the increased effort level, total landings
continued to decline from 4,600,000 metric tons in 1968 to 4,200,000 metric tons in the
early 1970's. The pulse fishing strategy of the distant water fleets resulted in the
collapse of many stocks such as the haddock, silver and red hakes, Atlantic mackerel,
and Georges Bank herring (NEFSC, 1995).
6

Excl udes boats under 50 metric tons.
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Table 1: Management of New England groundfish fishery.
Year
1949
1953
1970
1971
1972-1976

Management measures implemented
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) 1s
established.
Establishment of minimum mesh size for otter trawl (4 1/2 inches).
Haddock spawning area closures (March through May).
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for haddock implemented.
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for yellowtail flounder implemented.
T ACs for all regulated stocks established.
T ACs assigned by country.
"Second tier" TACs where the sum of national species TACs had to be less than the
sum of individual countries ' . TACs to allow for species interactions and by-catch.
Extension of haddock spawning area closures (February- May).

1976-1977

Declaration of Extended Jurisdiction by Canada and the United States.
Fisheries on Georges Banks no longer regulated by ICNAF.
Canadian and American fishermen continue to harvest in overlapping area of
Georges Bank claimed by both countries.

1977-1982

U.S. Fishery Management Plan for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder based on
quotas (annual, quarterly, by vessel classes, and lastly, trip limits) .
Minimum otter trawl mesh size (5 1/8 inches)
Seasonal spawning closures for haddock
Canadian TACs for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder

1982-1985

Interim U.S. Fishery Management Plan for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder.
All direct controls (quotas) on fishing mortality eliminated by the United States and
replaced by indirect controls (minimum mesh size of 51/2 inches, minimum
landings sizes for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, seasonal closed areas
retained, etc.)
Canada retains TAC system

1984

World Court establishes maritime boundary, " Hague line" across Georges Bank.

1986

U.S. Northeast Multispecies Management Fishery Management Plan extend
management to a complex of groundfish species, including cod, haddock, flounders,
hakes, and other species. Establishes acceptable levels of spawning potential for
individual stocks. Also, imposes minimum fish sizes,
mesh size restrictions, and closed haddock spawning areas.

1991 -1994

Amendment No. 4 to the Northeast Fishery Management Plan establishes
overfishing definitions, harvest rates above which recruitment overfishing would
occur.
Stock assessment of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder establish that recruitment
overfishing is occurring and that stocks continue to decline.
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Group of conservation organizations files suit based on continued over-exploitation
of groundfish resource.
Canada develops and individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for some segment
of the fleet.

1994

Amendment No. 5 implemented to address overfishing of groundfish resource.
Regulations included days at sea reductions, moratorium on new vessels, eastern
haddock closed area expanded and closed (January-June), 500 lb. trip limit for
haddock, minimum trawl mesh size of 6 inches, and mandatory logbooks.
Canadian TACs for cod and haddock adjusted to achieve fishing rates below F0 . 1 •
Secretary of Department of Commerce takes emergency action in December
permanently closing two areas on Georges Bank and one in southern New England
to all fishing gears harvesting groundfish, including scallop dredges.

1996

Amendment No. 7 to the Northeast Multispecies Plan mandates further days at sea
reductions, expands limited entry to include groundfish otter trawl and gillnet from
45 to 30 ft., raises haddock trip limits, and establishes "target" TAC quotas for cod,
haddock, yellowtail flounder and other species

Sources: Fogarty and Murawski, 1998, Wang and Rosenberg, 1998, OECD, 1996.

In 1971, a global TAC for haddock in division 4X and subarea five (i.e. Scotian Shelf,

Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank, and Southern New England) was first established
together with a Scheme of Joint Enforcement to ensure catch compliance. Additionally,
there was a provision that stated that the directed fishery should cease whenever the
accumulated catch (directed catch plus by-catch) reached 80 percent of the quota,
anticipating that the by-catch after the closure would be 20 percent. Mesh size limits,
closed spawning areas, and a closed area-season for haddock division 4X were also in
place. The TAC for haddock went from 18,000 tons in 1970 to 12,000 tons in 1972.
Despite a continued increase in fishing effort from 1968 to 1974, the total catches in
NW Atlantic declined to about 4.2 million tons (MMT) in the early 1970s (from 4.6 MMT
in 1968).
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In 1972, ICNAF's MSY objective was changed to the optimum utilization of stocks. In

the same year, catch quotas were allocated between countries. The allocation of catchquotas among countries was new and restrictive, so cheating and mis-reporting occurred
(Anthony, 1990). Non-contracting parties fished in the area but their catches were not
considered when allocating quotas. Each country was initially responsible for
enforcement within its own fleet, but later enforcement among countries was limited to
above the deck examination of catch only. North Americans inspectors were dissatisfied
with the system since they felt that infractions by distant water nations went
unpunished. ICNAF management work was also hampered by poor and limited
information for assessments, inaccuracy of catch reporting and time lags obtaining data
and use of MSY or F max did not provide sufficient safeguard against errors in
assessments due to these factors. Catches reflecting abundance continued to decline
dramatically between 1970 and 1975.

In 1973, it became obvious that single-species quotas were not reducing fishing

mortality. 7 After a series of meetings, ICNAF decided to implement a 'second-tier
scheme' to deal with excessive fishing and by-catch problems. The second-tier TAC
procedure set a TAC for each country and was always to be less than the sum of the
country's catch quotas for individual species. This forced each country to direct its
fishing towards the species that was the most valuable to that country so that unwanted
by-catch, which counted against the total second-tier quotas, was not taken (Anthony

7

The number of stocks under TA Cs grew from four in 1972, to 24 in 1973.
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and Murawski, 1986). There were several indications that the second-tier quota scheme
was effective in reducing the level of overall by-catch and helped to control landings on
a species basis to be less than the TA Cs. 8 The adoption of the second-tier scheme led
some countries to redirect their fisheries to minimize or reduce by-catch. By reducing
the by-catch of species with small allocations, countries were able to catch higher
proportions of their second tier quotas than if fishing patterns used in previous years
were employed. The second-tier quota scheme was abandoned in 1977 when the US
extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles.

In 1976, ICNAF called for a 40 percent reduction in effort by non-coastal states

(relative to 1972-73 levels) with specific stock quotas largely responding to the
imminent implementation of extended jurisdiction. ICNAF also adopted Fo.1 for setting
TACs and agreed to give coastal states a higher percentage of shares of the overall
quotas. The quotas were often exceeded due to the multispecies nature of the fisheries
and non-selective properties of gear; however, by 1975 and 1976, stocks were
beginning to recover. 9 Actual reduction in fishing effort was less than the 40 percent
targeted; it appears that as much as 1/3 of the reduction occurred between 1973 and
1976 in subareas two, three, and four. ICNAF ceased to exist shortly after the United
States and Canada extended jurisdiction. In addition to the difficulties of managing a
multigear and multispecies fishery, ICNAF had a reputation for being slow, awkward

8

9

Parsons (1993) argues that it was not in place long enough to assess its effectiveness.
The major groundfish stocks on Georges Banks and Southern New England increased by 86 percent from 1974 to

1977. Groundfish abundance in all of subareas two, three and four decreased by more than Y2 between 1967 and
1975, they remained stable in 1975-1976, and then more than doubled between 1976 and 1984.
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and often incapable of implementing regulations contrary to the interests of any of its
members (Eckert, 1979).
2.4.3. Magnuson Era

In 1976, Fisheries and Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) was enacted. The

Act (subsequently renamed the Magnuson Act) gave the U.S. government authority to
regulate and manage marine fisheries between 3 to 200 miles from the coastline. Under
this Act, the New England groundfish fishery became under the United States
jurisdiction and the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) was given
the responsibility of its management.

On March 15 1977, the Council implemented its first Groundfish Fishery Management
Plan (FMP), which was developed to protect and enhance the severely overexploited
stocks of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder. The plan called for annual catch quotas,
closed spawning areas, mesh-size restrictions, minimum fish sizes, and trip limits for
yellowtail flounder. The groundfish plan was essentially the resumption of the
management scheme in effect under ICNAF. 10

At the beginning, the Council set annual quotas, or Optimal Yields (OYs), at levels
which would promptly recover the stocks. Fishermen resisted them since they felt that
with the departure of the foreign fleets there was little need for management

10

ICNAF largely regulated its fisheries by allocating catch quotas by species and geographic area, closed spawning

areas, and minimum-mesh size.
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(Hennemuth and Rockwall, 1987). Furthermore, some stocks like haddock appeared to
be recovering and making a strong comeback.

Soon after of the implementation of the FMP, it became clear that the annual cod and
haddock quotas would be met in the first five months of 1977. In June 1977, concerns
over the possibility of market gluts, price declines, and having an idle fleet for half the
year, led the Council to implement quarterly quotas, haddock trip limits, additional
catch restrictions on yellowtail flounder west of 69° longitude, and new haddock bycatch regulations (Anthony, 1993). The Council's intention was to spread the catch over
the year and minimize potential user conflicts (Appolonia, 1978). Quarterly quotas soon
proved to have its limitations too. Since the fleet was so diverse in their fishing capacity
and capability to operate under different weather conditions and or seasons, some
segments of the fleets could not harvest their share of the quarterly allocation before
they were met or exceeded (Appolonia, 1983). To counter this situation the Council
allocated quotas to specific vessel classes. This was steered at increasing the change that
each vessel would have an opportunity to harvest their fair share. In July 1977 the US.Canadian Reciprocal Fishing Agreement was signed. The arrangement allocated Canada
17 percent of cod quota, 20 percent of the haddock quota, and 1 percent of the flounder
quota. As result the cod quota was met in August of 1977 and the directed fishery was
closed (Anthony, 1990).

Between 1979 and 1982, the abundance of principal groundfish species had declined by
53 percent, while fishing trips increased by 47 percent. Fishing mortalities for cod and
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haddock increased dramatically (nearly doubled between 1977 and 1986). The seasons
became shorter as the number of vessels (and vessel size) and trip rose. The lack of
control on the number of participants proved to be disastrous. Between 1977 and 1980,
the fishing fleet increased from 836 vessels to 1,316 vessels (57% increase). This surge
in capacity was fueled by a sense of optimism, which reigned in the fishery. Fishermen

believed that since the foreign fleet was gone, large amounts of fish would be available
to them. Easy financing and government subsidies only aggravated matters. The failure
to control catches required an increasing number of regulations. Discarding, underreporting and mislabeling catches became rampant during this time. Halliday and
Pinhom (1997) observe that between a quarter and half of all the fishermen operating on
Georges Bank frequently violated fishing regulations. Disagreement and poor
communication between scientists, managers, and fishermen resulted in a loss in
confidence in the program and mistrust. The plan was finally replace in March of 1982.

In 1982, the Council implemented the Interim Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic
Groundfish. The Council believed that quota management program was not necessary
for rebuilding the resources; instead it relied indirect methods of controlling fishing
mortality such as minimum fish sizes, mesh-size regulations, spawning area closures,
and seasonal closures for protection of resources (Anthony, 1990). The plan was a
stopgap measure until a more encompassing plan could be established (Halliday and
Pinhom, 1997). The focus of the plan was to maintain stock sizes and enhance the
prospects of spawning of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder while reliable data could
be collected on the fish stocks and harvesting practices (Halliday and Pinhom, 1997).
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The main groundfish stocks, however, continued to decline. Effort declined on Georges
Bank, but continued to rise in Gulf of Maine and Southern New England. Despite
decreasing effort on Georges Bank, CPUE and landings declined.

The interim plan was replaced by the Fishery Management Plan for the Northeast
Multispecies fishery in 1986. The goal of this plan was allow the fishery to operate with
minimum intervention while safeguarding reproductive potential of the stocks. The
main goal was to control fishing mortality, primarily of juvenile fish as to maintain
adequate spawning potential (Halliday and Pinhom, 1997). The plan contained a series
of regulations that included minimum mesh sizes, enlarged closed areas, and greater
restrictions on small mesh fishing. In the following years, fisheries regulation was
strengthen by a series of amendments.

In 1987, Amendment # 1 increased minimum fish sizes and enlarged the areas were

large mesh size regulations were in effect. This amendment also scheduled a mesh size
increase from 5.5 to 6 inches. The groundfish resources continued to decline in this
period. In 1989, Amendment# 2 dropped the scheduled mesh size increase in favor of
by-catch limits. The plan also increased minimum fish sizes and expanded large mesh
areas to cover identified spawning grounds and seasons. In the same year, Amendment
# 3 was introduced which created a flexible area action system to protect juvenile fish.
In 1991, Amendment # 4 established more stringent minimum fish sizes, mesh size

restrictions, and closed haddock spawning areas. Amendment # 4 also recognized the
need to develop and implement rebuilding strategies for the principal groundfish stocks.

24

The failure of indirect control to prevent overfishing resulted in environmental groups
suing the Department of Commerce in 1991. The suit eventually led to Amendment# 5.

In 1994, Amendment # 5 was introduced. The goal of the Amendment was to reduce

fishing mortality to a level, which will increase the percentage of maximum spawning
potential for cod and yellowtail flounder to 20% in 5 years and to 30% for haddock in
1o years. The plan called for a moratorium on new entry and a reduction in fishing
effort by 50 percent over 5-7 years. The Council also required fishermen to keep and
submit log records, to accept sea-observers, and banned certain gears.

The groundfish resource continued to decline. In 1994, 17 percent of Georges Bank was
closed. On June 1994, Amendment # 6 established 500-lb. haddock possession limit. In
1996, Amendment# 7 was implemented. The amendment instituted additional restrains
on fishing effort as the number of days at sea were further reduced. The amendment
also established target quotas, stringent days at sea controls, minimum fish sizes, closed
haddock spawning areas, mesh size restrictions, and permanently closed areas for fish
habitat. These measures have resulted in marked reductions in fishing mortality for four
main New England groundfish stocks (Georges Bank cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounder, and Southern New England yellowtail flounder). The latter of the three stocks
has recently changed from overexploited to fully exploited.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Model
3.1. Introduction

Traditionally reducing the species selectivity properties of the gears has been advocated
for rebuilding overexploited stocks. On the surface, such policies are expected to
recover dwindling stocks by reducing fishing effort and thus allowing the stocks to
recuperate. While these policies may be sensible in a single species fisheries, it is
unclear their impact in a multispecies context. Well-intentioned policies may generate
un-intended consequences given the complex biological, economic and technological
interrelationship present in multispecies fisheries.

The goal of this chapter is to qualitatively derive the biological and economic
consequences of modifying the species-selectivity properties of fishing gears. To
achieve this goal we draw on the method of comparative statics. Comparative statics
allows us to investigate how a system changes from one equilibrium position to another
in response to changes in one variable. For the purposes of this chapter, we only
examine selected rebuilding scenarios. However, the results are sufficiently general to
contemplate other management scenarios.

The organization of this chapter is as follows . The next section reviews the implications
of modifying the species selectivity properties drawing on production theory. The third
section introduces the bioeconomic framework. The fourth and fifth sections analyze
bioeconomic impacts of modifying the species-selectivity properties of fishing gears in
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a single and multispecies fishery context. The last section summarizes the main results
and discusses policy implications.
3.2. Production Possibility (Transformation) Frontier

Fishing, like most economic activities, turns inputs into outputs. During the production
process, fishermen are faced with a set of alternative output combinations for a fixed
amount of inputs given the existing technology. The set of maximum feasible output
combinations is often referred as the production possibility (transformation) frontier.
Figure 2 shows the production possibility frontier for a fishing vessel that harvests two
species.

Mathematically, we can express it as

where e is fishing effort (an aggregate input), xi is the stock size of species i, and hi is
the harvest of species i. The stock sizes are assumed to be constant.

The slope of the tangent line to a point of the frontier is the rate at which one output is
substituted by another at a given input level. Thus, moving along the frontier reflects the
rate of technical substitution (RTS). The rate of product transformation (RPT) is defined
as the negative of the slope of the product transformation curve.
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Figure 2: Production Possibility Frontier

ho 1

To derive the RPT, the production function needs to be totally differentiated

acp

acp

de=-dh1 +-dh2
8h1 ·
8h2

(3.2)

Since a small change in de is zero when the factor level is fixed (i.e., moving along the
frontier). Then the above relationship reduces to

(3.2')

where the RTS 12 is equal to the ratio of marginal physical productivity of x in the
production of h2 to the marginal productivity of h 1. Economic theory tells us that the
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profit maximizing output level (h

0

1

and h

0

2)

is found where the marginal rate of

technical substitution equals the outputs price ratio. Conceptually, modifying the
species selectivity properties of the gears involves changing the shape of the production
frontier (figure 2). For instance, if we were interested in reducing the catchability of
species 1 we would modify the technology as to shift inward the lower part of the
production possibility frontier. Conversely, if we were interested in increasing the
catchability of species 2 we would modify the technology as to shift outward the upper
part of the production possibility frontier.

3.3. The Model

To investigate the impact of improving the species-selectivity properties of the gear, we
assume a stylized open access fishery where fishermen are allowed to choose the most
efficient gear configuration and effort levels as to maximize profits. The fishing fleet's
profit function is given by

n

rr

n

= LP;h; -c(e) = LP;q;er xf -c(e)
i=l

(3.3)

i=l

where p; is the price of species i, h; is the harvest rate of species i, e is the rate of fishing
effort (i.e., labor and capital devoted to harvesting), q; is the constant catchability
coefficient of species i, x; is the stock size of species i, c(e) is the harvest cost function,
and fl and y are constants.
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Clark (1985) uses the coefficient on the stock size to capture the relationship between
fish density and population size. 11 The f3 represents the output-stock elasticity, that is,
the percentage change in the output due a to percentage change in the stock size. The
output-stock elasticity embodies the impact the stock size and fish density relationship
has on harvesting costs. The low values imply that harvesting costs are less dependent
on stock size. A stock-output elasticity of zero indicates that harvesting costs are
independent of the stock size. Although we recognize that fishermen's ability to select
the harvest mix (i.e., target) is a function of the technology and relative prices, for
present purposes, we assume that relative prices are constant. 12 Furthermore, we assume
that the effort and population dynamics are given by
n

e = k(LP;q;x; -

(3.4)

ce)

i=I

n

n

X; =G(x;)- Lh; =G(x;)- Lq;exf
i=I

where x; and

\;/ i

(3.5)

i=I

eare the rate of change of the fleet's effort

and G(x;) is the growth rate of species i,

Ce

and population size of species i,

is the marginal cost of effort, and k is a

constant. The friction parameter, k, captures the system's inability to adjust effort
instantaneously both at the individual vessel level and at the fleet level through entry
and exit. We also assume that the growth function has the following curvature
properties
11

In Clark's formulation,

f3's greater than one were found to correspond to demersal fisheries whereas 0 $ {3$ Iwere

found to correspond to pelagic schooling fisheries. This formulation, however, is not necessarily fishery- specific.
Hanneson (1983), Flaaten (1987), and Eide et al., 1998 use this Cobb-Douglass formulation as gear specific instead.
Eide et al., (1998) indicate that active gears such bottom trawls and gears which attract fish such as longlines and
hand lines tend to have low f3 values. Gill nets, on the other hand, were found to possess
12

For a discussion on this issue see Campbell and Nicholl ( 1994).
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f3's closer to one.

G(x;) > 0 V 0 < X; < K,

G(O) = G(K) = 0,
G x, x, (x;) < 0 V

A

X;

>0

In the following sections, we present the long-run impact of modifying the species

selectivity properties of the gear both in a single and multispecies context. Although we
do not discuss the effects of improving the catchability in the short-run, we introduce
both short-run and long-run results in appendix A.

13

3.4. Technical change in a single species fishery

To investigate the long-run implications of modifying the catchability coefficient it is
useful to start our analysis examining a single species fishery. For this case we assume
that the bionomic conditions are specified by
(3.6)

x = G(x) -

(3.7)

qexf3

To solve for the long-run impacts of modifying the species selectivity properties of this
system, we set equations 3.6 and 3.7 equal to zero (i.e., equilibrium) and differentiate
with respect to q, the catchability coefficient. To ensure that a stable equilibrium exists,
we restrict the sign of specific terms based on dynamic stability considerations. 14 The
use of these stability conditions is important since it allows us to make determinate
qualitative inferences about comparative statics results. In our case, these conditions
determine that the sign of the denominator be positive in the comparative statics results
(Appendix B).
13

For the purposes of this chapter, the difference between short-run and long-run is that in the long-run the stock size

adjusts to a new equilibrium whereas in the short-run there is no change in the stock size.
14

This method is also know as the "correspondence principle" (Samuelson, 1947).
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Solving for the long-run impact on effort of modifying the species-selectivity properties
of the gear, we find that
de
dq

(3.8)

{3pq 2 xf3 x(/3-1) -(Gx - {3qex<f3-I)) cee
(+)

The long-run impact on the stock size is given by
(+)
r-"------.

dx

-xf3(pqxf3 +ceee)

dq

{3pq 2 xf3x< f3-I) -(Gx -{3qex <f3-l) )cee

(3.9)

(+)

The long-run impact on the harvest rate is given by
(+)
r-"------.

-x 13 Gx(pqxf3 +ceee)

dh
dq

(3.10)

2

{3pq xf3 x<f3-I) -(Gx -{3qex <f3 - l) )cee
(+)

A summary of the long-run impacts of improving the catchability coefficient in a single
species fishery is presented in table 2.

Table 1: Long-run impacts of improving the catchability in a single species fishery.
Exploitation level
Underexploited(Gx<O)
Maximum sustainable yield (Gx=O)
Overexploited (Gx>O)

de/dq

dx/dq

dh/dq

(+)

(-)

(+)

No change

(-)

No change

(-)

(-)

(-)

Until now the exposition has focused on the mathematical derivation of the long-run
impacts on effort, stock size, and harvest rates of modifying the species selectivity
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properties of the gear. The attainment of these new equilibria, however, has been
assumed to have occurred instantaneously. While the technique employed provides
valuable insight into the long-run effects, it neglects the dynamic adjustments between
equilibria. The understanding of this transition is useful since many of the variables do
not adjust instantaneously. The population size, for example, will not adjust
immediately to increased levels of effort. In fact it will take several time periods to
equilibrate to new effort levels. Similarly, the presence (absence) of rents will not
necessarily result in rapid entry (exit) of vessels into the fishery as there are significant
start-up costs and capital is not malleable.

For expository purposes, we assume that the fleet is initially in long-run bionomic
equilibrium (point A in figure 3). At this equilibrium the fleet's long-run average
revenue of effort, ARlR(X0 ), intersects the short-run average revenue curve, ARE

SR(X0) , and the marginal cost of effort, MCE. The long-run average revenue curve,
ARl \X0) , describes how the fleet's total revenue varies per unit of effort produced
when both effort and stock size have fully adjusted. The short-run average revenue
curve, ARESR(X0) , also known as the stock-constant average revenue curve, captures the
fleet's average revenue over a shorter period of time, where effort is allowed to vary but
stock size is held fixed. In other words, the period of time is too short for the stock size
to adjust to new effort levels. Lastly, the marginal cost of effort, MCE> shows how costs
increase by employing an additional (marginal) unit of effort. In the panel below, the
curve labeled PEC, the population equilibrium curve, describes the relationship between
long-run population size and effort.
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Now Jet us assume that there is a reduction in the catchability coefficient, which makes
harvesting less efficient. In the short-run, we expect that revenue will decrease as the
fleet's short-run average revenue of effort shifts downwards, decreasing effort to point
B. At this effort level, the marginal cost of effort, MCE, is equal to the new short-run
(stock-constant) average revenue of effort curve, ARESR'(X0). Although the ARlR and
PEC shift when the catchability coefficient is changed, the fishery is not in equilibrium
in the short-run. The PEC shifts outwards because more effort is needed to maintain the
stock at any given size. Similarly, the lower portion of the ARE LR rotates outwards, as
more effort is needed to produce the same amount of revenue formerly generated. As
the stock size declines, the short-run average revenue of effort increases. The fleet
reaches a new effort equilibrium where the short and long-run average revenue curve
intersect with the marginal cost of effort yielding a new equilibrium effort (E 1) and
stock size (X 1) levels (see, point C in figure 3). In short, reducing the catchability
coefficient results in a long-run increase in effort and stock size.
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Figure 3: Reduction in the catchability coefficient
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3.5. Technical change in a multispecies fishery

When considering the impact of modifying the selectivity properties of the gear, it is
useful to distinguish between two polar cases: perfectly selective and perfectly nonselective fishing technologies. Perfectly selective technologies grant fishermen perfect
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control of the harvest mix. In other words, fishermen can catch (target) specific species
or species group. Conversely, perfectly non-selective technologies do not allow
fishermen control over the catch composition. In reality, the selectivity properties of
most gears fall between these categories. Squires and Kirkley (1991), for instance, have
shown that non-selective technologies such as trawls have a mo.dicum of flexibility
depending on the species harvested. Nevertheless, this categorization provides us with
clearer understanding of how improving the selectivity impacts different types of
harvesting technologies.

The adoption of improved technology has been instrumental to the rise and demise of
many fisheries. Excessive fishing pressure has been linked to changes in the food web
structure and species composition. In our model, we consider how technology impacts
the fish community structure. In particular we investigate multispecies fisheries that are
biologically independent and interdependent. We focus on these scenarios because we
want to derive qualitative insights for developing rebuilding strategies and establish
benchmarks to investigate to what extent shifts in the community structure are
dependent on fishing activities and biological interactions.

While the derived theoretical results are sufficiently general to investigate a wide range
of cases, our exposition will focus on three specific rebuilding strategies.

a) Reducing the target species catchability. Gear restrictions, such as, limitations
on mesh size, number of hooks per line, and dredge size are often adopted for
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rebuilding overexploited fisheries. These policies contribute to the rebuilding
process by decreasing the fishing pressure on the target species, allowing the
stocks to recover.

b) Increasing the non-targeted species, or accompanying species, catchability. It
has been argued that these policies increase the economic returns from the
accompanying species by making their harvest less expensive. These policies
are expected to divert some effort away from the target overexploited species.

c) Simultaneously decreasing the target species catchability and increasing the
accompanying species catchability. This policy, when feasible, is preferred
because any losses in profitability caused by reductions in the catchability in the
target species can be at least partially offset by increasing economic returns from
the accompanying species.
3.5.1.

Perfectly Selective Technology

3.5.1.a. Biologically Independent Two-Species Fishery Case

We assume that either one fleet harvests two species simultaneously or that two
independent fleets individually harvest one species. Additionally we assume that the
fleet(s) is (are) operating under open access conditions and that the long-run equilibrium
the following conditions hold

e. = k .(p ·q r·xP
1

1

1

1

- ce; (e''. eJ·))
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=o

(3.11)

(3.12)
(3.13)

(3.14)

where

e;

and

ej

are the effort levels devoted to harvesting the target species i and the

accompanying species j , respectively. Also, we assume that the fleet(s) are
economically interrelated. The fleet(s) marginal cost of effort is dependent on the
amount of effort devoted to each species. For instance, if we attenuate fleet i's
catchability coefficient, we also reduce the opportunity cost of effort devoted to
harvesting species i. The opportunity cost of effort is the forgone benefits for employing
the effort in the next best alternative. Since fishery j has now a higher opportunity cost
of effort, some effort is transferred from species i to species j as to maximize the
economic returns per unit of effort. This transfer of effort increases the marginal cost of
effort of harvesting species i (ce.i) and decreases the marginal cost of effort of harvesting
species j (ceJ). The new equilibria is reached when each fleet's long-run average
revenue curve equals their respective marginal cost of effort at the new equilibrium
stock sizes and effort levels. Lastly, throughout the analysis, we assume that the target
species i is overexploited, and the accompanying species} is underexploited.

To investigate the long-run consequences of improving the catchability coefficient in
biologically independent two-species fishery, we set equations (3.11)-(3.14) equal to
zero and differentiate them with respect to q;. Since we are only interested in stable
equilibrium results we draw on stability conditions to determine unambiguous
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qualitative results. The effects of modifying the catchability of species i are shown in
appendix C.

Initially, we consider the case where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited
species i. Comparative statics results show that the long-run effort on the overexploited
species i increases while the long-run effort on the underexploited species j decreases
(Figure 4). In the long-run both stock sizes increase. The intuition of this case is as
follows. We begin by assuming that the fleets are in long-run bioeconomic equilibrium
at point A and A', respectively. Decreasing the species i's catchability causes fleet i's
short-run (stock-constant) average revenue to fall reaching point B, decreasing fleet i's
short-run effort level. In contrast, fleet j's short-run average revenue curve remains in
the original position; however, fleet j's MC(ej.ol e i,o)' shifts to B' as if receives some
effort from fishery i.

As more effort is transferred from fishery i to fishery j, the costs of fishery i increase,
shifting the MC(E;,olEj.o)' to the left. This marginal cost curve shift further reduces
fishery i effort level to point C. Similarly fishery j's costs decrease, and fishery j effort
level increases to C' (respect to A). As mentioned above, the marginal cost curves shift
because of economical interdependencies. Changing species i's catchability coefficient
shifts the population equilibrium curve, PEC, outward.

As the harvesting rate of species i decreases, its size stock begins to recuperate raising
fleet's i short-run average revenue curve. The increase in species i stock size, causes

39

fleet i's profitability to increase drawing effort back from the accompanying species j
fishery and also rotates outward the lower portion of species i's long-run average
revenue curve. This shift in effort releases some of the fishing pressure from species j,
which then starts to increase as well. The effort transfer shift target species, shifts
species i and j marginal cost of effort curve to right and left, respectively. Once both
populations stabilize both fleets' short and long-run average revenue curves intersect
the new marginal cost of effort curve reaching a new long-run effort and stock size
equilibria at D and D'. In the long-run, effort devoted to the harvest of species i
increases to Eu while the effort devoted to the species j decreases to Ej.1. The long-run
both stock sizes increase to x;,1 and Xj. 1•

Next we consider the case where we improve the catchability of the underexploited
species j. In the long-run, the effort level on overexploited species i decreases and its
stock size increases. On the other hand, the long-run effort level on species j decreases
and its stock size decreases (figure 5).

The economic reasoning is as follows. Increasing species j's catchability raises fleet j's
short-run average revenue curve from A' to point B' and increases short-run effort. As
the opportunity cost of effort increases some is transferred from fishery i to fishery j.
Fleet i' s short-run average revenue curve remains in its original position but the effort
level diminishes as its marginal cost of effort shifts to the left (point B). As more effort
is transferred, fleet j's marginal cost curve shifts to the right to point C'. As before,
changing the catchability of species j shifts the PECj outwards.
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Figure 4: Decreasing the catchability coefficient of the target species.
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The increased harvesting pressure on species j, decreases species j's stock size and
increases species i's stock size. The increase in species i's population, increases fleet i's
profitability and draws effort away from fleet). This raises (drops) fleet i's (j's) shortrun average revenue curve and shifts the marginal cost of effort curve to the right (left).

Eventually, both fleets' stock size and effort level settle into a new long-run equilibrium
at D and D'. In the long-run, species i's population size increases and its effort level
decreases. In contrast, in the long-run, species j's stock size decreases and its effort
level increases.
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Figure 5: Increase in the catchability of the accompanying species in the selective case.
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Lastly, we consider the impact of regulations that simultaneously increase the
underexploited species j's catchability and decrease overexploited species i's
catchability. Comparative statics results show ambiguous results for both effort levels
and speciesj's stock size. However, species i's stock size increases. As in the previous
case, the fleet i's effort is initially drawn into the accompanying species j causing the
species j's (i's) short-run average revenue curve to fall (rise). As the profitability of
fleet j 's declines because of diminishing stocks, fleet i's profitability increases due to
mcreasing stocks. As result, fleet i draws back some effort initially taken by fleet j.
Ultimately both fleets adjust to a new stock and effort equilibria. As before, altering the
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catchability coefficient causes the lower portion of the long-run average revenue curve
of species i (j) to rotate outward (inward). The extent of shift determines the magnitude
and sign of the species i and j effort level, and species j stock size. Species i stock size
increases ambiguously.
3.5.1.b.

Biologically Interdependent Two-Species Fishery Case

In the preceding analysis, we assumed there were no biological interactions between the
harvested species. An open question is how do the results change when biological
interdependencies are present, in particular predator-prey relationships. To explore this
case we introduce a vector of interdependent stocks as arguments in the growth
functions such that

(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)

where Xis a vector of biologically interdependent stock sizes, G(x) and H(x) are the
growth function of species i and j, respectively. Applying the comparative statics
technique, we obtain the long-run equilibrium effects on effort and stock size (see,
Appendix D). Throughout we assume that species i is the prey while the species j is the
predator.
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The first case is where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited prey species i.
Comparative statics results show that in the long-run both stock sizes increase and that
the impact on both effort levels is ambiguous. The reasoning for this result is as follows.
Reducing the catchability of the prey species i reduces fleet i's profitability. Therefore,
some of the prey effort is drawn to predator fleet j. The prey stock size increases in
response to reduced harvesting and predatory pressure. As the prey becomes more
abundant, the prey fleet i's profitability increases and some of the effort is drawn back
from the predator fleet j. This effort transfer relieves some of the harvesting pressure
from predator stocks, which now have a more abundant food source. This increased
food availability allows the predator stock size to increase. Eventually, both stocks
settle to new higher stock size equilibrium. The long-run impact on effort levels is
ambiguous because it depends on the relative magnitudes of predatory response and the
economic value of the two species. Flaaten (1991), for instance, has shown that when
the prey is inexpensive to harvest compared to the predator there is the possibility that
the predator may not be harvested under open access conditions.

We next examined the case in which the selectivity of the underexploited predator
species j is increased. In this case, comparative statics results show that in the long-run
the impact on both effort levels and predator stock size is ambiguous. The prey
population size, however, increases. The third case examined was where the selectivity
of the predator species j is increased and the selectivity of the prey species i is
decreased. Comparative statics analysis showed inconclusive long-run results for both
effort levels and for the predator stock size. The prey stock size increased. The

44

economic reasoning for these two cases follows the logic of the first case. As mentioned
earlier, the ambiguity of some results is due to the relative magnitudes of economic and
biological interactions, which determine the sign and extent of long-run impacts.
3.5.2.

Non-Selective Technology

3.5.2.a.Biologically Independent Two-Species Fishery Case

So far, we have considered the impact of modifying the catchability coefficient when
the technology is selective. Remarkably, all three policies in the biologically
independent, perfectly selective gear case contribute to rebuilding the stocks. The issue
we examine in this section is whether the effectiveness of these policies will hold in the
biologically independent, perfectly non-selective case.

To examine this case we assume that the fishery is in the long-run equilibrium where
the following conditions hold

(3.19)
(3.20)
(3.21)

To explore the long-run consequences of modifying the catchability coefficient in a
biologically independent two-species fishery, we set equations (3.20)-(3.22) equal to
zero and differentiate them with respect to q;. The derivation of the effects of changing
the catchability of species i is shown in appendix C. Throughout the analysis we assume
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that species i is the overexploited targeted species while the species j is the
underexploited accompanying (non-targeted) species.

First, we investigate the impact of reducing the catchability of the overexploited target
species i' s. Comparative statics results indicate that reducing the target species i's
catchability increases long-run effort and the target species stock size. The
accompanying species stock size, on the other hand, decreases. The economic reasoning
is straightforward.

Starting where the fishery initially is in long-run equilibrium, the fleet's short-run and
long-run average revenue of effort curve intersect the marginal cost of effort curve
(point A in figure 6). Note that the long-run average revenue curve is kinked. Reducing
the catchability coefficient of species i , lowers the fleet's short-run average revenue
curve, and, thus, decreases short-run effort to point B. The change in catchability
coefficient shifts outward species i's population equilibrium curve, PEC; ', as more
effort is needed maintain any stock size.

The increased harvesting pressure lowers accompanying species j's stock size. Species
j's population equilibrium curve is not altered since there is no change in its catchability

coefficient. As the target species i stock size increases, the fleet's short-run average
revenue curve rises reaching a new higher equilibrium at ARE (x;,J,Xj.J)sR. The top
portion of the long-run average revenue curve rotates inwards and the lower portion
outwards. The new long-run and short-run average revenue curve of effort intersects
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marginal cost of effort curve at point C. This new long-run equilibrium results in a
higher long-run effort level (E1) and target stock size (xu ), and lower accompanying
stock size (XJ.J ).

Figure 6: Reduction in the catchability coefficient of the target species.
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Second, we analyze the case where we improve the catchability of the underexploited
accompanying species j. In this case, comparative statics results show that long-run
effort increases and both stock sizes decrease. The economic reasoning for this case is
as follows. Increasing the catchability of the accompanying species, raises the fleet's
short-run average revenue curve, and thus, short-run effort.
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Figure 7 shows how the short-run average curve increases from ARE (x ;,o,xj,O )SR to ARE
(x ;,o,Xj.o) SR'. This increased short-run effort results in lower short-run stock sizes. After

the initial increase in effort, harvest rates become unsustainable. This lowers the fleet's
short-run average revenue curve as both stocks begin to decline. Simultaneously to
change the catchability coefficient the population equilibrium curve, PEC

j,

shifts

inward and the lower part of the fleet's long-run average revenue curve rotates inward.
Eventually, the system settles into new bioeconomic equilibrium where the short and
long-run average curve intersect the marginal cost of effort curve. This new equilibrium
yields lower long-run effort levels, and population sizes. In this case, policies that
increase the catchability of accompanying species will not aid the rebuilding process.
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Figure 7: Increase in the catchability of the accompanying species in the non-selective
case.
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Third, we consider the case where we simultaneously increase the catchability of the
accompanying species and reduce the catchability of the target species. Comparative
statics results show that in the long-run, effort increases while the accompanying
species stock size decreases. The long-run impact on the target stock size is ambiguous.

The intuition of this case is similar to that presented in the prev10us cases. The
ambiguity, however, arises from the magnitude of the impact each species has on the
fleet ' s average revenue curve. The long-run impact on the target stock depends on the
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magnitude of the shift in the population equilibrium curve. If there was a significant
change in the catchability of the target species i, this would cause a notable outward
shift in the population equilibrium curve, which in tum would result in a larger
population size. Conversely, if the reduction of the catchability of the species i was
minimal then its stock size could either increase or show no change, depending on the
extent of the shift in the population equilibrium curve. The population size of the
accompanying species j, however, will always decrease since the population
equilibrium curve shifts inward.
3.5.2.b.

Biologically Interdependent Two-Species Fishery Case

Now we incorporate biological interactions into the perfectly non-selective technology
case. To explore this instance we introduce a vector of interdependent stocks as
arguments in the growth functions such that

(3.22)
(3.23)
(3.24)

where x is a vector of biologically interdependent stock sizes, G(x) and H(x) are the
growth function of species i and j, respectively. Applying the comparative statics
technique, we obtain the long-run equilibrium effects on effort and stock size (Appendix
D).

so

Here we revisit the same extensions discussed in the earlier sections, however, we
incorporate predator-prey relationships to examine how these new results differ from
the biologically interdependent, perfectly selective case. In the latter case, it was found
that in the long-run the prey stocks increased unambiguously, however, the long-run
impact on the predator stock size varied depending on the case considered.

First, we consider the case where we reduce the catchability of the overexploited target
prey species i. Comparative statics analysis yields ambiguous results on long-run effort
and long-run prey and predator stock sizes. To understand these results, we need to
know how the predator stocks vary with changes in prey abundance.

Setting equations (3.23) and (3.24) equal to zero, we obtain
G(x)

=

q;X;

H(x)
qj xj

Differentiating the above equation with respect to the stock sizes, we obtain

(3.25)

By inspection it is clear that the sign of the marginal increase in the prey abundance
(species i) is ambiguous given the assumptions of this case. In the numerator, for
instance, the first and second terms are positive while the last term is negative.
Therefore, the increases (decreases) in prey abundance do not necessarily translate into
higher (lower) predator abundance.
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We observe that by decreasing the catchability of the target prey stock, the short-run
profitability and effort decrease. As the prey abundance begins to increase, several
scenarios are possible. Larger prey stocks could provide additional food to the predator,
thus, increasing the abundance of the latter. The increased stock will result in greater
profits, leading to larger effort levels. The increased effort could, depending on the
magnitude of the reduction in the prey' s catchability, decrease the predator's abundance
to a greater extent. Thus, in the long-run, effort levels and prey stock size could increase
while the predator stock size could decrease. Alternatively, if predation rates were
sufficiently large as to consume any gains from stock rehabilitation, increased predator
stock levels could further depress prey stocks and the profitability of the fleet. Lower
profits could result in further lower effort levels. Eventually, the fleet could achieve a
new long-run equilibrium with lower effort and prey stock size and a higher predator
stock size.

The second case is where the catchability of the predator is increased. Comparative
statics results show that in the long-run effort increases and the predator stock
decreases. The impact on the prey stock, however, is unclear. The reason for this result
is that by increasing the catchability of the predator, the prey stock size increases. This
increase in prey abundance increases the fleet's profitability and effort level. This effort
increase further diminishes the predator stocks. The impact on the prey stock, however,
depends on the relative strength of the offsetting effects of predation and harvesting
pressure.
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The third case examined is where there is a simultaneous increase in the catchability
coefficient of the predator species and reduce the catchability of the prey species. In this
case, the long-run effects on effort and stock size are ambiguous. As in the previous
cases, the ambiguity results from the relative magnitude of decreasing predation rates
and increased harvesting pressure.

3.6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have discussed, in qualitative terms, the bionomic impacts of

modifying the species selectivity properties of the selective and non-selective gears in a
multispecies fishery. We consider the cases where the fishery is biologically
independent and biologically interdependent. Our analysis shows that there is a
considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the qualitative impact of technological
improvement. Not surprisingly, the level of uncertainty increases when biological
interrelationships are introduced. In the perfectly non-selective gear case, the number of
effects with ambiguous signs increased from one to seven in the presence of predatorprey relationships. Similarly, in the perfectly selective gear case, the number of effects
with ambiguous signs increased from three to eight.

The major thrust of this piece, however, is to consider policies that can contribute to
rebuilding overexploited stocks. Our analysis shows that policy prescriptions vary
considerably with the type of technology employed. When regulating non-selective
gears, managers interested in rebuilding stocks should focus on reducing the
catchability of the target species (table 3). Policies intended to divert effort towards
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accompanying species can wind up further decreasing the stock of the overexploited
species. Policies that simultaneously decrease the catchability of the target species and
increase the catchability of the accompanying species yield ambiguous results. In the
presence of predator-prey relationships, none of the policies yield unambiguous results.

Managers have greater leeway when regulating perfectly selective gears. Restricting the
catchability of the target species, or increasing the selectivity of the accompanying
species, or a combination of these policies, can contribute favorably to the rebuilding
efforts. The presence of a biological interaction does not add ambiguity to the
rebuilding process. However, it does not yield clear-cut results on the impact on the
accompanying species (Table 4). Although no general results could be obtained for
some of the cases, uncertainty could be reduced on a case by case basis by the use of
numerical simulations. Bioeconomic outcomes could be significantly different
depending on the relative strength of the biological and economic terms.

These results have useful implications for rebuilding New England groundfish stocks. If
managers were interested in recovering the overexploited stocks policies should be not
only species specific but also gear specific. When regulating non-selective gears, such
as trawlers and gillnets, managers should focus on policies that reduce the catchability
of target species. Decreasing the selectivity of target species will contribute to
rebuilding the stocks while increasing long-run effort.
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Another consideration in regulating non-selective gears is the notion that fishermen, in
some cases, can choose the catch composition in response to relative prices (Kirkley
and Strand, 1988; Squires and Kirkley, 1991; Campbell and Nichols, 1994). We,
however, assumed that prices were fixed in this study. Nevertheless, if fishermen can
select to some extent the catch mix, then it is possible to create a system of incentives
that would allow fishermen to manage stocks on an individual basis (Sissenwine and
Kirkley, 1991,Campbell and Nicholl,

1994). This implies that market-based

mechanisms may have a role in rebuilding the stocks. For instance, to expedite the
groundfish rebuilding process a program could be instituted where groundfish catches
(prey) are taxed and pelagic and /or elasmobranch catches (predators) are subsidized. If
fishermen cannot select their output mix then the catch is technologically determined
and such methods would not be effective. Taxes and subsidies would provide no
protection to overexploited species and, under certain conditions, could lead to
extinction (Costa Duarte, 1992).
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Table 3: Main results from the perfectly non-selective multispecies technology case.
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Another implication for managing New England groundfish stocks is that perfectly
selective gears provide greater flexibility. Fishermen's ability to allocate effort between
species until the marginal revenue per unit of effort is equal among species expands the
suite of options available to the manager. In fact, all three gear modification policies
considered under both biologically dependent and biologically interdependent
conditions contributed to the rebuilding of the groundfish stocks. Analogous to the nonselective case, managers can also make use of market-based mechanisms. Costa Duarte
(1992) notes that when fishermen can perfectly select their catch, a tax (subsidy) policy
would be appropriate since it would lower (increase) the marginal revenue from the
overexploited species and transfer effort to the accompanying species.
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Chapter 4: Econometric Estimation
4.1

Introduction

Most multispecies models assume that the output (species) mix of multiproduct firms is
fixed in proportions. This specification is extremely restrictive since fails to recognize
that the harvest mix may be a function of relative prices as well as technology.
Depending on the type of technology, fluctuations in market prices may induce firms to
modify the harvest mix. Failing to recognize that fishermen may be able to respond to
relative prices has important implications for management.

In this chapter, we examine the technology of the New England fishing fleet, which

operates in Georges Bank. The model serves as a basis for empirically testing -to what
extent, if any, fishermen can select the composition of their catch. The estimates are
then used in chapter five to develop an empirical bioeconomic model.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the second section, we describe
alternative approaches to modeling multiproduct firm's technology. The third section
presents the profit maximizing duality-based approach to examine the underlying
characteristics of the technology. Section four describes the estimation procedure and
section five describes the statistical results. The last section summarizes the main results
and limitations.
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4 .2

Approaches to modeling firm's technology

The finn 's technology can be derived from two distinct but equivalent approaches. The
primal approach explicitly solves the firm's production optimization problem. Under
this approach, the usual behavioral objective is profit maximization. After solving for
the first order conditions, output supply and input demand curves can be derived. This
approach has been prevalent in fisheries economics literature for decades (see, for
instance Clark, 1990). Most of the work under this approach has focused on comparing
the different forms of exploitation such as open access and optimal management.

A limitation of the primal approach is that fails to introduce profit-maximizing behavior
on the part of the fishermen into the estimation of production functions. In other words,
production functions simply describe relationships between outputs and inputs (Dupont,
1988). Prices do not play a significant role in the description of the technology.
Furthermore, input-output relationships are usually in fixed proportions.

An alternative to the primal approach is the dual approach. Under a dual approach, we
assume that fishermen have solved the optimization problem and that the solution yields
an indirect objective function. Since the indirect profit function represents the maximum
profit associated with given output and factor prices, the fishing vessel's technology can
be derived by applying the envelope theorem. 15 The optimal levels of output and factors
are a function of output and factor prices. The dual approach yields output supply and

15

The envelope theorem states that a change in the maximum value of a function brought about by a change in the
parameter of the function can be found by partially differentiating the function with respect to the parameter (when
all other variables are taken at their optimal values).
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factor demand equations by partially differentiating the indirect objective function with
respect to output and input prices, respectively.

Mathematically,

m

n

n= IPiQ~(P,W)-IW;E~(P,W)

(4.t)

where P is a vector of m output prices, Q is a vector of m outputs, Wis the vector of n
input prices, and E is a vector of inputs.

More compactly,

7t = n(P, W)

(4.2)

Applying Hotelling's lemma (i.e., differentiating the profit function with respect to
price P;), we obtain

an

.

(4.3)

BP= Q; (P,W)
I

where Q; is the i 1h output supply equation.
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Similarly, partially differentiating by the input price we obtain

air =-E .• (PW)

aw.

I

(4.4)

'

I

where E; is the i 1" factor demand equation.

While the dual approach does not offer more insight than the primal approach, it is often
a more convenient way to estimate technological relationships. The primal approach
uses quantities as arguments while the dual approach uses prices as arguments. The dual
approach has the advantage that when we statistically _estimate technological
relationships, the potential of simultaneity bias is avoided since input and output prices
are assumed to the exogenous; however, this is not usually the case with quantities.
Also, the dual approach is useful in generating a functional specification for a consistent
set of output supply and factor demand equations for econometric estimation (Beattie
and Taylor, 1993). To recover all the relevant economic information about the
technology from the indirect profit function a series of regularity conditions must be
met. Regularity conditions require that the profit function be continuous, twice
differentiable, bounded, linearly homogenous and convex in input and output prices,
and increasing and concave in the fixed factors.
4.3

The Model

To estimate the multiproduct fishing vessel's technology we drew on the duality
framework. We assumed that fishermen maximize profits (revenue) in two stages as
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hypothesized by Squires and Kirkley (1991). In the first stage (short-run), fishermen
maximize revenue, while at sea, by selecting the most valuable output mix for a given
level fixed inputs, and relative output prices. During the fishing trip, vessel inputs are
largely fixed and cannot be readily modified (Kirkley and Squires, 1991). Therefore,
profit (revenue) maximizing is an appropriate behavioral objective for a fishing trip
once the fishing grounds have been decided (Kirkley and Strand, 1988). In the second
stage (long-run), we assume that fishermen choose the effort level that minimizes costs
(and thus maximizes profits) by selecting the optimal capital stock.

We modeled the short-run, revenue maximizing stage where fishermen decide on its
output mix given a fixed level of inputs, weather and stock constraints, and relative
output prices. McFadden (1978) has shown that revenue maximization is equivalent to
profit maximization when inputs are fixed. Chambers (1988) observes that revenue
maximizing is a true economic problem since firms for a fixed input bundle can choose
to produce an array of outputs.

To examine fishing vessel technology a specific functional form must be selected. The
selection of the functional form was governed by a number of issues. An initial
consideration may be the number of parameters to be estimated since insufficient data
may prevent the adoption of richer and more complex specifications. Second, the
researcher must be careful in choosing a specification that imposes restrictions on the
hypothesis to be tested. For instance, the use of the normalized quadratic imposes
homothetic input-output separability (Dupont 1990). Third, the investigator may want to
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select a specification that yields direct estimates of output quantities as opposed to
shares. For instance, the Leontief specification uses quantities as dependent variables
whereas the translog specification uses shares as the dependent variable. Lastly, the
investigator may desire analytical solutions rather than numerical approximations,
which can be very unstable.

An important consideration in selecting a specification is the ability to test a certain
hypothesis, in our case fishermen's ability to target or select their harvest mix. A
commonly tested hypothesis is the presence of non-jointness-in-inputs. A production
process that is non-joint-in-inputs does not require all inputs to produce all outputs.

Under the revenue-maximizing framework, fishermen maximize benefits by selecting a
point on the product transformation frontier where the marginal rate of transformation
equals the relative price of the outputs. If the technology is non-joint-in-inputs then a
separate production function exists for each output (or set of outputs) since there are no
technological or cost tradeoffs between the different production processes. This
suggests that producers maximize the production of outputs and that the supply of the
individual outputs is inelastic. Since the supply of outputs is inelastic the output mix is
technologically determined.

Graphically, the proportion of each species harvested depends upon the effort level but
not on relative prices (Figure 8). Since fishermen harvest in fixed proportions the
product transformation curve traces the output expansion path. From an economic
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perspective, this case is trivial since it can be easily converted to a single product case
by defining a new composite input and a new composite price.

More interesting is the joint-in-inputs case. A technology that is joint-in-inputs requires
all inputs to produce all outputs. Jointness-in-inputs suggests the presence of
technological and cost interrelationships in the production process. Since joint-in-inputs
technologies are not necessarily inelastic, fishermen may have some control over the
harvest mix. In other words, technologies that are joint-in-inputs allow fishermen to
select (target) their output composition (species mix) in response to market conditions.
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Estimation

The estimation of the multiproduct firms technology requires the fulfillment of
regularity conditions. Unfortunately, a significant share of the applied economic
production work frequently violates these conditions, particularly the theoretically
expected curvature conditions. 16 Our empirical results were no different. Our estimates
failed to conform to economic theory. Violations in the curvature conditions were
manifested in the wrong signs on the own-price elasticities of supply.

In this section, we review the different specifications that we tried in our search for

theoretically sound estimates. We estimated a non-homethetic generalized Leontief
profit function and two forms of the normalized quadratic profits functions (i.e., nonconstant and constant returns to scale) on an annual level. Finally, we estimated the
non-homethetic generalized Leontief profit function on a trip level.

Initially, we selected a non-homothetic generalized Leontief profit (revenue) function to
characterize the economic and technological interactions of the multiproduct firms. 17
Kirkley and Strand (1988) originally used this specification to describe the harvesting
technology of the New England fishing fleet. The Leontief functional form is a flexible
functional form. Flexible functional forms are second order numerical or differential
approximations to an Uflknown function. Chambers (1988) observes that the advantage

16

F .
or instance, ifthe profit function is not convex this suggests that output supply and factor demand

functions are not well-behaved since they could have the wrong slopes or show discontinuities or kinks.
17

The non-homothetic nature of the function arises from the effort-squared term which allows for a non-linear

relationship between effort, outputs, and revenue.
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of a flexible functional form is the ability to place few restrictions on the estimates. This
allows the researcher to derive relationships directly from the data rather than from the
chosen functional form. In other words, flexible functional forms allow the data to
"speak". In the case of the Leontief functional form, the flexibility of the form permits
the investigator to derive non-constant substitutions relationships between outputs.
However, the Leontief functional form imposes linear homogeneity in prices. This
restriction does not preclude us from examining important characteristics of the
technology such as separability and non-jointness (Kirkley and Strand, 1988).

Mathematically, the non-homothetic Leontief profit (revenue) function can be expressed
as

2

n = :La;E + LL f3 if (P;Pj )
i

i

112

j

E + LLX ;K DKP;E + L8 ;X ;P;E + LLS ;, F, P;E (4.5)
i

k

;

;

s

Applying Hotelling's Lemma, we obtain the input-compensated supply functions 18

where R; is the revenue function, Q; are landings of species i, P; is the price of species i ,

E is effort measured as days absent, and X; is the stock size of species i, Dk is the port

18

Th .

e input-compensated supply functions only consider substitution and complementarity effects among output

pairs since the input endowment is fixed .
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dummy which captures the regional effects relative to the port of New Bedford,
Massachusetts. Fs are the quarterly dummies for winter, spring, and fall. Symmetry was
imposed by the restriction /3u =f3F for i-:t:-j.

Firm level input-compensated supply functions were estimated for the gillnet, longline,
and otter trawl gears that operate in the Georges Bank multispecies fishery. Landing,
revenue and vessel characteristics data was obtained from the National Marine Fisheries
Service Weightout File. Species landed were aggregated into five categories: roundfish
(cod, haddock, and silver hake), flatfish (yellowtail and winter flounders),
elasmobranchs (spiny dogfish and skates), pelagics (mackerel and herring), and 'other
species' or miscellaneous group. This last group was set equal to total landings minus
the sum of the other groups. In cases where the landings for the species' groups were
zero, they were assigned an arbitrarily low value of 0.01 kg. Implicit ex-vessel prices
for the species groups were estimated by dividing the total revenue by the quantity
landed.

The data used ranged from 1989 to 1993. The fleet was subdivided by tonnage classes
to reflect different operational strategies, capital stock and location of fishing grounds.
Smaller fishing vessels tend to harvest inshore, whereas larger fishing vessels tend to
harvest offshore. The otter trawl fleet was divided into four tonnage classes: 5-50 GRT,
51-100 GRT, 101-150 GRT, and 151+ GRT. The gillnet and longline fleets were not
subdivided by tonnage classes because of the small number of observations present in
the larger tonnage classes.
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The input-compensated supply equations were estimated usmg Zellner's seemingly
unrelated regression technique and iterated to convergence (Squires and Kirkley, 1991).
Each individual input-compensated supply equation was tested for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. To correct for heteroscedasticity we assumed that error variance was
proportional to the effort-squared. Therefore, we normalized all the input supply
equations by effort. While this approach did not remove all the heteroscedasticity
present, it reduced the number of equations with this problem. The effort normalization
also reduced the level of multicollinearity present. We tried to reduce the
heteroscesdasticity by normalizing by different vessel characteristics, but our attempts
proved unproductive.

Following Kirkley and Strand (1988) we estimated an annual model where the species i
total annual landings by vessel were the dependent variable. Theoretically, we expected
that the sign on the effort term to be positive. The effort-squared term could be
negative, zero, or positive depending whether the technology exhibited decreasing,
constant, or increasing returns to scale. Similarly, we expected positive own-price
elasticities. Our initial estimates consistently violated the theoretically expected
curvature conditions since all the own-price elasticities were negative.

As an alternative to the non-homothetic Leontief functional form, the non-constant
returns to scale normalized quadratic form was tested. The advantage of this form is that
convexity can be imposed without losing the flexibility of the functional form. While
the proper curvature conditions can be imposed globally on the Leontief functional
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form, the restrictions are too stringent for applied work. 19 Dupont (1988) first used this
normalized quadratic form in a fisheries context to study rent dissipation in the British
Columbia salmon fishery.

The normalized quadratic profit functional form is given by

Applying Hotelling's lemma we obtained the associated supply equations. For i=l the
output supply is given by

For #1 the supply equations are given by

19

.

For instance, the imposition of concavity in the cost function rules out complementarity between input pairs
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where P; are prices, Zj are the fixed factors (effort and stock size), and a and

~

are

predetermined pararneteres. The price of roundfish, P1, and Z1, effort, where the
arbitrarily chosen as numeraires.

Attempts to use this specification with five outputs (i.e., species groups) and five inputs
(i.e., four stock sizes and effort) were thwarted by the presence of perfect
multicollinearity. The multicollinearity arose from the terms where annual estimates of
stock abundance were multiplied together.

Contingent on these results, a variant of the normalized quadratic was utilized. This
flexible functional form imposes constant returns to scale and requires one less free
parameter than a flexible functional form. Grafton (1992) first used this specification in
fisheries context to study rent capture in the British Columbia sablefish fishery.

The normalized constant returns to scale quadratic profit (revenue) function was defined
as

(4.10)

where a is a predetermined parameter. Symmetry was imposed by setting the
coefficients

ay=aji.

Diewert and Wales (1987) observe that a can be a priori preset by

the observer without losing flexibility. Following Grafton (1992), we arbitrarily set the
(Diewert and Wales, 1987).
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predetermined parameter, a, equal to l/E1, where E1 is the first observation of the input
(i.e., effort).

Applying Hotelling's lemma the associated supply equations can be derived. For i=l
the output supply for the normalized price is given by

(4.11)

For i=2,3, .. N the supply equations are given by

(4.12)

For the normalized quadratic revenue function to describe the underlying technology,
several conditions must be met (Diewert and Ostensoe, 1988). First, the profit function
must be linearly homogenous. The price of roundfish (P 1) is used as the normalizing
price which guarantees homogeneity of degree zero in the outputs. Second, the profit
function must be convex in prices. Convexity in prices can be established when the
matrix of all

au

is positive semidefinite. A sufficient condition for a positive definite

matrix is that all the eigenvalues be non-negative.

Following the estimation, properties of the technology were examined. The resulting
Parameters were checked for convexity in prices. Because the eigenvalues of the
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different fleets were not all non-negative, the function was not found to be globally
convex. There are several reasons why convexity may be violated including data
aggregation, inadequate data variation and multicollinearity (Dupont, 1990).

all

Since

output

supply

equations

were

non-convex,

all

equations

were

reparameterizated to impose convexity. Wiley, Schmidt and Bramble (1973) developed
a method where convexity is imposed by replacing the

au matrix by a lower triangular

matrix D and its transpose such that A= DDT.zo The au parameters can be retrieved from
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The reparameterization of the A matrix requires a non-linear estimation technique since
the profit function becomes non-linear in the parameters. These samples were estimated
using maximum likelihood. Initially, the parameters were estimated using the Newton
and Marquadt methods in SAS. Since the parameters failed to converge, the DavidsonFletcher-Powell algorithm in SHAZAM was used instead. When using a numerical
optimizer, caution must be exercised because the method may converge to a local
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optimum other than the global maximum. For this reason, the model was re-estimated at
different starting values (i.e., one and five). Maximum likelihood estimates for most of
the cases were close in magnitudes but not identical suggesting that the surface of the
function was flat.

Reparameterization had two main effects. First, it imposed the theoretically proper
curvature conditions in some but not all of the supply equations. The small magnitude
of some of the au parameters may have contributed to approximation errors. Second,
many of the estimated elasticities (and, thus curvature conditions) were highly inelastic
(very close to zero).

A major difficulty with these estimates was the lack of stock abundance term necessary
for the bioeconomic model. The presence of perfect multicollinearity in non-constant
returns to scale normalized quadratic formulation prevented us from adopting stocks
sizes as explanatory variables. Rather than incorporating stock sizes in the cost function,
which would have been ad hoc, we resorted to re-estimating the non-homethetic
generalized Leontief functional form on a trip rather than an annual basis. In the
following section, we describe the results from the trip level non-homothetic
generalized Leontief functional form.

4.4

Results

Trip level input-compensated supply equations were estimated usmg Zellner's
seemingly unrelated method. As before, we corrected for autocorrelation and
20

The first column and row of the A matrix are zeros because of linear homogeneity.
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heteroscesdaticity by normalizing all the equations by effort. This partially mitigated the
heteroscedasticity problem.

The generalized R2 for the system of equations pnor to the correction for
2

heteroscedasticity varied between 0.97 and 0.16. Table 5 shows a high R for the gillnet
fleet and a medium to low R2 for the otter trawl and longline fleets (Table 5). The
generalized R 2 was computed

(4.13)

where Lo(L 1) is the sample maximum log-likelihood when all the slope coefficient are
constrained to zero (unconstrained) and N is the sample size.
Table 5: Goodness of fit for selected fleets and tonnage classes
Fleet
Otter trawl

Gillnet
Longline

Tonnage class
5-50 GRT
51-100 GRT
101-150 GRT
151+ GRT
All
All

0.59
0.23
0.16
0.66
0.97
0.49

To assess the ability of fishermen to target, we examined whether the technology was
non-joint-in-inputs. The econometric restriction for overall non-jointness-in-inputs
requires all cross-price coefficients

/3ii =O for all} not equal to i. Non-jointness-in-inputs

for individual outputs, Qi, requires that

/3ii

=O for all j not equal to i. We also tested

whether ports, seasons, and abundance as individual groups were statistically
significant.
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4.5.1. Results from the Otter trawl fleet
4.5.1.l

Estimation of the 5-50 tonnage otter trawl fleet

We first analyzed the technology of the smaller vessels of the otter trawl fleet. The
Wald, Likelihood ratio and Lagrange multiplier test failed to reject overall nonjointness-in-inputs as well as individual species group's non-jointness-in-inputs (table
6). Both port and season dummies as individual groups were found to be statistically
significant whereas stock sizes as a group were not. These results were surprising
because of all tonnage classes, we expected 5-50 GRT to be the most responsive to
price changes. Kirkley and Strand (1988) rejected overall non-jointness-in-inputs for
this segment of the fleet but observed that some species such as cod and mixed
flounders were non-joint-in-inputs.

As Kirkley and Strand (1988) observe, the operational strategy of this fleet is not well
known and likely to vary significantly across ports. For instance, New Bedford has
traditionally harvested mostly scallops and groundfish species, whereas Pt. Judith has
always fished a wider range of species. The level of species aggregation may be also
response for these counter-intuitive results. The high level of species aggregation can
confound harvesting strategies by obscuring fleet's price responsiveness. The presence
of low-value silver hake in the high-value roundfish group (which includes cod and
haddock) likely biases some of the results. Furthermore, not all species are harvested
together since they are necessarily present in the same fishing grounds.
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Table 6: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (5-50
GRT)
Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No. of
independent
restrictions
10

Wald

Reject?

Reject?

L.R.

L.M .

Reject?

14.50

N

14.49

N

14.49

N

4

6. 11

N

6. 11

N

6. 11

N

4

8.86

N

8.84

N

8 . 84

N

4

1. 81

N

1 . 81

N

1 . 81

N

4

7.64

N

7.63

N

7.63

N

4

4.81

N

4.81

N

4.81

N

30

581 . 10

y

581.11

y

581.11

y

15

56 . 55

y

56.55

y

56 . 55

y

4

0.86

N

0.86

N

0 . 86

N

Contingent on these results we re-estimated the input-compensated supply equations.
However, we left stock size as an explanatory variable in spite of its statistical
insignificance because we needed them for the simulation. Also, since some of the stock
sizes showed negative signs, meaning that as stocks increased the fishing vessels would
harvest less of them, we restricted them to be positive.

The re-estimated individual supply equations for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch,
pelagic and miscellaneous species had an R 2 of 0.176, 0.316, 0.06, 0.266, and 0.228,
respectively.

Table

7

reports

the

estimated

parameter

values

for

input-

compensatedsupply equations. All of the effort terms (Pi's) and effort-squared terms
(ai' s) showed positive and negative signs, respectively. The effort or own-price
estimates (Pi's) were statistically significant for roundfish, flatfish and elasmobranch
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groups, whereas the effort-squared estimates were only statistically significant for the
miscellaneous species group. Since the technology was non-joint the cross-price terms
were omitted in the re-estimation.

About fifty percent of the port dummies were statistically significant. Most these
statistically significant estimates corresponded to the roundfish, flatfish, and
miscellaneous supply equations. Notably, fishing vessels operating from the ports of
Rhode Island, Gloucester, and Boston were shown to land more roundfish than those
vessels from New Bedford. The higher landings rates were statistically significant at the
10% significance level for Rhode Island ports, and at the 5% significance level for
Gloucester and Boston. This phenomenon is explained by the presence of high
concentrations of silver hake in the roundfish group. In 1993, Pt. Judith and Gloucester
were ranked the number one and two, respectively in whiting revenues. In contrast,
New Bedford boats had the highest flatfish landing levels from New Bedford. This
situation reinforces the distorting impact of silver hake when interpreting roundfish
supply estimates. The fleet operating from the port of Chatham harvested less
elasmobranchs than the New Bedford fleet. The statistically significant negative
relationship was not surprising because it was not until late 1993 that this fleet started
targeting spiny dogfish (MAFMC, 1993). Fishing vessels from Rhode Island ports
landed more pelagics than their New Bedford counterparts. This relationship was
expected given the multispecies nature of this fleet. The Rhode Island port dummy was
statistically significant at the 5% level. Only two of the season dummies were
statistically significant.
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None of the stock abundance estimates were statistically significant. Restricting these
parameters to be positive decreased the magnitude of flatfish, elasmobranch, and
pelagic abundance estimates as these become essentially zero.
Table 7: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (5-50 GRT).
Quantities sul!l!_lied of
Roundfish
Flatfish

Elasmobranchs

Pelagics

Other
~ecies

Effort
Effort-squared

Stock size
Rhode Island
Gloucester
Boston
Ptown
Chatham
Other MA
Quarter I
Quarter II

Quarter III

26921 .27*
(3638.6)
-659.93
(356.1)

40380.04*
(2553.0)
-546.779
(293.1)

7379.488*
(2769.4)
-274.925
(332.0)

28.40943
(778.8)
-54.7771
(80.6597)

11.56475
(25.0920)
21911 . 55**
(8782.5)
25713.97*
(7568 .5)
8200.672
(7621 .7)
-18699.6*
(2984.6)
-22369.5*
(2686.3)
-24313.3*
(9350 .5 )
-3775.79
(2448.5)
-1931 . 54
(2283.9)

1.01E-6

1.01E-6

1.01E-6

(.)

(.)

(.)

-21471.2**
(8650.7)
-38339 . 4*
(5884.4)
-38353.7*
(6411 .1)
-39095.5*
(2503.9)
-39216.9*
(2230.2)
-39297.4*
(7957.1)
1361.836
(1958 .4)
1924.967
(1805 .5)

1371.342
(8013.6)
-8978.88
(6937.3)
-10299. 8
(6955.2)
260.6731
(2712. 7)
-6632. 91*
(2453.8)
6152.152
(8524.6)
-1932.66
(2232.1)
-1573.72
(2088.8)

31950.25*
(2780.5)
2026.795
(1729.8)
251.8448
(2014.3)
130. 0317
(775.7)
174.6506
(689.3)
156.981
(2515.5)
292.3569
(593.0)
41.45193
(538.7)

-4870.19
(2587.6)

2425.395
(2044.9)

8197.782*
(2369.1)

-261.264
(607.7)

30550.69*
(3102. 9)

824.601**
(360.2)

39377.56*
(9053.4)
4686.713
(7779.7)
1737.626
(7861.0)
-24967.3*
(3054.8)
-29039.9*
(2764.7)
-29219.2*
(9632.2)
1234.596
( 2512. 1)
4668.148*
*
(2349.4)
1294.316
(2662.4)

* s1grnficant at 1% ** s1gmficant at 5%.
4.5.1.2 Estimation of the 51-100 tonnage otter trawl fleet
The statistical tests show that this segment of the fleet has the ability to respond to
relative prices (Table 8). However, the harvesting of flatfish, elasmobranch, and
miscellaneous species appears to be non-joint-in-inputs. These results unexpected given
that pelagic landings only accounted for 1.6% of the total landings whereas roundfish
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accounted for 45.8% of the total landings. This result speaks to one of the limitation of
the dual approach where some species may be incidentally harvested with the target
species but their low price discourages fishermen from allocating resources for their
harvest (Kirkely and Strand, 1988). Port and season dummies as a group were
statistically significantly different from zero while stock abundance estimates as group
were not.

Table 8: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (51-100
GRT)
Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No. of
independent
restrictions

Wald

Reject?

L.R.

Reject?

L.M.

Reject?

10

21.36

y

21.36

y

21.36

y

4

10 .17

y

10. 17

y

10.17

y

4

2.93

N

2.93

N

2.93

N

4

1.15

N

1 .15

N

1 . 15

N

4

10.42

y

10.42

y

10.42

y

4

9. 17

N

9 .17

N

9 . 17

N

40

523.24

N

523.24

N

523.24

N

15

52. 21

N

52.21

N

52.21

N

4

7.38

y

7.37

y

7.37

y

Based on these results we re-estimated the output supply functions imposing restriction
on stock size variables and on the cross-price coefficients

Cf3u) between roundfish and

pelagic stocks. We restricted the roundfish-pelagic cross-price coefficient because its
sign was positive, which generated a downward sloping supply curve. To remedy this
situation be restricted this parameter to be negative.
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The re-estimated supply curves of roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic and other
species had R2 of 0.10, 0.128, 0.0024, 0.06, and 0.145, respectively. Parameter
estimates are presented in table 9. Effort and effort-squared terms exhibited the all
positive and negative signs, respecively with the exception of the effort-squared term on
pelagics. A positive sign suggests increasing returns to scale for the pelagic group.

Ten of the forty port dummies were found to be statistically significant different from
zero. The fishing vessels operating from Gloucester and Pt. Judith were found to be land
more roundfish than fishing vessels from New Bedford. The Gloucester and Pt. Judith
port dummies were statistically significant at the 5% level. This again captures the
distorting effect on silver hake in the roundfish landings. Between 1989 and 1993, Pt.
Judith's and Gloucester's silver hake contribution to roundfish landings was of 96.06%
and 44.76%, respectively.

In contrast, New Bedford's silver hake contribution to

roundfish landings was less than 0.2%. The flatfish supply equation had only Pt. Judith
as a statistically significant port dummy. The positive sign was unexpected given the
New Bedford's heavy reliance on groundfish, particularly cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounder. One explanation for this is that while New Bedford caught more flounder,
especially yellowtail flounder, Pt. Judith caught more winter flounder. Thus, the
estimate may be capturing the relative higher efficiency of Pt. Judith vessels respect to
New Bedford vessels. Recall that since heteroscedasticity was present, the dependent
variable was landings per day absent. The pelagic supply equation had two statistically
significant ports (Gloucester and other Rhode Island) while the elasmobranch supply
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equation had none. Five of the fifteen season dummies were statistically significant
while none of the abundance estimates were.

Table 9: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (51-100
GRT).
Quantity
Effort
Effort squared
Pelagics
Maine
Gloucester
Boston
Provincetown
Dukes
Newport
Pt. Judith
Other RI
Stock
size
Quarter I
Quarter II
Quarter III

*significant at 1%

Roundfish
8952.302
(5318.7)
- 1729. 61 *
(520.7)
-1 E-8
(0)
26464.14**
( 13312 . 2)
35096.26*
(5153.6)
10847.09
(6149.9)
-6645.04
(3836.9)
-4399.6
( 15433. 8)
941.309
(7181.9)
63407.32*
(5498.0)
-2784.6
(21770.8)
51 . 53025
(37 . 9628)
-7380.46
(3965.1)
-3957.21
(3613.9)
2563.43
(3634.2)

Flatfish
1496.814*
(394.5)
-63.9323
(49.0634)

su~~lied

of

Elasmobranchs
1886.48**
(811.1)
-247.058**
( 100.9)

-339.202
(1253 .0 )
-96.8927
(485.7)
195.9616
(579.2)
- 337.673
(361.7)
615.788
(1453 .5 )
369.314
(676.8)
8376 . 546*
(517.4)
-538.854
(2049.6)
1.01E-6
(0)
-622.643
(373.5)
-935.603*
(340.7)
-740.094**
(342.5)

-1020. 93
(2575.9)
-772.462
(998.5)
-912.496
( 1190. 7)
333 . 6045
(743.6)
-1082.12
(2988.1)
206.7435
(1391.4)
1881.722
(1063.7)
-653.107
(4213.7)
1.01E-6
(0)
-533.294
(767.8)
-509.005
(700 . 4)
1273.239
(704.2)

** significant at 5%.
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Pelagics
53 . 55962
(281.6)
10343.87
( 2611 . 8)

All others
10343.87*
( 2611 . 8)
-795 . 385**
(324.8)

205.3809
(667.2)
963.1371*
(259.1)
45.38551
(308.4)
- 28.038
(192. 9)
119.6609
(773.2)
45.31248
(360.0)
2930.358
(276.7)
-134.8*
(1093 .3)
0.36138
(0.4709)
-1 .3904
198.6
-88.0273
181. 2
-269.77
182. 1

40697.95*
(8294.6)
20681.01*
(3215 . 4)
11251 . 17*
(3834.3)
-1664.65
(2394.4)
1922.778
(9621.8)
3969.381
(4480.3)
56209.89*
(3425.3)
-4185.23
(13568.4)

-5721.34**
(2472.5)
- 7925.34*
(2255 . 2)
- 6119.54*
(2267.4)

4.sJ .3 Estimation of the 101-150 tonnage otter trawl fleet

Statistical tests indicate that 101-150 tonnage class is joint-in-inputs. The presence of
jointness-in-inputs indicates the presence of technological and cost tradeoffs. Table 10
shows that port, season, and stock dummies as a group are not statistically significantly
different than zero.

Table 10: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (101-150
GRT)
Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No. of
independent
restrictions
10

Wald

Reject?

L.R.

Reject?

L.M.

Reject?

142.06

y

142.06

y

142.06

y

4

68.87

y

68.87

y

68.87

y

4

110.10

y

110.11

y

110.11

y

4

31.59

y

31.59

y

31.59

y

4

41 .18

y

41 . 18

y

41. 18

y

4

16.98

y

16.98

y

16.98

y

45

763 . 08

y

763.09

y

763.09

y

15

79.46

y

79.46

y

79.46

y

4

65.38

y

65.41

y

65.41

y

A close examination of the parameters showed that some of stock size variables were
negative and that all of the own-price elasticities (not shown) were negative as well. To
ensure theoretically consistent results for our simulation we restricted the abundance
and own-price elasticity estimates to be positive. Rather than adopting Diewert and
Wales (1988) apporach, which is too restrictive for empirical work, we imposed a
milder restriction to ensure positive own-price elasticities. For each own-price elasticity,
we weighted the sum of cross-price coefficients by the sample mean of output prices.
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While this condition did not ensure global convexity, it did not preclude obtaining
substitution and complementarity relationships.

The parameters of the re-estimated supply equations are presented in table 11. The
individual R 2 for the output supply equations of roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch,
pelagic, and miscellaneous species were 0.024, 0.027, 0.0032, 0.015, and 0.04
2

suggesting a poor fit of the model. Recall that the generalized R for the system, prior to
correcting for heteroscedasticity, was only 0.16.

All effort and effort-squared terms conformed to theory. Statistically significant crossprice coefficients indicate jointness particularly in the flatfish and elasmobranch groups.
Cross-price coefficients suggest that flatfish is a substitute for elasmobranch and
miscellaneous species while it is a complement to pelagics. The substitutability with
elasmobranchs was intriguing given the both spiny dogfish and skates are often caught
as by-catch in groundfish operations. NMFS documents indicate that during this time
elasmobranch species were often discarded. The substitutability between flatfish and
elasmobranchs may be explained by the fact that fishermen initially target flounders,
and when they return they target skates. An increase in the price of flounder may
encourage fishermen to devote more resources and time to the catch of flounders; thus,
decreasing the harvest rate of elasmobranchs, which are mainly skates.21 It is
noteworthy that both pelagic and elasmobranch groups only constitute 2.1 % and 1.9%
ofthis fleet's landings.

21

.

A Provmcetown fishennan offered this explanation.
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Thirteen of the forty-five port dummies were statistically significant. Vessels from the
ports of Pt. Judith and Gloucester exhibited statistically higher roundfish landing rates
than the New Bedford fishing vessels for the same reasons explained earlier. Similarly,
fishing vessels from Gloucester, Boston, and Newport exhibited statistically lower
flatfish landing rates than fishing vessels from New Bedford. In the elasmobranch
supply equation, the ports of Pt Judith and Provincentown were statistically significant
at the 5 and 10%, respectively; whereas in the pelagic supply equation, the port of Pt.
Judith was statistically significant at the 5% level.

Three of the four stock abundance coefficients were statistically insignificant. Only the
pelagic stock's abundance was statistically significant at the 5% level. Five of the
fifteen season dummies were statistically different from zero.
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Table 11: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet (101-150
GRT).
Quantity SUJ!J!lied of

Effort
Effort squared
Roundfish

Roundfish

Flatfish

Elasmobranchs

Pelagics

1551.076*
(569.8)
- 150.617**
(63.1506)

594.1454*
(58.5882)
- 12.5852
(6.4888)
36.33482
(47.5232)

164.076*
( 41. 6531)
-11 .0942*
(2. 7057)
18.26466
( 11 . 3206)
- 20.6377**
(9.7116)

- 173.267
(128.0)
-2.8268
( 10. 5648)
-222.818*
(53.2825)
214.923*
(41.3853)
-56 . 8824*
( 11 . 9488)

9264.756*
( 1245. 1)
3276.413*
(739.8)
568.2496
(591.5)
30.25201
(995.0)
- 165. 465
(5865.4)
4.779799
(568.5)
8477.559*
(728.4)
- 233.803
(10154 . 7)
415.5655
(10157 .4)
1.01E-6
(0)
-497.485
(510 . 1)
-160.796
(500.7)
- 393.287
(498.7)

-40.6156
(127.9)
-234.302*
(76.1017)
-304.044*
(60.7637)
-121.602
(102.5)
815.9928
(602.4)
- 130.159**
(58.7166)
520.8881*
(75.3889)
-231.88
( 1043. 0)
-296.462
(1043.4)
1.01E-6
(0)
-122.004**
(52.4087)
- 152.171*
(51.5316)
-215.427*
(51.2167)

72.48458
(53.3011)
- 49.3124
(32.0392)
-42.4398
(25 . 3293)
106.966**
(42.8964)
- 85.2506
(250.4)
11.75669
(24.5143)
236.0714*
(32.2588)
-8.335
(433.5)
15.52872
(433.6)
1.01E-6
(0)
-22.9753
(21 .9964)
-13.0393
(21 .6293)
23.56345
(21.3796)

376.5949
(207.4)
15.30252
( 123.8)
35.31837
(98.4802)
35.26444
(166.0)
73.82621
(974.1)
-12. 6042
(95.3785)
885.6881*
(123.3)
-79.0295
( 1686. 5)
-53.0907
( 1687. 1)
0.569556**
(0.2363)
-54.0362
(85 . 4387)
72 . 01692
(83.9663)
-162. 66
(83.1782)

Flatfish
Elasmobranch
Pelagic
Misc. Species
Maine
Gloucester
Boston
Provincetown
Dukes
Newport
Pt . Judith
Other State I
Other State
II
Stock
size
Quarter I
Quarter II
Quarter III
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Misc.
Species
1793.49*
(494.6)
- 108. 411 * *
(53 . 7672)
42.17843
(56.3957)
-105.15*
(37.0775)
14.97303*
(5.8147)
-17.4571
(33.6465)
13715.49*
( 1060 .0)
1441.897**
(629.9)
740.4387
(503.6)
37.86365
(847 . 2)
683.1054
(4993.6)
220.2205
(484.2)
7199.631*
(619.9)
10156.92
(8645.3)
267 . 8108
(8647.7)

-547.66
(434 . 3)
893.579**
(426.3)
-1504 . 45*
(424.5)

4.5.1.4 Estimation of the 151 +tonnage otter trawl fleet
As in the previous case, the larger tonnage classes showed that the technology was
joint-in-inputs (table 12). Both port and season dummies were statistically significant
as a group. Abundance and own-price elasticities (not shown) were negative. For the
purposes of the simulation, we restricted the stock abundance and own-price elasticity
estimates to be positive.

Table 12: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the otter trawl fleet (151 +
GRT)
Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No. of
independent
restrictions
10

Wald

Reject

L.R.

Reject

L.M.

Reject

284.87

y

283.65

y

282.37

y

4

238.72

y

237.05

y

235. 17

y

4

72.45

y

72.30

y

72.31

y

4

18.64

y

17.62

y

17.07

y

4

84.15

y

83.77

y

83.45

y

4

145.57

y

144.87

y

143.74

y

35

2238.9

y

2122.3

y

2082.1

y

15

72.88

y

72 . 67

y

72.49

y

4

8.76

N

8.39

N

8 .17

N

The re-estimated output supply equations for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic
and miscellaneous species yielded an individual R 2 of 0.17, 0.07, -0.01, 0.27, and 0.01,
respectively. The re-estimated model, showed the theoretically expected signs on all
effort terms. Significant cross-price variables in the roundfish supply curve indicated
that flatfish, elasmobranchs and pelagics were complements whereas miscellaneous
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species were substitutes. This complementarity was not surprising since flatfish and
elasmobranchs are often harvested together. Kirkley and Strand (1988) also found that
for vessels of this tonnage class, cod and yellowtail flounder were complements. In the
production of flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagics and miscellaneous species were found to
be substitutes. Flatfish was found to be substitute for elasmobranchs (mostly skates),
pelagics and miscellaneous species. Lastly, elasmobranchs and pelagics were found to
be complements of miscellaneous species.

Twenty of the thirty-five dummy ports were statistically significant. Both roundfish and
flatfish port dummies exhibited the same trends present in smaller tonnage classes.
Estimates from the elasmobranch supply equation indicate that vessels from Pt. Judith
landed more elasmobranchs than vessels from New Bedford, while the vessels from
Maine, Glouscester, Boston, and Newport landed less elasmobranch than vessels from
New Bedford. In the pelagic group, only the other Rhode Island port was statistically
significant. The Rhode Island dummy reflects the activity of the fleet operating in
Quonset Point, which targets pelagics (mainly mackerel) and Loligo squid. None of the
abundance estimates were statistically significant while four of the season dummies
were statistically significant.
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Table 13: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the otter trawl fleet ( 151 +
GRT)
Quantity
Effort
Effort - squared

su~~lied

of

Roundfish
1026. 124*
(343 . 9)
-213.25*
(24 . 2797)

Flatfish
336 . 8175*
(59 . 0625
-1.21341
(3.1227)
87.31942**
(38.8866)

Elasmobranchs
115 . 0486
(86 . 5968)
-5 . 69854*
(2 . 1972)
58.96083*
(12.3216)
-76 . 322*
( 11 . 3199)

Pelagics
54.05242
(374.4)
-22 . 5351
(23.8834)
333.404*
(108.3)
-110.215**
(47 .6461)
-19.9323
(14.9285)

Misc. species
885.4309
(497 . 6)
-126. 73*
(46.3863)
-237.842*
(52.1611)
-6 . 29598
(23.3481)
29.50682**
(7.2681)
-155.197*
(75.8691)

2363.51*
(278 . 4)
1330. 166*
(208.8)
612.0636*
( 195. 9)
736.3775
(417.6)
6625.9*
(265.6)
1073.427
(831. 6)
-1114.42
(4311.7)
3.572765
(2.5084)
473.7387**
(212 . 4)
302.4815
(205.3)
876.1154*
(206.3)

-284.436*
(35.7950)
-307.38*
(26.7385)
-316.57*
(25 .1333)
-109.969**
(53 . 5522)
- 170.433*
(35.7131)
-302.223**
(106. 7)
-293.547
(552.1)
8.643869
(6.2434)
-4.07991
(27 . 3280)
-36.2135
(26.4380)
-61.1493**
(26.4514)

-56.0717**
(25.0722)
- 69 . 563*
( 19. 0606)
- 72.1222*
(17 . 6394)
-45.3105
(37.4836)
65 . 85736**
(26.7549)
-39. 1166
(74.6536)
108.9576
(385.6)
0.139085
(0.4477)
-12.1515
( 19.4040)
-5.99297
(18.6667)
-17.0164
( 18. 5842)

32.46466
(271.3)
9.759805
(203.2)
-24.1633
(190.9)
72.96831
(407.5)
376.976
(272.1)
30002.83*
(812.1)
207.8199
(4194 . 6)
1E-8
(0.6048)
27.35761
(208.4)
316.5499
(205 .0 )
-14.0539
(200.7)

3864.671*
(534.5)
798.8908**
(400.3)
876.8434**
(376.2)
387.4356
(801. 7)
1125.521**
(498.6)
8280.735*
( 1595 . 7)
2652.55
(8278.0)

Roundf i sh
Flatfish
Elasmobranch
Pelagic
Misc. Species
Maine
Gloucester
Boston
Newport
Pt. Judith
Other RI
Other State
Stock
size
Quarter I
Quarter II
Quarter III

1059.278*
(407.7)
-156.693
(393.8)
-401.777
(395.8)

4.5.2. Estimation of the gillnet fleet

The Wald, L.R., and L. M. test suggested that the gillnet production process is nonjoint. However, the production of flatfish appeared to respond to relative prices (table
14). Port, season, and abundance estimates as a group were statistically not different
from zero.
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Table 14: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the gillnet fleet

-

Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No . of
independent
restrictions
10

Wald

Reject

L.R.

Reject

L.M.

Reject

14.60

N

14.59

N

14.59

N

4

6.42

N

6.40

N

6.40

N

4

9. 71

y

9.71

y

9.71

y

4

2.45

N

2 . 45

N

2.45

N

4

5.43

N

5.43

N

5.43

N

4

8.67

N

8 . 67

N

8.67

N

30

82.78

y

82.77

y

82.77

y

15

201.96

y

201.96

y

201.96

y

4

7.36

y

7 . 36

y

7.36

y

The R2 re-estimated supply output curve for roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranch, pelagic
and miscellaneous species were estimated at 0.1015, 0.0748, 0.1023, 0.0396 and
0.2057, respectively. Effort terms in general followed theoretical expectations.
However, only one effort term on elasmobranchs was statistically significant while two
effort-squared terms on roundfish and miscellaneous species were statistically
significant. Their negative sign on the effort-squared terms indicates decreasing returns
to scale.

Only three of thirty-six port dummies were statistically significant. Statistically, only
fishing vessels from Chatham and Barnstable landed less elasmobranchs than their New
Bedford counterparts. This reflects New Bedford increased interest in this fishery. Since
the early 1990' s, New Bedford's fixed gear fleet began targeting elasmobranchs,
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primarily spiny dogfish. The larger tonnage vessels (51 + GRT) more found to land less
elasmobranchs, pelagics, and miscellaneous species than the smaller tonnage vessels.
None of the abundance estimates were statistically significant while six of the fifteen
season dummies were statistically significant.

Table 15: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the gillnet fleet
Quantit~ su~~lied

Effort
Effort- squared
Maine
Gloucester
Barnstable
Chatham
Other MA
Other State
Large vessel
dummy
Stock
size
Quarter I
Quarter II
Quarter III

Roundfish
1322.798
(2703.2)
-103.265**
(46.7833)
3490.731
(2684.1)
2942.576
(2677.0)
-8.15234
(3101 .6)
-245.772
(2666.4)
-79.7915
(3494.2)
-937.362
(5282.3)
-1296.92
(817.4)
1.885822
(5.4255)
-869.171
(529.4)
-941.022
(526.1)
302.2671
(400.1)

Flatfish
-144.553
(451 .0)
1.732504
(7.8685)
97.61999
(451.3)
614.7927
(449.8)
49.34266
(521. 7)
137.0019
(448.4)
-41 .4263
(587.4)
145.0877
(888.6)
-96.9041
(137. 5)
1E-8
(0)
- 53.8486
(89.0620)
267.6565*
(88.5047)
-14. 2891
(67.3183)

Elasmobranch
22184.87*
(7483.1)
-195.958
(130.6)
-10445
(7489.0)
-13822.9
(7463.3)
- 21450.1**
(8657.1)
-21579**
(7441 . 0)
-20353.6
(9746.4)
-21988.9
( 14745. 0)
-6981.9*
(2280.8)
1E-8
(0)
-2317.36
( 1477 .8)
-1146.69
( 1468. 6)
3291.115*
(1117.0)

of
Pelagic
35.67559
(64.2565)
-1.09329
(1.0864)
43.93175
(62.3413)
8.127567
(62.3997)
- 10.1377
(72.0468)
-21.6092
(61 .9085)
51.84492
(81.4545)
-53.6602
(122. 7)
-37.4023**
(19.0014)
0.049063
(0.0304)
- 25.5854**
( 12. 3130)
-48.2157*
(12.2184)
-40.3738*
(9.2886)

Misc. Species
3946.528
(4353.9)
-202.296*
(75.9669)
9232.385**
(4357.3)
4441 .841
(4342.4)
- 1236. 13
(5037.0)
-2072.63
(4329.4)
-1243
(5670.8)
-3739.7
(8579.2)
-3044.59**
( 1327. 1 )

128.5754
(859.9)
' -2481. 87*
(854.5)
- 1089. 11
(649.9)

4.5.3. Estimation of the longline fleet
Lastly we estimated the technology of the longline fleet. Statistical test suggested that
production was non-joint-in-inputs(i.e., there is a separate production function for each
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species group). Port dummies as a group were statistically significant while season and
abundance estimates as a group were not statistically different from zero (table 16).

Table 16: Statistical tests for the harvesting technology of the longline fleet
Test

Overall
non-jointness
Roundfish
non-jointness
Flatfish
non-jointnes
Elasmobranch
non-jointness
Pelagic
non-jointness
Miscellaneous
non-jointness
Port
dummies
Season
dummies
Stock
size

No. of
independent
restrictions
10

Wald

Reject

L.R.

Reject

L.M.

Reject

16.13

N

16. 11

N

16. 11

N

4

14.71

N

14.68

N

14.68

N

4

9.32

N

9.30

N

9.30

N

4

2.68

N

2.67

N

2.67

N

4

0.62

N

0.61

N

0.61

N

4

6 .18

N

6.18

N

6 . 18

N

30

145 . 15

y

145. 14

y

145. 14

y

15

13.63

N

13.63

N

13.63

N

4

3.50

N

3.48

N

3.48

N

Table 17 shows parameter estimates of the re-estimated input-compensated supply
equations. Two of the five effort terms were negative while two of the five effortsquared terms were positive. Only the effort term on miscellaneous species was
statistically significant.

Four of thirty port dummies were statistically significant. For the roundfish equation,
the port of Gloucester was statistically significant while for the miscellaneous species
equation the ports of Gloucester, Chatham, and other Massachusetts were statistically
significant. Larger vessels (51 + GRT) were found to statistically land more roundfish
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and miscellaneous species than the smaller vessels. None of the abundance estimates
were statistically significant while only one season dummy was statistically significant.

Table 17: Parameter estimates of the supply functions of the longline fleet
Quanti!I sueelied of
Effort
Effort-squared
Maine
Gloucester
Pt own
Chatham
Other MA
Boston
Large vessel
dummy
Stock
size
Quarter I
Quarter II
Quarter III

4.6

Roundfish
749.6613
(606.9)
-34. 9293
(20.7614)
136.4355
(515.0)
1346.681*
(502.1)
-31 9.43
(1057 . 2)
-20.0979
(538.0)
-216.241
(646.3)
188.2733
(869.6)
-631 . 917**
(272.4)
2.324345
(3.8828)
-1 5 . 1093
(180. 7)
26.63872
(192.5)
18.91855
(244.6)

Flatfish
1.88109
(3.0679)
-0.0879
(0.0986)
0.083945
(2.4383)
0.247839
(2.3806)
-0.93487
(4.9864)
0.207043
(2.5458)
-0.37719
(3.0415)
0.099133
(4.1214)
-0.22718
(1.2876)
0.054482
0.4065
-1.52695
(0.8515)
-1.09072
(0.9124)
-1.5428
( 1 . 1699)

Elasmobranch
- 64.7747
(229.5)
2. 116814
(8.6577)
50.68681
(214.5)
371.0619
(208.0)
68.13725
(438.8)
38.57052
(224.0)
27.3486
(267.6)
55.62657
(362.6)
8.658852
( 113. 3)
1 E-8
(0)
-25.7652
(74.9004
10.66658
(80.2701)
220.8819**
( 101. 7)

Pelagic
-0.6927
(0.6779)
0.023613
(0.0215)
- 0.21353
(0.5324)
0 . 04008
(0.5192)
0.149255
(1.0891)
0.219146
(0.5565)
0.167524
(0.6688)
-0.03112
(0.8986)
-0.07961
(0.2815)
0.00101
(0.000723)
0.068626
(0.1860)
0.318993
(0.1989)
-0 . 03712
(0.2540)

Misc. Species
3917.334*
(1017.0)
-40.0317
(38.3677)
714.8744
(950.7)
2645.186*
(921. 8)
-2658.44
( 1944. 6)
-3477.52*
(992.8)
-3636.59*
( 1186. 1)
963.258
(1606.9)
-2561.15*
(502.1)

- 264.197
(331 . 9)
-527.815
(355.7)
183.4074
(450.9)

Summary

The econometric analysis suggests the technological and economic interactions vary
significantly across firms. For instance, the otter trawl fleet showed a wide range of
technologies. The smaller tonnage classes exhibited non-joint-in-inputs technologies
while the larger tonnage classes exhibited joint-in-input technologies. The presence of
jointness-in-inputs in the larger otter trawls evidences the presence of technological and
cost interrelationships. It also suggests that fishermen can select the catch composition
93

to some extent. Gillnet and longline vessels, on the other hand, exhibited non-jointnessin-inputs, suggesting that there are no technological and cost tradeoffs during their
production process. It also evidences that these fleets have a separate production
process for each species harvested.

The absence of price responsiveness especially in the smaller otter trawl tonnage class,
which is known for its opportunistic behavior, is troublesome. This situation
underscores potential problems with our estimates. One of the most vexing problems
during the estimation was the consistent presence of downward sloping supply curves
and negative abundance terms. The empirical literature suggested several reasons for
theoretically inconsistent results. The first and probably most important reason is
aggregation. Gates (1974) reports that aggregation bias may yield negative and
statistically insignificant own-price elasticities. Kirkley and Strand (1988), who
examined the otter trawl fleet operating on Georges Bank, showed consistent positive
own-price elasticities of supply. However, their estimates rejected the imposition of
symmetry, which casts doubts on the robustness of their results. Squires (1987), who
also examined the New England otter trawl fleet, reports negative own-price elasticities
of supplies for some of its aggregated species groups.

Ideally to overcome this problem we could have had disaggregated our species groups.
Unfortunately, given the scope of the study, which required coupling our estimates with
an aggregated predator-prey model, we could not disaggregated our species group
further. Kirkley and Stand (1988) observe that given the high number of species present
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in the fishery, little can be done to resolve this problem. Moreover, aggregation bias
may have been exacerbated since some of the individual species within the species
groups had large price differentials masking the effect of prices. For instance, in 1993
the haddock ex-vessel price was approximately 1.38 dollars per pound while the silver
hake ex-vessel price was approximately 0.37 dollars per pound. In hindsight, a better
way to umavel the operational strategies of the different fleet segments would be to
stratify the fleet not only by tonnage class but also by port.

Another limitation was the lack of variability both in prices and stock sizes, which may
have contributed to multicollinearity. Given that many vessels did not land all species in
all trips we resorted to placing monthly (or annual depending the case) prices. This may
have caused coefficients to have the wrong sign or implausible magnitudes. This
situation was particularly true for the pelagic group. Similarly, the use of annual
abundance estimates may have further contributed to the poor econometric estimates.
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Chapter 5: Empirical Model
5.1. Background
The objective of this chapter is to develop a bioeconomic model that explicitly accounts
for multiproduct technological interrelationships.

The model

investigates

the

implications of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gears using the
Georges Bank multispecies fishery as a case study. As mentioned earlier, Georges Bank
has traditionally supported large pelagic and demersal resources. In the 1960's and
1970's, excessive harvesting by foreign fleets resulted in the over-exploitation of
pelagic stocks. In the 1980's and early 1990's, intensive fishing by domestic fleets led
to the decline of several demersal stocks. Simultaneously, the biomass of non-targeted
species such as elasmobranchs, mainly spiny dogfish and skates, increased. More
recently, previously overexploited pelagic resources recovered while the abundance of
elasmobranchs began to decrease. This progression of over-exploitation to previously
less desirable species has led to extensive changes in the structure of the Georges Bank
ecosystem.

In recent years increased awareness of the negative environmental impacts of
indiscriminate harvesting practices and increased research funding have encouraged the
development of environmentally friendly gear technologies (F AO, 1997). A large share
of gear technologists efforts, has been focused on the design of more selective trawl
gear. In particular, designing new mesh configurations and incorporating selection
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grids. Also significant amount of work has been devoted to the development of new
gears.

Murawski (1990) observes that mesh size selectivity depends on cod-end dimensions
and other operational factors such as towing speed, fish density, and net fullness. The
impact of modifying the mesh size will not only depend on the size distribution and
composition of the catch but also on fish behavior. DeAlteris and Morse (1997) observe
that when otter trawls are dragged on the bottom, the doors will generate sand clouds
that herd cod and haddock between the wing ends of the trawl. As the fish become tired,
cod turn back into the trawl and dives down while haddock will attempt to rise above
the headrope. Thus, fishermen trying to reduce the haddock bycatch in cod tows, will
reduce the headrope height to facilitate the escape of haddock. The body shape is
another consideration. Roundfish have a different body shape than flatfish; thus,
different escapement rates are expected. Widening mesh sizes does not necessarily
ensure that smaller sized fish will necessary escape due to clogging. Ueber (1990)
observers that effectiveness of larger mesh sizes decreases with larger number of
species. Not surprisingly, Hanna (1990) notes that in multispecies fisheries there is no
optimum mesh size. An important consideration is that escapement does not guarantee
survival since fish that successfully escaped through trawls may die shortly after due to
injuries incurred while passing through the mesh.

In addition to changing mesh configurations, gear technologists have been developing a

variety of devices that segregate the catch prior to entering the cod-end of nets (FAO,

97

1997). These devices use a separator grid and escape panels to allow the incidental
catch to escape. The panel separates fish of different sizes by allowing the smaller fish
to pass through the grid while deflecting larger fish. These grid systems are widely used
in shrimp fisheries around the world.

Also gear technologists have been actively developing alternative technologies. Brewer
et al. (1994) report that in Australia's northern fish trawl fishery, trials using semi-

pelagic trawls have reduced the level of incidental catch without reducing the catch
level of target species compared to the traditional bottom trawls. Similarly, the
development of pots and traps has been shown to be an effective environmentally
friendly alternative to traditional gears. Weyman (1995) reports that in the Bering Sea
cod fishery, pots and lines significantly reduced the level of halibut bycatch.

It is

important to observe that in some cases modifying the species selectivity does not
necessarily require changing the configuration of gear, but could include the
management actions such as permitted fishing times and/or areas. Management can also
modify the species selectivity of the gears by requiring additional devices such as
pingers and bird scaring lines, which minimize the incidental catch of marine mammals
and seabirds in gillnet and longlines, respectively.

While the adoption of a specific technology is an important issue in itself, the
bioeconomic model focuses on the overall impact of modifying the species selectivity
properties of the gear rather than addressing the specific technology to be used. The
model is primarily concerned with understanding how improving the species selectivity
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properties of the principal gears can contribute to the rebuilding the more commercially
valuable Georges Bank groundfish stocks.

Despite the important biological and economic implications of rebuilding the
groundfish stocks, scant economic work has been conducted in this area. Most of the
empirical work focused on the bioeconomic implications of effort management. For
instance, Edwards and Murawski (1993) estimated the dissipation of rent from the
commercial harvest of groundfish resources of New England. They estimated that the
net economic value of the fishery would be maximized by a 70% reduction in fishing
effort. 22 Overholtz et al. (1995) developed a multispecies model of the New England
groundfish fishery to evaluate the impact of effort reduction policies. They found that
significant reduction in short-term effort and catch would triple to quintuple catch per
unit effort levels in the long-run, especially for haddock and flounder.

More recently, Thunberg, Helser, and Mayo (1998) examined the bioeconomic impacts
of targeting different age groups of silver hake in the Northeast. They found that by
shifting the harvesting pressure to younger age classes, the fleet experienced short-run
gains at the expense of long-run declines in biomass, which lowered the fishery's value
and yield. Conversely, they found that by targeting older individuals the value of the
fishery might improve over present levels with modest reductions in short-run yield.
Although Thunberg et al. 's work investigated the implication of modifying the

22

They estimated that the potential resource rent was approximately US$ 130 million annually.
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catchability properties of the gear, they did not examine this issue in a multispecies
context nor did they investigate its impact on fish assemblage compositions.

5.2. Model Description

The model simulates the dynamics of a multispecies fishery under a suite of
management measures. The primary focus of this work is to provide an improved
understanding of species selectivity changes in a multispecies context. The model
simulates the interaction between the main fish assemblages and fishing fleets operating
on Georges Bank. Conceptually, the model is simple. The are two main components,
one describing the population dynamics of the stocks and the other describing the
economics of the fleets. The model is organized as a set of interrelated subroutines
controlled by the main program.

The biological component is a multispecies aggregated surplus production model.
Holling I type multispecies interactions are assumed. 23 The fish assemblages are
selected because of their commercial and/or trophic importance. The main assemblages
considered were roundfish, flatfish, elasmobranchs and pelagics. The roundfish
assemblage is composed of Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua ), haddock (Melanogramus

aeglefinus) and silver hake (Merluccius bilinearis). The flatfish assemblage consists of
yellowtail

flounder

(Limanda ferruginea)

and

winter

flounder

(Pleuronectes

americanus). The elasmobranch assemblage includes spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias)
and winter skates (Raja ocellata) and little skates (Raja erinacea), while the pelagics
23

.

Functional response describes how the per capita growth rate is affected predation and consumption. In our case,
we assume that the functional response is a function of stock abundance (i.e., multiply both stocks sizes together)
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assemblage includes Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) and herring (Clupea
harengus).

The stock dynamics are modeled as,

where r and K are the intrisic growth rate and carrying capacity for species i, and Y is
yield.

a,~,

x.,,

o,

and

E

are the interaction parameters of the Holling I functional

response.

The economic component focuses on three fishing fleets, namely otter trawls, gillnets
and longliners. Ideally, the fleet dynamics for the entire northeast region (i.e., Gulf of
Maine, Georges Bank, and Southern New England), rather than partitioning the fleet's
activity to Georges Bank only, would be modeled. Most of the fishing activity,
especially of larger vessels, is not confined to one area. In fact, they straddle their
harvesting operations across several areas. 24 Given that only a part of the system is
modeled, this limits our understanding of the fleets' financial success or failure since
many of these vessels participate in other areas. The fleets' participation in other areas

24

Th " .
is is particularly true, for Georges Bank where closures forced fishermen to operate in different waters and target

different species. This model does not consider the impact of closures nor attempts to address fishing location issues.
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and/or fisheries determines their overall profitability and thus investment and
disinvestment decisions. Because of this, we did not model the fleets' entry-exit
behavior but rather restricted ourselves to model total number of days absent. If we had
modeled the entire northeast region, the fleets' financial viability could have been
examined and their expected future participation could have been determined. When
modeling a partitioned fishery, this feature cannot be fully captured.

In view of the above and the limited entry regime, we moved away from modeling fleet

dynamics and switching behavior, and focused on developing a simpler model that
captured days absent as a proxy of fishing effort. Fishing effort expended by the fleets
was represented as the profit maximizing number of days absent per trip per season
multiplied by the average number of trips per season taken by each fleet segment. For
the purposes of this analysis, we used the average number of trips taken between 1989
and 1993.

The profit maximizing effort level is obtained by setting the value of marginal product
of effort equal to the long-run marginal cost of effort and solving for the optimal level
of effort. Mathematically, the value of the marginal product of effort is given by

aR = 2I a.PE+ I I [3 .. (PP .) 112 +n
-aE
. ,,
. .
1
I)

I

I

,

j

where Q captures season and port dummies and stock abundance.
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(5.1)

Since the NMFS Weightout database does not provide information on the cost structure,
cost estimates were obtained from the Sea Sampling database. The variable costs
included ice, fuel and labor costs. The return to labor was measured as its opportunity
cost. We assumed that the crew would be employed in manufacturing sector. Estimated
earnings were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The captain's opportunity
cost was set 30% higher than the average crewmen opportunity cost.

We assume that the long-run variable cost function was quadratic, such that

C=cE+dE 2

(5.2)

where c and d are parameters on days absent and days absent square.

Combining the above equations, we solved for the profit maximizing effort level such
that

E

=

'°'

1

2L.a;P;

"
_d (c- "
L.L.{3;/P;P;)
;

1/ 2

-Q)

(5.3)

j

In calibrating the model, the estimated cost parameters were adjusted until the value of
effort was close to the 1989-1993 mean (Campbell, 1995). Then we mimicked 1989-93
mean landings by adjusting a;'s and p;;'s within one standard deviation. This allowed
landings to be calibrated to within 10% 1989-93 mean.
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5.3. Results

5.3.1. Introduction

Simulation runs indicated that without dramatic reductions in effort, roundfish and
flatfish stocks would collapse soon. At the existing exploitation levels, roundfish and
flatfish biomass collapsed in year 37 and 41, respectively. In contrast, elasmobranch
and pelagic biomass continued to increase, stabilizing at 188.8 and 1,784.2 million tons
respectively.

We also examined the impact of changing the species selectivity properties and taxing
overexploited species. Model runs showed that this measures alone did not prevent the
collapse of the roundfish and flatfish stocks. These measures simply delayed the
collapse of the roundfish stocks. For example, reducing the roundfish catchability by
20% delayed the collapse of roundfish stocks by three years. Similarly, imposing a 20
% tax on roundfish landings pushed the collapse of the roundfish stocks by one year.

Under both policies flatfish stock continued to collapse in year 41.

These results suggested that neither policy by itself would reverse the collapse of the
roundfish and flatfish stocks. Thus, a different approach was needed to ensure the
sustainability of these stocks. Ideally, we would have run the model until it reached
some sustainable steady state. Then we would have re-run the model under some policy
scenario until in reached again some sustainable steady state. Then both steady states
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would be compared. Unfortunately, given the high exploitation rates, we were forced to
reduce the overall effort level to generate new steady state stock size levels.

Simulations runs showed that overall effort had to be reduced by 58% in order to
prevent the collapse of the roundfish and flatfish stocks. To meet this effort reduction,
we reduced the number of trips taken by the fleet rather than reducing the fleet size.25
At this effort reduction level, roundfish stock sizes stabilized at 840.1 million tons,
whereas flatfish and pelagic stocks stabilized at 76.4 and 2,221.8 million tons,
respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapsed in year 66. Given that the reduction in
effort recovered the roundfish and flatfish stocks, this work will focus on how effort
reductions in conjunction with other policies can expedite the recovery of roundfish and
flatfish stocks.
5.3.2. Bioeconomic performance of management alternatives
The behavior of the Georges Bank multispecies fishery was analyzed under two sets of
policies. First, we considered a policy that would require the fishing industry to adopt
new gear designs or configurations that modify the species selectivity properties of the
gear. Second, we considered using market-based mechanisms to induce fishermen to
change their harvest composition.
25

We recognize that there are alternative approaches to reducing effort that may more accurately reflect the fleet

dynamics. The chosen method may not accurately reflect the dynamics of large vessels since they may not be able to
cover their fixed costs under days at sea limitation. Furthermore, Aguirre International (1996) observes that "while
moving into alternative fisheries has been the most preferred response, most of the larger vessels of Gloucester and
New Bedford have become too specialized and too dependent on family networks for staffing vessels to shift into
other fisheries without substantial capital investments. Small and medium-sized (30-75 ') vessels have had more
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Changing the species selectivity properties of the gears has long been advocated. On the
surface, the adoption of such policy should contribute to the rebuilding of the stocks.
However, changing the catchability of one species may have adverse spillover effects
into the other species depending on complementarity and substitution possibilities of the
gear technology. The presence of biological interrelationships further complicates the
issue.

To examine this issue, we followed Campbell and Nicholl's approach. In their 1995
paper, the authors modified the catchability of the gears by multiplying the parameters
of supply equation species i by a scalar. Mathematically,

Applying Hotelling lemma and assuming a two species system, we obtain

Qi =8(a;E 2 +PiiE+Pijc;J) 1' 2 E+nE)

(5.5)

I

112
Q J. = a J.E 2 + ...,R JJ.. E + SR
.. (P; )
E + nE
1-'u P.

(5.6)

J

success moving into alternative fisheries, yet often have been met with hostility as they attempt to enter fisheries
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where

e is the proportion by which the catchability of species i

since the

~y's

is modified. Note that

have to be symmetric, theta has to appear in all the supply equations.

Table 18 presents a summary of the technological change experiments conducted.

Next, we considered market-based mechanisms or incentive and disincentive programs
as referred by Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982). The study of market-based mechanisms
is motivated by two considerations. First, market-based mechanisms are prevalent in the
resource economics literature. Taxes and subsidies are often advocated for correcting
market inefficiencies. Taxes have been implemented to prevent the producer from
exploiting resources too rapidly, whereas subsidies have implemented to encourage
higher exploitation rates. Under market-based mechanisms, fishing pressure could be
redirected by changing relative prices. By imposing a tax on the price of an
overexploited species, fishermen would find harvesting the overexploited species less
attractive. In contrast, by imposing a subsidy on an underutilized species, fishermen
would find harvesting the underexploited species more attractive. This effort redirection
implicitly assumes that markets for the underutilized species will develop. Several
mechanisms for collecting and redistributing rents have been discussed including
system of pooled landing fees, price controls, etc. Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982)
discuss the benefits and shortcomings of each of these market-based approaches in a
fishery context.

dominated by families and fleets that have been in those fisheries for generations".
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A second motivation for market-based mechanisms is that they have been considered as
a possible policy instrument for New England. The availability of overexploited species
such as roundfish and flatfish stocks, and underexploited species such as pelagic stocks
makes New England a good candidate. Moreover, several segments of the fishing
industry had expressed support for this mechanism. However, this policy was never
implemented.

Under our specification the impact of imposing a tax on species i, in a two species case
would be modeled as

(5.7)

2
pi - 't 112
Q J. =a J.E +A1-'u.. E+A1-'ij.. ( -P.- ) E+QE

(5.8)

J

where 'tis the tax. Table 19 summarizes the main experiments conducted.

To gauge the performance of the different scenarios we developed a baseline scenario.
This benchmark scenario assumed that the current limited entry regime remains in place
for the duration of the simulation. Throughout the analysis, we normalize the benefits to
the baseline level. In other words, the NPV index for the baseline scenario is 100%. The
simulations ran for 100 years and used a 3% discount rate.
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Given the number of scenarios a description of each outcome is relegated to Appendix
E. Tables 20 and 21 summarize the economic performance of the models. In addition,
tables 20 and 21 provide information regarding the number of years that are required to
achieve the same pre-policy (scenario) revenue in nominal terms. This number of years
provides an indication of short-term sacrifices the industry must endure for adopting a
given policy. We also provide the number of years needed under the current scenario
needed to generate the same amount of discounted benefits than the baseline scenario.
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Table 1: Summary of technological change policies
Description

Scenarios
Scenario I

Scenario IT

Scenario ID

Scenario N

Scenario V

Scenario VI

Scenario VIT

Parameter change

Reduction in the roundfish species

All roundfish supply parameters

selectivity

by 5,10,15, and 20%

Reduction in the flatfish species

All flatfish supply parameters by

selectivity

5,10,15, and 20%.

fucrease in the elasmobranch species

All elasmobranch supply

selectivity

parameters by 5,10,15, and 20%.

Reduction in the elasmobranch

All elasmobranch supply

species selectivity

parameters by 5,10,15, and 20%.

fucrease in the pelagic species

All pelagic supply parameters by

selectivity

5,10,15, and 20%.

Reduction in the pelagic species

All pelagic supply parameters by

selectivity

5,10,15, and 20%.

Reduction in the roundfish species

All roundfish supply parameters

selectivity and increase in

by 10 and elasmobranch supply

elasmobranch species selectivity

parameters by 5,10, 15, and
20%.

Scenario YID

Reduction in the roundfish and

All roundfish supply parameters

elasmobranch species selectivity

by 10 and elasmobranch supply
parameters by 5, 10, 15, and
20%.

Scenario IX

Reduction in the roundfish species

All roundfish supply parameters

selectivity and increase in pelagic

by 10 and pelagic supply

species selectivity

parameters by 5,10, 15, and
20%.

Scenario X

Reduction in the roundfish and

All roundfish supply parameters

pelagic species selectivity

by 10 and pelagic supply
parameters by 5,10, 15, and
20%.
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Table 2: Summary of market-based policies.
Scenarios

Scenario XI

Parameter change*

Description

Roundfish catches taxed at 5, 10,

Tax on roundfish catches

15, and 20 %
Scenario XII

Tax on flatfish catches

Flatfish catches taxed at 5,10,
15, and 20 %

Scenario XIII

Tax on elasmobranch catches

Elasmobranch catches taxed at 5,
10, 15, and 20 %

ScenarioXN

Subsidy on elasmobranch catches

Elasmobranch catches
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20 %

Scenario XV

Pelagic catches taxes at 5, 10,

Taxes on pelagic catches

15, and 20 %
Scenario XVI

Subsidy on pelagic catches

Pelagic catches subsidized at 5,
10, 15, and 20 %

Scenario XVII

Tax on roundfish catches and subsidy

Roundfish catches taxed at 10 %

on elasmobranchs catches

while elasmobranch catches are
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20

Scenario XVill

Tax on roundfish catches and subsidy

Round fish catches taxed at 10 %

on pelagic catches

while pelagic catches are
subsidized at 5, 10, 15, and 20 %

(*) All taxes and/or subsidies are applied on the ex-vessel price.
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Table 20: Summary of benefits under technological change policies.
Scenario

.....
.....

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

I.a.

5% reduction in roundfish selectivity

115.71

13

70

Lb.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity

118.39

11

66

I.e.

15% reduction in roundfish selectivity

118.58

11

65

I.d.

20% reduction in roundfish selectivity

117.39

10

66

II.a.

5% reduction in flatfish selectivity

102.53

21

94

II.b .

10% reduction in flatfish selectivity

104.25

20

90

II.c.

15% reduction in flatfish selectivity

105.54

19

87

11.d.

20% reduction in flatfish selectivity

106.56

19

85

III.a.

5% increase in elasmobranch selectivity

101.01

21

98

IIl.b.

10% increase in elasmobranch selectivity

101.94

21

95

111.c.

15% increase in elasmobranch selectivity

102.8

20

93

III.d.

20% increase in elasmobranch selectivity

103.62

20

91

IV.a.

5% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

98.90

23

>100

IV.b.

10% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

97.68

23

>100

IV.c.

15% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

96.29

24

>100

IV.d.

20% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

94.66

25

> 100

N

Table 20 (cont): Summary of benefits under technological change policies.
Scenario

.....

.....

VJ

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

V.a.

5% increase in pelagic selectivity

98.49

23

> 100

V.b.

10% increase in pelagic selectivity

96.61

24

> 100

V.c.

15% increase in pelagic selectivity

94.05

26

>100

V.d.

20% increase in pelagic selectivity

89.69

29

>100

VI.a.

5% reduction in pelagic selectivity

101.28

21

97

VI.b.

10% reduction in pelagic selectivity

102.40

21

94

VI.c.

15% reduction in pelagic selectivity

103.40

20

92

VI.d.

20% reduction in pelagic selectivity

104.30

20

90

VII.a.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 5%

118.66

11

66

118.92

11

66

119.18

11

65

119.43

11

65

increase in elasmobranch selectivity
VIl.b.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%
increase in elasmobranch selectivity

VII.c.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15%
increase in elasmobranch selectivity

VIl.d.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20%
increase in elasmobranch selectivity

Table 20 (cont.): Summary of benefits under technological change policies.

Scenario

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

VIII.a.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 5%

118.12

11

67

117.85

11

67

117.57

11

67

117.28

12

68

118.17

11

67

117.95

11

67

117.73

11

67

117.50

11

67

reduction in elasmobranch selectivity
VIII.b.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

VIII.c.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15%
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

.p.

VIII.cl.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20%
reduction in elasmobranch selectivity

IX.a.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%
increase in pelagic selectivity

IX.b.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%
increase in pelagic selectivity

IX.c.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15%
increase in pelagic selectivity

IX.d.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20%
increase in pelagic selectivity

Table 20 (cont.): Summary of benefits under technological change policies.

Scenario

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

X.a.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%

118.61

11

66

118.83

11

66

119.06

11

66

119.26

11

65

reduction in pelagic selectivity
X.b.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 10%
reduction in pelagic selectivity

X.c.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 15%
reduction in pelagic selectivity

......

......
Vl

X.d.

10% reduction in roundfish selectivity and 20%
reduction in pelagic selectivity

Table 21: Summary of benefits under market-based policies.
Scenario

......

°'

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

XI.a.

5% tax on roundfish catches

118.62

12

66

Xl.b.

10% tax on roundfish catches

118.31

13

66

XI.c.

15% tax on roundfish catches

117 .74

14

67

Xl.d.

20% tax on roundfish catches

117.09

14

67

XII.a.

5% tax on flatfish catches

119.30

12

65

XII.b.

10% tax on flatfish catches

119.34

12

65

XII.c.

15% tax on flatfish catches

119.37

12

65

XII.d.

20% tax on flatfish catches

119.41

12

65

XIII.a.

5% tax on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIII.b .

10% tax on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIII.c.

15% tax on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIII.d.

20% tax on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIV.a.

5% subsidy on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIV.b.

10% subsidy on elasmobranch catches

119.26

11

65

XIV.c.

15% subsidy on elasmobranch catches

119.27

11

65

XIV.d.

20% subsidy on elasmobranch catches

119.27

11

65

Table 21 (cont): Summary of benefits under market-based policies.
Scenario

.....
-....}

Description

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

XV.a.

5% tax on pelagic catches

119.28

11

65

XV.b.

10% tax on pelagic catches

119.30

11

65

XV.c.

15% tax on pelagic catches

119.32

11

65

XV.d.

20% tax on pelagic catches

119.35

11

65

XVI.a.

5% subsidy on pelagic catches

119.24

12

65

XVI.b .

10% subsidy on pelagic catches

119.22

12

65

XVI.c.

15% subsidy on pelagic catches

119.21

12

65

XVI.d.

20% subsidy on pelagic catches

119.19

12

65

Table 21 (cont.): Summary of benefits under market-based policies.
Scenario

XVII.a.

Description

10% tax on roundfish catches and 5%

NPV Index Relative to
Baseline Levels (%)

Years Needed to Met
Pre-Policy Revenue
Levels

Years Needed to Match
Baseline Profit Levels

118.30

13

66

118.31

13

66

118.32

13

66

118.32

13

66

118.29

13

66

118.28

13

66

118.27

13

66

118.25

13

66

subsidy on elasmobranch catches
XVII.b.

10% tax on round fish catches nd 10%
subsidy on elasmobranch catches

XVII.c.

10% tax on roundfish catches and 15%
subsidy on elasmobranch catches

XVII.d.

10% tax on round fish catches and 20%

00

subsidy on elasmobranch catches

XVIII.a.

10% tax on roundfish catches and 5%
subsidy on pelagic catches

XVIII.b.

10% tax on roundfish catches and 10%
subsidy on pelagic catches

XVIII.c.

10% tax on roundfish catches and 15%
subsidy on pelagic catches

XVIIl.d.

10% tax on roundfish catches and 20%
subsidy on pelagic catches

5.4. Discussion

In addressing the modification of the species selectivity properties of fishing gears, we
attempted to address this issue theoretically and empirically. In chapter three, a stylized
construct of this issue was developed. While theoretical treatment recognized two types
of technology, namely perfectly selective and perfectly non-selective, it failed to
recognize fishermen's ability to respond to relative prices. Several studies have shown
that fishermen have a modicum of maneuverability to target one or more species.

To overcome this limitation, we adopted a more flexible specification. This new
specification allowed us to examine this issue in detail. The scenarios investigated in the
empirical section fell into two categories: market-based and technologically-based. The
former focused on tax and/or subsidy programs while the latter focused on changing the
gear's species selectivity properties.

An essential consideration for the study of tax and subsidy policies is that these

mechanisms are commonly advocated in situations involving externalities. This
situation is particularly relevant for the New England groundfish fishery where several
studies have shown the need to significantly reduce fishing effort to ensure the
biological and economic sustainability of the fishery. While one of the goals of this
work was to investigate strategies for rebuilding groundfish stocks, this work did not
investigate the socially optimal taxing policies. Clark (1990) observes that there are
several difficulties associated with taxation in fisheries. First, fishermen unanimously
oppose them because governments receive most of the rents, leaving fishermen with no
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rents or, at best, inframarginal rents. Second, the estimation of the optimal tax requires
managers to know the cost structure of the fleet and biological characteristics of the
stock, which fluctuate unpredictably. Third, since the optimal tax would have to be
calculated each year, new legislation would have to be passed for each fishing season.

The model was design so that the consequences of the vanous policies could be
investigated in simulation experiments. Throughout we assume that the physical
environment played no role in the system dynamics. The economic performance was
evaluated by comparing the NPV indexes with the baseline case, which was set at
100%. The first set of policies investigated the impact of modifying the species
selectivity properties of the gears (Table 20). The initial scenarios evaluated the impact
of reducing the catchability of the overexploited stocks. Simulation results showed that
reducing the catchability of roundfish yielded more benefits than reducing the
catchability of flatfish. The economic performance of these scenarios is due to the
harvest paths prior to reaching steady. Although, roundfish harvest rates are initially
lower than baseline harvest levels, between years 15 and 20 (depending on the policy)
they overtook baseline harvest levels. Since discounting favors present consumption
over future consumption, it is not surprising that NPV indexes are higher than baseline
levels.

An important feature of the model is the presence of predator-prey interactions. To

examine the impact of changing the selectivity properties on these interactions, we
initially modify the catchability of elasmobranchs species. Elasmobranchs are both prey
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and predators of roundfish and flatfish. We found that by increasing the catchability of
elasmobranch stocks we moderately increased the economic benefits relative to the
baseline, whereas when we decreased the catchability of elasmobranch stocks were
lowered the economic benefits relative to the baseline. These simulation experiments
indicate that by decreasing the elasmobranch abundance we increase the economic
performance of the fishery suggesting that elasmobranchs behave as a net predator.

Next, we examined policies that altered the catchability of pelagics stocks. Pelagics
species are an important prey item for roundfish. Pelagic stocks were overexploited in
the 1960's and 1970's, but since they have recovered to record levels. In recent years,
this fishery has received considerable attention as possible substitute for the
overexploited roundfish and flatfish fishery. Simulation results showed that by
increasing the pelagic selectivity the economic performance of the fishery decreased,
whereas when we decrease the pelagic selectivity the economic performance of the
fishery increased. These results suggest that redirecting effort towards the pelagic stocks
may have un-intended consequences, in spite of the record high stock levels.

We also investigated the impact of modifying the species selectivity properties
concurrently. We considered the cases where we reduced the roundfish catchability by
10% and modified (either increasing or decreasing) the catchability of elasmobranchs
and pelagics. Simulation results reinforced the direction of the results obtained when
only one policy was applied. However, the changes in magnitude were small. A
simultaneous reduction in the catchability of roundfish with an increase m
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elasmobranch catchability marginally improves the economic performance compared to
a policy that reduces the catchability of roundfish only. Similarly, simultaneously
reducing the catchability of roundfish and decreasing the catchability of pelagics
produces marginally better results than solely reducing the catchability of roundfish.

The second set of policies we considered were market-based programs. In selecting
incentive-disincentive policies, we first examined taxing roundfish and flatfish catches.
Based on the scenarios developed, simulation results indicated that a tax policy on
flatfish catches yielded marginally higher benefits than a similar taxation plan on
roundfish catches (Table 21). This was surprising since in the technology-based
scenarios, roundfish generated higher benefits. A closer examination of the harvest
paths shows that under the flatfish tax scenario, both roundfish and flatfish harvest
levels exceed baseline levels in year 9; whereas under the flatfish technological change
scenario, roundfish harvest levels exceed baseline levels in between years 9-84, while
flatfish harvest levels exceeded baseline levels between years 32 and 36.

Increasing the tax and subsidies rates on elasmobranchs and pelagics did not
appreciably change welfare indexes. However, the directions, if any, were comparable
to our findings from the technological based scenarios. Lastly, we investigated the
impact of simultaneously taxing roundfish at 10% and subsidizing elasmobranchs and
pelagics at different rates. Increasing the subsidy rate on elasmobranchs increased
welfare while increasing the subsidy rate on pelagics decreased welfare (Table 21 ).
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Again, the welfare changes were minuscule and followed the same patterns than in the
single policy case (and the technological based scenarios).
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Policy Implications

Advances in fishing technology have had profound consequences on the structure of
marine ecosystems. In Georges Bank, technological change contributed to dramatic
shifts in species composition. Commercially valuable demersal fish communities such
as roundfish and flatfish have been displaced by commercially less valuable
elasmobranch stocks. In recent years, elasmobranch stocks have begun to decline due to
increasing harvesting pressure. Simultaneously, low-value pelagic species, previously
overexploited, recovered to record levels.

In New England, an important policy priority to ensure the sustainable use of fisheries

resources and the economic viability of the industry is the improvement of the species
selectivity properties of fishing gears. The development of management measures to
ensure the sustainable use of fish resources requires an understanding of the
bioeconomic consequences of modifying the catchability of the gears.

To shed some light on this important policy concern, this research exammes the
bioeconomic implications of modifying the species selectivity properties of marine
gears. This work addresses this issue both theoretically and empirically. In the
theoretical section, a stylized model was developed to analyze the long-run equilibrium
bioeconomic properties of modifying the species selectivity properties of the gears. The
study examined two polar cases, namely when the gears were perfectly non-selective
and perfectly selective. Within each case, the impact of biological interactions (i.e.,
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predator-prey relationships) was considered. Three policies were considered: a
reduction in the catchability of the target species, an increase in the catchability of the
accompanying species, and the simultaneous combination of the above policies.

The analysis showed that there was a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the
impact of technological improvement. Policy prescriptions for rebuilding stocks varied
dramatically depending on the type of technology employed. In the perfectly nonselective gear case, rebuilding strategies would benefit decreasing the catchability of the
overexploited species as long as the stocks were biologically independent. In the
presence of biological interrelationships, decreasing the catchability yielded ambiguous
results. Other policies such as increasing the catchability of accompanying species and
simultaneously decreasing the catchability of the target species and increasing the
catchability of the accompanying species in the both the absence and presence of
biological interrelationship generated ambiguous results.

In the perfectly selective case, overexploited stocks were shown to recover under any of

the three policies considered both in the presence and in absence of biological
interrelationships. However, the impact of these policies on the accompanying species
and effort levels yielded different outcomes depending on the presence of biological
interrelationships.

In the empirical section, a bioeconomic model of the New England groundfish fishery
was constructed to investigate the dynamic behavior of the system when the species
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selectivity properties of the gear were altered. The model incorporates key predatorprey relationship of Georges Bank as well as recent advances in dual formulations,
which in fisheries applied work have been primarily used in a static context. The use of
dual formulations adds an interesting dimension to this research in that there is growing
evidence that fishermen who employ non-selective gears can choose the catch mix in
response to relative prices.

Simulation results indicate that technology and market-based mechanisms can aid in the
rebuilding process; however, by themselves are insufficient to recover the overxploited
roundfish and flatfish stocks. Rebuilding these stocks will require substantial reductions
in fishing effort.

The policy implications of our model are two-fold. First, policies that call for the use of
subsidies to divert fishing effort away from the overexploited stocks do not necessarily
increase the economic performance of the fishery. For instance, increasing the
catchability of pelagics actually reduced the economic performance of the fishery.
Second, attempts to modify predator-prey dynamics yielded modest results. For
instance, decreasing the pelagic selectivity to increase forage availability modestly
enhance the economic performance of the fishery. A similar conclusion is obtained
from modifying the elasmobranchs catchability coefficients. Neither increasing the
elasmobranch selectivity as a means to reduce predator concentration, nor decreasing
the elasmobranch selectivity as a means of increase forage significantly augmented
welfare.
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These conclusions and policy implications are dependent on the degree to which the
model is able to describe the interactions between the resource and the harvesting
sector. In spite of evidence of significant trophic interactions, some predator-prey
parameters estimates have a high degree of uncertainty (Collie and Delong, 1998).
Recent stock assessments suggest that some species groups such as elasmobranchs,
which during the study were underexploited are currently overexploited. Similarly, the
roundfish group appears to be increasing in spite of its overexploited status. These
results, while consistent with this model, may show different dynamics. The predatorprey relationships may be further refined as more data become available.

Another limitation of this model is that many of the stock parameters present in the
input-compensated supply equations violated the theoretically proper curvature
conditions. Imposing restrictions on the parameter estimates in many cases yielded
parameters in the order lOE-8. This made the input-compensated supply equations
essentially insensitive to stock changes. Given the insensitivity level of these parameters
and the uncertainty of some of the predator-prey relationships, further work needs to be
conducted before these results can be incorporated into management decisions.

While this study extends earlier works by considering the impact of altering the species
selectivity properties into a multispecies context, several aspects of this issue remain
unexplored. For instance, no attempt has been made to incorporate uncertainty into the
model. Stochastic variability in the form of red noise (variance as a decreasing function
of frequency) a feature commonly observed in marine environments could be readily

127

incorporated into the predator-prey model. Spencer and Collie (1994) used this red
noise specification to explain predator-prey interactions between haddock and spiny
dogfish.

Similarly, other forms of stochastic variability could be incorporated on ex-vessel prices
and the fleets harvest mix and cost structure. In addition to increasing the number of
species being explicitly modeled, a possible extension of the model would be to
incorporate spatial considerations such as the impact of closures and effort
redistribution. Spatial models are likely to become increasingly important as essential
habitat concerns catch the public officials' attention. Finally, while this piece has been
focused on marine ecosystems, this type of analysis could be extended to land
ecosystems. The relationship between wildlife game and hunting policies would be one
example.
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Appendix A

To analyze the short-run effect of modifying the catchability coefficient in a single
species fishery we assume that the industry has the following profit function
n

= pqexfJ

-c(e)

In addition, we assume that the effort dynamics is given by

Setting the effort dynamics equation to zero and differentiating with respect to the
catchability coefficient we obtain
de

pxfJ

dq

cee

-=--

The above relationship states that an increase in the species selectivity properties of the
gear in the short-run will be directly related to the price of the species, stock size, and
harvest-stock size elasticity (/3) and indirectly related to the rate of change of the
marginal cost of effort.

To examine the impact on yield we differentiate the harvest function
dh
f3 dq /3
dx
fJ -de
-=ex
-+ qex (/J-I) -+qx
dq
dq
dq
dq

Since in the short-run the impact dxldq=O then we obtain
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Appendix B

To solve for the local stability conditions we need to estimate the characteristic roots or
eigenvalues of a linearized dynamical system evaluated at its steady state. Assuming
that our system is given by pair of first order differential equations
i = F(x,y) and
y=G(x,y)

where the steady state solution is given by (x*, y*) such that F(x*, y*)=G(x*, y*)=O.
Then the linearized differential equation at the neighborhood of the equilibrium is
obtained by using Taylor series expansion and retaining the linear term such that
i = FxCx*,y*)(x-x*) + FY (x*,y*)(y- y*)
y = Gx(x*,y*)(x-x*)+Gy(x*,y*)(y- y*)

Rewriting the system in matrix form we obtain

Solving for the characteristic equation we get that
detlA-RII= [ a 11 -A.
U21

a
U22

12

-A

]

=0

Making use of the Routh theorem which states that the real parts of all of the roots of
the n 11z degree polynomial

are negative if and only if the first n of the following sequence of determinants
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[b, l, [::

:: ] ,[;

are all positive. In our quadratic case

with real coefficients (b 1 and b0) both have negative and real parts if and only if b 1 > 0
and b2> 0.

This implies that for the system to stable (a11+a22) < 0, and

IAI > 0. These are sufficient

and necessary conditions. Thus, in our case the following conditions must hold

In the case of a 3x3 matrix modified Routh-Hurwitz conditions reqmre that

2 A -11 < o (Murata, 1977).

1
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Appendix C
This appendix reviews the biologically independent case for both the perfectly
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies. The results show that in some
instances the impact of changing the catchability coefficient is ambiguous. Thus, to
derive some unambiguous results and make the analysis more tractable we introduce
two additional assumptions

<
( H x j -aq J.ex<.a-l))
J

0

for any set of equilibrium values (e*,x 1 *,x2 *). These assumptions ensure that the
individual stock size equilibrium is dynamically stable.

C. l. Perfectly Selective Technology Case

(-)

-IHI
( +)

(-)

(-)

IHI
( +)
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C.2. Perfectly Non-Selective Technology Case
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Appendix D

In this appendix, we review the biologically interdependent case for both the perfectly
selective and perfectly non-selective technologies.

D.1. Perfectly Selective Technology Case
(-)

(-)
,....-----"---

(ce;•1 p jXJ (Hx, Gx1 -(Gx; - /Jq;e;x }/3-l))H xi )

IHI
.__.,..,

IHI
.__.,..,

(+)

(+)
(-)

IHI
.........
{+)
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.--------A-----

/3 ((H x -aq .e .x {a-1))
)
q;X;/3 c•J.•j + Gxj q1.x1a.cee
1 1 1.
+ P;X;
j
I j

((
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D.2. Perfectly Non-Selective Technology Case
(-)

(-)
P.
(/3-1) a
aH )
aH (G
P.
(/3-1))) dqj
(Gx . ( PP;q;x;
ex1· + P1·X1· x· - P1·q1· x . x . - PP;q;x;
dq .
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Appendix E
Baseline scenario

To gauge the suite of proposed management policies a baseline scenario was developed.
The baseline scenario assumed that the current limited entry regime remains in place for
the duration of the simulation. As mentioned earlier, to ensure that the valuable
demersal stocks (i.e., roundfish and flatfish) do not collapse, the overall effort level is
reduced by 58 %. Under this scenario, roundfish biomass continues to decline until year
14 reaching minimum biomass level of 55 million tons, then rising rapidly and
stabilizing at 840.1 million tons. Flatfish and pelagic stocks increase stabilizing at 76
and 2,221.8 million tons, respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapse in year 87. The
collapse of elasmobranch stocks is not surprising given that dogfish constitute a larger
proportion of this assemblage. Dogfish grow slowly, mature late, and produce a small
number of offspring, leaving them vulnerable to overexploitation.

In terms of harvesting, roundfish stocks initially yield 28.5 million tons rapidly

dropping to 25.15 million tons in year 14. Subsequently, roundfish stocks increased
stabilizing at 180.9 million tons. Flatfish catches increase from 2.1 million tons to 4
million tons. Similarly, pelagic and miscellaneous species catches increased from 9 and
16.4 million tons to 42.8 and 21.8 million tons, respectively. In contrast, elasmobranch
stocks yield decreased from 2.16 million tons to zero in year 87. In terms of economic
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performance, the net present value of discounted quasi rents is normalized to one for
.

.

policy companson purposes.
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Technological change scenarios

Scenario I: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks.

This scenario considers reducing the gear's roundfish selectivity by 5, 10, 15 and 20%.
Under this scenario, roundfish profile is shifted to the left in respect to the baseline case.
Steady state roundfish biomass levels increase with larger reduction in catchability.
With a 5% reduction in catchability, roundfish steady state levels reached 856.8 million
tons while with a 20% reduction roundfish steady state levels reached 907.3million
tons. Flatfish biomass profile under the reduced catchability cases shift upwards around
year 18 in respect to the baseline scenario. At year 80, flatfish biomass profiles
converge slightly above the baseline benchmark around 76 million tons. Similarly,
reducing the catchability of roundfish shifted up the pelagic biomass profile between
years 18 and 85 in respect to the benchmark pelagic biomass. After year 85, pelagic
biomass profiles converge to the baseline scenario. At a 5% roundfish reduction, pelagic
long run stock size reached 2,223 .7 million tons while at a 20% reduction pelagic stocks
stabilized at 2,230.3million tons. Reducing the roundfish catchability accelerated the
collapse of the elasmobranch stocks.
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The estimated NPV was US$ 4,141.6 million. Assuming a 100-year horizon at a 3 percent discount

rate.
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In harvesting terms, reducing roundfish selectivity shifts roundfish harvesting paths to
the left of the baseline scenario. Roundfish steady state harvest levels decrease with
increased reductions in catchability. At a reduction of 5%, roundfish stocks stabilize at
108.70 million tons while at a 20% reduction roundfish stocks stabilize at 93.94 million
tons. Flatfish catches exhibit a similar pattern to roundfish stocks. At a 5% reduction,
flatfish harvest levels stabilized at 3.96 million tons while at a 20% reduction flatfish
harvest levels stabilized at 3.82 million tons.

With decreasing catchability,

elasmobranch catches exhibit decreasing harvest levels.

With a 5% reduction in

roundfish catchability, pelagic and miscellaneous species yielded 5.6353 and 21.7913
million tons, respectively while with a 20% reduction they yielded 5.3941 and 21.6923
million tons, respectively.

Scenario II: Reduction in the catchability offlatfish stocks.

The second scenario evaluates reducing the flatfish catchability. As in other scenarios,
we considered a reduction of 5, 10, 15 and 20%. Reducing the catchability of flatfish
shifts the roundfish and flatfish biomass profiles to the left. Roundfish, flatfish and
pelagic long run biomass levels exceeded baseline levels. At a 5 % reduction, roundfish,
flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilize at 840.1, 76.64, and 2,222.6 million tons,
respectively, while at a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilize at
841.16, 77 .5, and 2,225.1 million tons, respectively. Elasmobranch stocks collapse
sooner in the presence of policies that curtail the catchability of flatfish.
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At a 5 % reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species catches
stabilized at 113.03, 3.79, 5.67, and 21.79 million tons, respectively, while at a 20 %
reduction the catches of these stocks stabilized at 112.93, 3.18, 5.58, and 21.76 million
tons, respectively.

Scenario III: Increase in the catchability of elasmobranch stocks

The third scenario evaluates increasing the catchability of the elasmobranchs. With a
5% increase in the elasmobrach selectivity, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks
stabilized at 840.2, 76.1 , and 2,222 million tons, whereas with a 20% increase they
stabilized at 840.3, 76, and 2,222.6 million tons, respectively.

Under the 5 % increase scenario, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
landings reached stabilized at 113 .07, 4.0, 5.70, and 21.81 million tons, respectively
whereas with a 20% increase these stocks stabilized at 113.07, 4.0, 5.678, and 21.8123
million tons, respectively.

Scenario IV: Reduction in the catchability of elasmobranch stocks.

The four scenario investigates reducing the elasmobranch species selectivity. With a 5%
reduction, the roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 840.1, 76, and 2,221
million tons, respectively. With a 20% reduction, they reached steady state level of
839.7, 76.0, and 2,220.7 million tons, respectively.
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With a 5% reduction in elasmobranch selectivity, the harvest of roundfish and
miscellaneous species stabilized at 113.0686 and 21.8037 million tons, respectively;
while with a 20% reduction they stabilized at 113.0547 and 21.7982 million tons,
respectively. In contrast, a 5% reduction resulted in flatfish and pelagic stocks reaching
a long-term steady state harvest rate of 4 and 5. 7152 million tons, respectively. While
with a 20% reduction, flatfish and pelagic stocks reached a steady state harvest rate of
4.0028 and 5.7360 million tons, respectively.

Scenario V: Increase in the catchability ofpelagic stocks.

The fifth scenario considers increasing the pelagic species selectivity by 5, 10, 15, and
20%. Increasing the catchability from 5 to 20%, reduces the stock size of roundfish
from 838.9 to 853.3 million tons. Analogously, the pelagic steady state stock size drops
from 2,214.3 to 2,191.8 million tons. The flatfish stock size increases from 75.9 to 76.3
million tons.

In harvesting terms, augmenting the pelagic catchability from 5 to 20% reduced the
roundfish steady state harvest level from 112.8673 to 112.2719 million tons and
increased the flatfish steady state harvest rate from 3.99 to 4.0 million tons,
respectively. Likewise, steady state pelagic harvest levels increases from 5.98 to 6.79
million tons while miscellaneous species steady state harvest level decreased from 21.8
to 21. 79 million tons
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Scenario VI: Decrease in the catchability ofpelagic stocks.

The sixth scenario investigates decreasing the catchability of pelagic species. As in
other scenarios, we considered a reduction of 5, 10, 15 and 20%. At a 5 % reduction,
roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 841.3 , 76.5, and 2,229.2 million tons,
respectively, while at a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized
at 844.9, 75.9, and 2,251.5 million tons, respectively.

In terms of harvesting, reducing the pelagic catchability increased the steady state

roundfish and miscellaneous species harvest levels, and reduced steady state flatfish and
pelagic harvest levels. At a 5% reduction, roundfish and miscellaneous species harvest
levels stabilized at 113.27 and 21.8 million tons, respectively, while at a 20% reduction,
roundfish and miscellaneous species steady state harvest levels stabilized at 113.86 and
21.81 million tons, respectively. On other hand, a similar catchability reduction,
decreases flatfish and pelagic steady state harvest levels from 3.99 and 5.4 million tons
to 3.98 and 4.6 million tons, respectively.

Scenario VII: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks with an increase in
the catchability of elasmobranch stocks.

The seventh scenario explores the impacts of simultaneously reducing the catchability
of roundfish and improving the catchability of elasmobranchs. For the purposes of the

141

scenano, the roundfish catchability is reduced by 10% while the elasmobranch
catchability is increased between 5-20%.

With a 5 %increase in elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic stocks
stabilized at 873.36, 75.9, and 2,226.0 million tons, respectively; whereas with a 20%
increase in the elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks
stabilized at 873.8, 76.7, and 2,226.6 million tons, respectively.

With 5% increase, the long-run roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
harvest rates stabilized at 104.05, 3.9179, 5.55, and 21.77 million tons, respectively;
whereas with a 20% increase, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
harvest rates stabilized at

104.06, 3.9172, 5.5296, and 21.7754 million tons,

respectively.

Scenario VIII: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish and elasmobranch stocks.

The eighth scenano considers simultaneously reducing the gears ability to target
roundfish and elasmobranchs. This scenario assumed that roundfish catchability was
reduced by 10% whereas the elasmobranch catchability was reduced between 5 and
20%.

In the long-run with a 5% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at

873.5, 76.5, and 2,225.6 million tons respectively. With a 20% decrease in the

142

elasmobranch catchability, roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stocks stabilized at 873.4,
76.4, and 2,225 million tons, respectively.

In harvesting terms, an decrease of 5% results in roundfish, flatfish, pelagic, and

miscellaneous species steady state catch rates reaching 104.0566, 3.9211, 5.5661, and
21. 76 million tons, respectively. With a 20% decrease, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic, and
miscellaneous species long run catch rates stabilize at 104.0539, 3.9261, 5.5881, and
21.7625 million tons, respectively.

Scenario IX: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish stocks with an increase in
the catchability ofpelagic stocks.

The ninth scenano considers simultaneously reducing the gears ability to target
roundfish and increasing the ability to target pelagics. In the long run with 5% change,
roundfish, flatfish, and pelagic stock sizes stabilized at 872.4, 76.6, and 2,218.5 million
tons while with a 20% change they stabilized at 868.8, 76.5, and 2,196.5 million tons,
respectively.

Roundfish and miscellaneous species steady state harvest levels decreased from 103.88
to 103.35 million tons and from 21.76 to 21.75 million tons, respectively as the pelagic
selectivity was increased from 5 to 20%. In contrast, long-run flatfish, pelagic catch
levels increased from 3.9257 to 3.9269 million tons and from 21.765 to 21.7541 million
tons, respectively.
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Scenario X: Reduction in the catchability of roundfish and pelagic stocks.

The tenth scenario studies the effects of simultaneously reducing the catchability of
roundfish and pelagic. The roundfish catchability reduction was fixed at 10% while the
pelagic catchability reduction varied between 5 and 20%.

Under the 5 % reduction scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes
stabilized at 874.8, 76.3, and 2,233.1 million tons; whereas under the 20% reduction
scenario, they stabilized at 878.3, 75.9, and 2,254.8 million tons, respectively.

With a 5% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.23, 3.92, 5.29, and 21.77 million tons, respectively. With
a 20% reduction, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species harvest rates
stabilized 104.75, 3.91, 4.47, and 21.78 million tons, respectively.

Market-based scenarios

Scenario XI: Tax scheme on roundfish catches

The eleventh scenario analyzed was imposing a tax on roundfish landings. The cases
considered included a 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent tax on ex-vessel prices. Under the 5 %
tax scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 882.1,
76.0, and 2,256.4

million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized

at 894.9, 76.9, and 2,261.5

million tons, respectively.
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With a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 103.7359, 3.8521, 4.4153, and 21.7231 million tons,
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized 100.2338, 3.6670, 4.2199, and 21.4518 million tons,
respectively.

Scenario XII: Tax scheme for flatfish catches

The twelfth scenario investigates the impact of a tax on flatfish catches. Under the 5 %
tax scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.6,
75.9, 2,255.3 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at
879.5, 76.0, and 2,256.9 million tons, respectively.

Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.6478, 3.8910, 4.4357, and 21.7485 million tons,
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.5429,

3.8700, 4.3956, and 21.7146 million

tons, respectively.

Scenario XIII: Tax scheme for elasmobranch catches

The thirteenth scenario considers a tax on elasmobranch catches. Under the 5 % tax
scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.3, 76.0,
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and 2,254.7 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at 878.2,
76, and 2,254.5 million tons, respectively.

Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7559, 3.9136, 4.4784, and 21.7812 million tons,
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7674, 3.9185, 4.4877, and 21.7792 million tons,
respectively.

Scenario XIV: Subsidy scheme for elasmobranch catches

The fourteenth scenario evaluates a subsidy on elasmobranch catches. Under the 5 %
subsidy scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at
878.4, 75.9, and

2,254.9 million tons; whereas under the 20% subsidy scenario, they

stabilized at 878.4, 75.9, and 2.2551 million tons, respectively.

Under a 5% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7477, 3.9104, 4.4726, and 21.7824 million tons,
respectively; while with a 20% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7351, 3.906, 4.4644, and 21.7840 million tons,
respectively.
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Scenario XV: Tax scheme for pelagic catches

The fifteenth scenario investigates a tax scheme on pelagic catches. Under the 5 % tax
scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at 878.4, 75.9,
and 2,255.2 million tons; whereas under the 20% tax scenario, they stabilized at 878.7,
75.9, and 2,256.4 million tons, respectively.

Under a 5% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7524, 3.9091, 4.4613, and 21.7782 million tons,
respectively; while with a 20% tax, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized at104.7560,

3.9003, 4.4154, and 21.7679 million tons,

respectively.

Scenario XVI: Subsidy scheme for pelagic catches

The sixteenth scenario investigates a subsidy scheme on pelagic catches. Under the 5 %
subsidy scenario, roundfish, flatfish and pelagic steady state stock sizes stabilized at
878.2, 76.0, and

2,254.4 million tons; whereas under the 20% subsidy scenario, they

stabilized at 878, 76.0, and 2,253.4 million tons, respectively.

Under a 5% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species steady state
harvest levels stabilized at 104.7515, 3.9150, 4.4892, and 21.7855 million tons,
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respectively; while with a 20% subsidy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous
species harvest rates stabilized at 104.7515, 3.9238, 4.5283, and 21.797 million tons,
respectively.

Scenario XVII: Tax scheme for roundfish and subsidy scheme for elasmobranchs
catches

The seventeenth scenario considers tax/subsidy scheme where roundfish catches are tax
at a 10 percent while the subsidy level on elasmobranch catches was allowed to vary
between 5 and 20 percent at 5 % increments.

Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
biomass stabilized at 886.2, 76.2, and 2,258. l million tons, respectively. Under the 20%
subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized
at 886.3, 76.4, and 2,258.3 million tons, respectively.

Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
catches stabilized at 102.6450, 3.7896, 4.3499, and 21.65 million tons, respectively.
Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
harvest rates stabilized at 102.6331, 3. 7866, 4.3420, and 21.6511 million tons,
respectively.

148

Scenario XVIII: Tax scheme for roundfish and subsidy scheme for pelagic catches

The eighteenth scenario considered was a tax/subsidy scheme where roundfish catches
could be taxed at 10% while the subsidy on pelagic catches was allowed to vary
between 5 and 20 percent at 5% increments. Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish,
flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized at 886.0, 76.2, 2,257.6
million tons, respectively. Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic
and miscellaneous species biomass stabilized at 885.8, 76.1, and 2, 256.5 million tons,
respectively.

Under the 5% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
catches stabilized at 102.6487, 3.7932, 4.3675, and 21.654 million tons, respectively.
Under the 20% subsidy policy, roundfish, flatfish, pelagic and miscellaneous species
harvest rates stabilized at 102.6497, 3.8016, 4.4094, and 21.6677 million tons,
respectively.
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Appendix F
Matlab Code
al=.42; %0.39
close;
CCC=[28.55969857
25 .45322923] 'i

(8.428721918*0.46)

3.891659726 2.349503273

%Starting values
T=lOO;

%ti me span

x=[ 88.6 5 . 8 171.97 382 O] '; %initial stock size 5.4165 6.366
y= [ 88. 6 2. 28 170 382 O] '; %lagged initial stock size
%y=[ 68 5.47 147.21 239.2 0] ';
%x=[ 68 5.47 147.21 239.2 0] ';
%X= (737 80 199 2367 l] I
%=== ==================================================================
%List of parameters
%Biological (order: groundfish, flatfish,
misc. species)

elasmobranchs, pelagics and

%---------% intrinsic growth00954043
r=[ 0.557 1.108 (0.409) 0.314 O] '; % ms species original model
%r= (0. 72 1. 01 3. 95 0. 01 O] '; %single species
%1.10 8
% carrying capacities
K= [ (737) 80 199
2367 l] '; %original model
%K= (308. 8 60 30 2000 l] '; %single species

% multispecies interaction coefficient (i.e. t predator-prey)*.94116
alpha=l*[ 0.000000
0.000000
-0.001561
0.000132
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
-0.002890
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
-0.000359
-0.000927
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
- 0.000248
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000 l i
% alpha=zeros(5,5);
% vector of ones to sum multispecies interact ion coefficients
I=ones(5,l) ; %I=[ l 1 1 1 l) ';
%Economic
%--------
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% Fish prices
pr=l.71*(1-0.1);
%pr ice roundfish
pf=2.73*(1-0);
%pric e flatfish
pe=0.25*(1+0.0);
%pri ce elasmobranch
pp=0.36*(1+0.2);
%price pelagics
po=2.47*(1-0);
%price miscellaneous sp ec ies
pprime=[l.71 2 . 73 0.25 0.36 2.47] ';
p=[pr pf pe pp po]';
xprice=sqrt([l
pf/pr pe/pr pp/pr po/pr;
pr/pf 1
pe/pf pp/pf po/pf;
pr/pe pf/pe 1
pp/pe po/pe;
pr/pp pf/pp pe/pp 1
po/pp;
pr/po pf/po pe/po pp/po 1]);
price=sqrt([prA2
pf*pr
pe*pr
pp*pr
po*pr
%Techonology
%-----------

pr*pf
pfA2
pe*pf
pp*pf
po*pf

pr*pe
pf*pe
peA2
pp*pe
po*pe

pr*pp
pf*pp
pe*pp
ppA2
po*pp

pr*po;
pf*po;
pe*po;
pp*po;
poA2]);

% Otter Trawl Fleet (5 -50 GRT )
% ---------------------------%alphaotcl=[(-65 9 . 93-1.5*356) (-54 6.779+1.35*253 .1) (-274 .925 0.55*332) (-54.7771+.15*274.925) (-824.601 +0 .8*3 60.2)] I i
alphaotcl=[(-659 . 93-1*356.1 )
(-546.779+.3*253.1)
(-274.925 -. 9*332
(-54. 7771+ . 07*274. 925 ) ( -824. 601-0*360. 2 ) ] '. *adjust_alpha;
%2.3* %1. 7* %0.7 5 %0 *.15* %0*0 . 55*
betaotcl= [ (26921. 27-. 55*3638. 6)
0
0
0
0;
0
(40380.04-.0*2553.0)
0
0
O;
0
7379.488
0
0
0;
0
(28 . 40943)
0
0
O·
'
0
0
0
0
3 0550. 69] . *adjust;
portotc1=[21911.55 25713.97
24313.3
-21471.2
-38339.4
1371.342
-8978.88
31950.25 2026.795
39377.56 4686.713
29219.2] .*adjust_portotcl;

(8200.672)
-38353.7
-10299.8
251.8448
1737.626

-18699.6
-39095 . 5
260.6731
130 . 0317
-24967.3

-22369.5
- 39216.9
-6632.91
174.6506
-29039.9

- 39297.4;
6152.152;
156.981;

wtportotcl=[0.0105960
0.0145695
0 . 0145695 0 . 3165563 0 . 4993377
0. 0092715] ;
%wtportotcl=[0.0463576
0.0384106
0 . 0516556 0. 5 470199 1.6529801
0.0238411 ]; effort adj.
stockotcl=diag(adjust_stock'*[(ll .56 475 ) 1.0lE-6 l.OlE-6 1 . 0lE-6
0] )

I

i

seasonrotcl=adjust_seasonr.*[ -37 75 . 79 - 1931.54
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-4 870.19 O] ';

seasonfotcl=adjust_seasonf.*[ 1361.836 1924.967
seasoneotcl=adjust seasone . *[ -1932.66 -1573.72
seasonpotcl=adjust_seasonp. * [ 292. 3569 41. 45193
seasonootcl=adjust seasono.*[ 1234.596 4668.148
seasonotcl=[seasonrotcl seasonfotcl seasoneotcl
seasonootclJ ' ;
wtotcl= [O. 2278146 0. 2927152 0 .1880795 0. 2913907J

2425 .395 OJ';
8197.782 OJ';
-261. 264 OJ ';
1294.316 OJ';
seasonpotcl
';

%wtotc1=[0.2913907 0.2278146 0.2927152 0.1880795J '; effort adj.
%average number of trips per

ntripotcl= al* [172 221 142 220J '/5;
season

% Otter Trawl Fleet (51-100 GRT)
% ---------------------------1. 75279266 0. 78444012
ss2=[9.90778476

0. 344831133 8. 83936159J

Ii

alphaotc2=[ (-1729.61-1*520.7) (-63.9323+1*49 .0634)
(-247.0581*100.9)
(-17.1677-1*26.0975) (-795.385-1*324.8) J 1 .*adjust_alpha;
%a lphaotc2=[ (-1729.61-0.1*520.7) (-63.9323-.8*49.06)
(247.058+.37*100.9)
(-17.1677-.445*26.09) (-795.385-1.51*324.8) J 1;
betaotc2=[(8952.302 - 0.75*5318.7)
0
0
-lE-8
0.
'
0.
(1496.814+.1*394.5)
0
0
0
'
(1886.48-0.52*811.1)
0
0
0
0;
-lE-8
(53 . 55962+0.15 *281.6)
0
0
0;
(10343.870
0
0
0
1*2611.8)J .*adjust;
portotc2=[26464.14 35096.26 10847.09
63407.32 -27 84.6 ;
-2784.6
-96.8927 195.9616
8376.546 -538 .854;
-1020.93 -772.462
- 912.496
1881.722 -653.107;
205.3809 963.1371 45.38551
-134.8;
2930 .358
40697.95 20681.01 11251.17
56209. 89
-4185. 23 J . *adjust_portotc2;
%wt portotc2=[0.0452656
%
0.0364896
effort adj
wtportotc2=[

0.0087760
0.0064665

- 337.673

-4399.6

941.309

615.788

333.6045 -1082.12
-28.038
-1664.65

369.314
206.7435

119.6609 45.31248
1922.778

0.2494226
0.2272517

0.2600462
0 . 2092379

0.0748268
0.0309469

-6645.04

3969.381

0.4743649 ...
0. 0175520J;

0.0438799 0.2000000 ...
0.0595843 0.0032333J i

stockotc2=diag (adjust_stock' * [51. 53025 1. OlE-6 1. OlE-6 0. 36138 OJ) ';
seasonrotc2=adjust_seasonr.*[
seasonfotc2=adjust_seasonf.*[
seasoneotc2=adjust seasone.*[
seasonpotc2=adjust_seasonp.*[
seasonootc2=adjust seasono.*[

-7380.46
-622.643
-533.294
-1.3904
-5721 .3 4
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-3957.21
-935.603
-509.005
-88.0273
-7925.34

2563.43
-740.094
1273.239
-269.77
-6119. 54

OJ
OJ
OJ
0J
OJ

I•

'
'
I•
'
I ;
I•

I•

'

seasonotc2=(seasonrotc2 seasonfotc2 seasoneotc2 seasonpotc2
seasonootc2J 1 ;
%wtotc2 = (0 1. 0267898
1. 5819861 1. 5510393 J ';
wtotc2= (0 .1912240 0. 2969977 0. 3113164
0. 2004619J ';
ntripotc2=a1*(414 643 674 434J/5';
% Otter Trawl Fleet (101-150 GRT)
% ------------------------------ss3=(8.306704424

3.045217508 0.394546029 0.436494722 8.541146952J ';

alphaotc3=((-150.617-1*63.1506)
(-12.5852+1*6.4888) (-11.09421*2.7057) (-2.8268+1*10.5648)
(-108.4111*53.7672)J '.*adjust_alpha; %alphaotc3=( (-15 0.617+ .5*63.15 )
(12.5852+0*6.488) (-11. 0942+2*2.7) (-2.8268+0*10.56)
(108.411+0*53.7672)J I i
betaotc3=(
42.17843;

(1551.076-0.1 *569)

18.26466

36.33482

36.33482

(594.1454+1*58.58)

18.26466

-20.6377

-222.818

214.923

-20.6377

-222.818
214.923

105.15;
(164.076-1*41.65)

-56.8824

14.97303;
-56.8824

(-173.267+1.97*128)

17.4571;
.55*494.6)

42.17843
-105.15
J . *adjust;

- 17.4571

14.97303

(1793.494-

-165.465 4.779799
portotc3=[9264.756 3276.413 568.2496 30.25201
8477.559
-233.803
415.5655;
815.9928
-40.6156
-2 34 . 302 -304.044 -121.602
-130.159
520.8881
-231.88
-296.462;
-85.2506 11.75669
72.48458 -49.3124 -42.4398 106.966
236.0714
-8 .335
15.52872;
73.82621 -12.6 042
376.5949 15.30252 35.31837 35.26444
-53.0907;
885.6881 -79.0295
13715.49 1441.897 740.4387 37.86365
683.1054
220.2205
7199.631
10156.92 267.8108 J .*adjust_portotc3;
%wtportotc3=(
0 . 1889297
0.0043773 ...
%
0.7293138

0.7507766

0.2907371
0.2664502

0.0014120

wtportotc3=( 0.0199096 0.0618469
0.0972889
0.1060435 ...
0 . 0667890 0. 000282406
0. 000282406J;
stockotc3=diag(adjust_stock'*( l.OlE-6
0J)

I

l.OlE-6

0.1358373
0. 0035301 J;

0.0320531 0.000847218

l.OlE-6 0.569556

i

seasonrotc3=adjust_seasonr .*( - 497.485
seasonfotc3=adjust_seasonf.*(-122.004
seasoneotc3=adjust_seasone.*(-22.9753
seasonpotc3=adjust_seasonp.*(-54.0362
seasonootc3=adjust_seasono.*(-547.66
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-160.796
- 393 . 287 OJ';
-152.171
-215 .427 OJ';
23. 56345 OJ I;
-13.0393
72.01692
- 162 .66 OJ';
-1504. 45 OJ I;
- 893.579

seasonotc3=[seasonrotc3 seasonfotc3 seasoneotc3 seasonpotc3
seasonootc3] ' ;
%wtotc3=[1.7158995
1 .8469359
1 .8 047162] '; adj effort
wtotc3=[0.2438577

0.2661677

0.2780288 0.2119458] ';

ntripotc3=al* [ 1727 1885 1969 1501] '/5;
% Otter Trawl Fleet (1 50 + GRT)
% ----------------------------ss4=[6 . 57140044
0.608171078 0.094608867 1.329113896 4.245116304] ';

alphaotc4=[(-213.25-1*24.2797)
(-1.21341+1*3.1227)
1*2.1972)
(-22.5351+0*23.8834) (-126.73+1*46.3863)
] '.*adjust_alpha;

betaotc4=[

(-5.69854-

(1026.124+0*343.9) 87.31942
58.96083
333.404
-237.842
87. 31942 (336. 8175+0 .1 *59. 0625) -76. 322
-110. 215

6.29598
-76.322
58. 96083
29.50682
333.404
-110.215
(54.05242+0*374.4)
-155.197
-237.842
-6 .29598
(885. 4309+0*497. 6)]. *adjust;

(115.0486-1.7*86.5968)

19.9323

portotc4=[ 2363.51 1330.166
1073.427 -1114.42;
-284.436
-307.38
302.223 -293.547;
- 56.0717
-69.563
39.1166 108.9576;
32.46466
9.759805
30002.83 207.8199;
3864.671 798.8908
8280.735 2652. 55] . *adjust_portotc4;

612.0636
-316 .57

-19.9323
29.50682

736.3775
-109.969

-155.197

6625.9
-170.433

-72.1222

-45.3105

65.85736

-24.1633

72.96831

376 . 976

876.8434

387.4356

1125.521

wtportotc4=[0.0993361 0.2152707 0.2885598 0.0311542 0.1355975
0.0071502 0.000255363 l;
stockotc4=diag(adjust_stock'*[ 3.572765
8.643869 0.139085
lE-8
O]) I;

seasonrotc4=adjust_seasonr.*[473.7387
302.4815
876.1154
seasonfotc4=adjust_seasonf. * (-4. 07991
- 36. 2135
-61.1493
seasoneotc4=adjust_seasone.*[-12.1515
- 5 . 99297
-17.0164
seasonpotc4=adjust_seasonp. * (27. 35761
316. 5499
-14. 0539
seasonootc4=adjust_seasono. * (1059. 278
- 156. 693
-401. 777
seasonotc4=[seasonrotc4 seasonfotc4 seasoneotc4 seasonpotc4
seasonootc4] ' ;
wtotc4= [O. 2247191 0. 2842186
o. 2918795 0 . 1991828 ] ';
ntripotc4=al* (880 1113 1143 780 ] '/5;
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O] ';
O] ';

O] ';
O] ';
O] ';

-

%Gill net

%------- -ss5= (0. 80603796
0. 058431624 1. 53939396 0. 007941179 0. 002646416J ';
alphagill=((-103.265+0.5*46.7833)
1.732504
(-195.958+1*130.6) ...
(-1. 09329-1*1. 0864
(-202. 296-1*75. 9669) J '. *adjust_alpha;
betagill=( (1322.798-0.01*1322.798) 0
0
0
O;
(-144.553+0.14*451.0)
0
0
O;
0
(22184. 87+ .10*7483 .1)
0
0;
0
0
0 0
0
(35.67559-.19*64.2565)
O;
(3946.528- . 6918*4353.9)
0 0
0
0
J .*adjust;
portgill=( 3490.731 2942.576 -8.15234
-245.772
-79.7915
-937.362
-1296.92;
97.61999 614.7927 49.34266 137.0019 -41.4263
145 . 0877 -96.9041;
-13822.9
- 21579
-10445
-21450.1
-20353.6
21988.9
-6981. 9;
- 21.6092
51 . 84492
43.93175 8 . 127567
-10.1377
53.6602 -37.4023;
-2072. 63
-1243
9232.385
4441. 841 -1236.13
-3739.7
-3044. 59 J . *adjust_portgill;
wtportgill=(0.1115385
0.1423077
0.0102564 0.7256410 0.0051282
0 . 0012821 0. 0538462J;
%wtportgill =(0 .725 6410 0.5641026 0.0653846 2.3230769
0.0102564
0.0012821 0.2935897 J ; %adj. effort
stockgill=diag (adjust_stock' * ( 1 . 885822
lE-8
lE-8
0. 049063 OJ) ';
seasonrgill=adjust_seasonr.*(-869.171 -941.022
302 . 2671
OJ';
seasonfgill=adjust_seasonf.*(-53.8486 267.6565
-14.2891 OJ';
seasonegill=adjust_seasone. * ( -2317. 36
-1146. 69 3291 . 115 OJ ';
seasonpgill=adjust_seasonp. * (-25. 5854
-48. 2157
-40. 3 73 8 0 J ' ;
seasonogill=adjust_seasono. * ( 128. 5754 -2481. 87
-1089 .11 OJ ';
seasongill=(seasonrgill seasonfgill seasonegill seasonpgill
seasonogillJ ' ;
Wtgill=(0.1358974 0 . 1756410
0.3256410 0.3628205
) I;
%wtgill=(0 .5 153846 0.7423077 1.3064103 OJ';
ntripgill=al* (106 137 254 283 J '/5;

%adj effort

%Long line

%--- ---- - SS6= (0.198396252

9.68278E-05 0.025768891 3.49617E-05 0.640749996J I;

alphalong=( -34.9293
-0.0879 2.116814 0.023613
.12*38.3677)
J '.*adjust_alpha;
betalong=((749.6613-.5*606.9)
0
0
0
(1.88109-.38*3.0679)

( - 40.03170.I

0

0

0

0;

0
0
0

0
0
0

(-64.7747+.04*229.5)
0
O;
(-0.6927+.13*0.6779)
O;
0
3917.334].*adjust;
O
O
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portlong=[ 136.4355 1346. 681
-631.917 i
0.083945
0.247839
-0.22718;
50.68681
371.0619
8.658852
-0 . 21353
0.04008
-0.07961
714.8744
2645.186
-2561. 15] . *adjust_portlong;

wtportlong=[0.2514620 0.1169591
0.0087719 0.2777778];

-319.43
-0.93487
68.13725

-20.0979 -216.241 188.2733
0.207043 -0.37719 0.099133
38.57052 27.3486 55.62657

0.149255 0.219146
-2658.44

-3477.52 -3636.59

0.0058480

stocklong=diag(adjust stock'*[ 2.324345

0.167524

0.054482

wtlong=[ 0.3274854 0.2426901 0.1111111 0.3187135 ] ';

% Counter information
biomass=x';

effort_otcl=[O];
harvest_otcl=[O 0 O 0 O];
allboat_otcl=[l];
Nboat_otcl=allboat_otcl;
profit_otcl=[lO];
effort_otc2=[0];
harvest_otc2=[0 0 0 O O];
allboat_otc2=[1];
Nboat_otc2=allboat_otc2;
profit_otc2=[10];
effort_otc3=[0];
harvest_otc3=[0 0 0 0 O];
allboat_otc3=[1];
Nboat_otc3=allboat_otc3;
profit_otc3=[10];
effort_otc4=[0];
harvest_otc4=[0 0 0 0 O];
allboat_otc4=[1];
Nboat_otc4=allboat_otc4;
profit_otc4=[10];
effort_gill=[O];
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963.258

0.5555556 0.0380117

lE-8 0.00101 O]) ';

seasonrlong=adjust seasonr.*(-15.1093
26.63872
18.91855
seasonflong=adjust_seasonf.* (-1.52695
-1.09072
-1.5428
seasonelong=adjust_seasone. * (-25. 7652
10. 66658
220. 8819
seasonplong=adjust_seasonp.*[ 0.068626
0.318993 -0.03712
seasonolong=adjust_seasono.*(-264 . 197 -527.815
183.4074
seasonlong=[seasonrlong seasonflong seasonelong seasonplong
seasonolong] 1 ;

ntriplong=al* (112 83 38 109] '/5;

-0.03112

O]
O]
O]
O]
O]

';
';
';
';
';

harvest_gill=[O O 0 O O];
allboat_gill=[l];
Nboat_gill=allboat_gill;
profit_gill=[lO];
effort long=[O];
harvest_long=[O 0 0 0 O];
allboat_long=[l];
Nboat_long=allboat_long;
profit_long=[lO];
allprofits=[O];
zharvest- otcl=[O
zharvest - otc2=[0
zharvest - otc3=[0
zharvest - otc4=[0
zharvest_gill=[O
zharvest_long=[O
ssl= [ 2.76937473

0
0
0
0
0
0

0 0 0l ;
0 0 O];
0 0 O];
0 0 O];
0 0 O];
0 0 O];
2.96401222

1. 05290186

0. 23108738

%Cost
theta_otcl=O;
fcost_otcl=O;
c_otc1=2111.686;
d_otc1=100+20*73; %1E-8 2966
lr_cost_otc1=1861.973+1*508.0; %; %31900
theta_otc2=0;
fcost_otc2=0;
c otc2=2195.559
d_otc2=5000;%1E -8
2462.947
lr cost otc2= 2462.947+1*361.3;

theta_otc3=0; %own parameter SAS params suck
fcost_otc3=0;
c_otc3=7051.611 ;
d_otc3=1E-8 ;
lr_cost_otc3=4707.881-0.1*1836 . 8; %4000

theta_otc4=0; %own parameter SAS params suck
fcost_otc4=0;
c_otc4=3157.229;
d_otc4=150;
lr cost otc4= 3061.426+(1* 343.9) ;%7000;
theta_gill=O;
fcost_gill=300;
c_gill=llSO . 91;
d_gill=O;
lr_cost_gill=1153.749+1*11.248 ;%8000;
theta_long=O; .
fcost_long=O;
c long= 1187.303;
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3 .18420797]

Ii

d_long= 40.51+1*10.66; %40.51478
lr_cost_long=1187.303+1*102; %3000;
%intermediat e variables
ei_otcl=[O];
hi_otcl=[O 0 0 0 O];
s_otcl=(p'*seasonotcl) ';
ei_otc2=[0];
hi_otc2=[0 o o o O];
s_otc2=(p'*seasonotc2) ';
ei_otc3=[0];
hi_otc3=[0 O O O 0);
s_otc3=(p'*seasonotc3) ';
ei_otc4=[0];
hi_otc4=[0 o o o O];
s_otc4=(p'*seasonotc4) ';
ei_gill= [ 0] ;
hi_gill=[O 0 0 0 O];
s_gill=(p'*seasongill) ';
ei_long=[O];
hi_long=[O 0 0 0 O];
s long=(p'*seasonlong) ';
%call program
%»close; plot(2:t+l, b(2:t+l,1), '0-', 2:t+l,B1(2:t+l,1))
myproblem

for t=l:T; %annual timer
for i=1:4; %seasonal timer
for ii=l:5 % sets stock size equal to zero in event of negative
stocks sizes
if x(ii)<= O;
x(ii)=O;
end;
end;
% Selects for individual seasonal effort
ef_otcl= max((l/(p'*alphaotc1*2-d_otc1*2))*(lr_cost_otcl(I'*(betaotcl.*price')*I+stockotcl*(p.*x) ...
+s_otcl(i,l)*wtotcl(i,l)+p'*(portotcl*wtportotcl'))) ,0);

ei_otcl=[ei_otcl, ef_otcl];
ef_otc2= max((l/(p'*alphaotc2*2-d_otc2*2))*(lr_cost_otc2(I'*(betaotc2.*price')*I+stockotc2*(p.*x) ...
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+s_otc2(i,l)*wtotc2(i,l)+p'*(portotc2*wtportotc2'))) ,0)
ei_otc2=[ei_otc2, ef_otc2);

ef_otc3= max((l/(p'*alphaotc3*2-d_otc3*2))*(lr_cost_otc3(I' * (betaotc3. *price') *I+stockotc3* (p. *x) ...
+s_otc3(i,l)*wtotc3(i,l)+p'*(portotc3*wtportotc3'))) ,0)
ei_otc3=[ei_otc3, ef_otc3];

ef_otc4= max((l/(p'*alphaotc4*2-d_otc4*2))*(lr_cost_otc4(I'*(betaotc4.*price')*I+stockotc4*(p.*x) ...
+s_otc4(i,l)*wtotc4(i,l)+p'*(portotc4*wtportotc4'))) ,0)
ei_otc4=[ei_otc4, ef_otc4)

ef_gill= max((l/(p'*alphagill*2-d_gill*2))*(1r_cost_gill(I'*(betagill.*price')*I+stockgill*(p.*x) ...
+s_gill(i,l)*wtgill(i,l)+p'*(portgill*wtportgill'))) ,0);
ei_gill=[ei_gill, ef_gill);
ef_long= max((l/(p'*alphalong*2-d_long*2))*(lr_cost_long(I'*(betalong.*price')*I+stocklong*(p.*x) ...
+s long(i,l)*wtlong(i,l)+p'*(portlong*wtportlong'))) ,0)
ei_long=[ei_long, ef_long)

;

% Selects for individual seasonal harvest

harv_otcl=(ntripotcl(i)*max((alphaotcl*ef_otclA2+diag(betaotcl*xprice'
)*ef_otcl+(stockotcl' .*x)*ef_otcl ...
+(seasonotcl(:,i)*wtotcl(i,l))*ef otcl+(portotcl*wtportotcl')*ef otcl)
,0)/10A6);
for iii=l:4
i f x (iii)<= 0
harv_otcl(iii)=O;
end
end
hi otcl=[hi_otcl,harv_otcl');
ntripotc2=[414 643 674 434)/5';
harv otc2=
(ntripotc2(i)*max((alphaotc2*ef_otc2A2+diag(betaotc2*xprice')*ef_otc2+
(stockotc2' .*x)*ef_otc2 ...
+(seasonotc2(:,i)*wtotc2(i,l))*ef otc2+(portotc2*wtportotc2')*ef otc2)
,0)/10A6);
-

159

for iii=1:4
if x(iii)<= 0
harv_otc2(iii)=O;
end
end
hi_otc2=[hi_otc2,harv_otc2'];
harv otc3= (ntripotc3(i)*
max((alphaotc3*ef_otc3A2+diag(betaotc3*xprice')*ef_otc3+(stockotc3' .*x
)*ef otc3 ...
+(seasonotc3(:,i)*wtotc3(i,l))*ef_otc3+(portotc3*wtportotc3')*ef_otc3)
0) /10A6);
f

for iii=1:4
i f x(iii)<= 0
harv_otc3(iii)=O;
end
end
hi otc3=[hi_otc3,harv_otc3'];
bb4 = [ 3 7 6 . 1 2 2 2 . 6 2 2 8 . 6 15 6]

1

;

harv otc4= (ntripotc4(i)*
max((alphaotc4*ef_otc4A2+diag(betaotc4*xprice')*ef_otc4+(stockotc4' .*x
)*ef_otc4 . ..
+(seasonotc4(:,i)*wtotc4(i,l))*ef_otc4+(portotc4*wtportotc4')*ef_otc4)
0) /10A6);
f

for iii=1:4
if x(iii)<= 0
harv_otc4(iii)=O;
end
end
hi otc4=[hi_otc4,harv_otc4'];

harv gill=(ntripgill(i)*
max((alphagill*ef - gillA2+diag(betagill*xprice')*ef - gill+(stockgill' .*x
) *ef_gill ...
+(seasongill(:,i)*wtgill(i,l))*ef_gill+(portgill*wtportgill 1 )*ef_gill)
0) /10A6);
for iii=1:4
i f x(iii) <= O
harv_gill(iii)=O;
end
end
hi_gill=[hi_gill,harv_gill'];
I

harv long= (ntriplong(i)*
max((alphalong*ef_longA2+diag(betalong*xprice')*ef_long+(stocklong' .*x
) *ef long . ..
+(seasonlong(:,i)*wtlong(i,l))*ef_long+(portlong*wtportlong')*ef_long)
r 0) /10A6);
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for iii=1:4
if x(iii)<= 0
harv_long(iii)=O;
end
end
hi_long=[hi_long,harv_long'];
end;
e_otcl=sum(ei_otcl)
h_otcl=sum(reshape(hi_otcl, 5,5) ')'
ei_otcl=[O];
hi_otcl=(O O 0 O O];
e_otc2=sum(ei_otc2) ;
h_otc2=sum(reshape(hi_otc2, 5,5) ')'
ei_otc2=[0];
hi_otc2=(0 0 0 0 O];
e_otc3=sum(ei_otc3) ;
h_otc3=sum(reshape(hi_otc3, 5,5) ')'
ei_otc3=(0];
hi_otc3=[0 0 0 0 O];
e_otc4=sum(ei_otc4) ;
h_otc4=sum(reshape(hi_otc4, 5,5) ')'
ei_otc4=(0];
hi_otc4=(0 O 0 O O];
e_gill=sum(ei_gill) ;
h_gill=sum(reshape(hi_gill, 5,5) ')'
ei_gill= (O] ;
hi_gill=(O 0 0 0 O];
e_long=sum(ei_long) ;
h_long=sum(reshape(hi_long, 5,5) ')'
ei long=(O];
hi long=(O 0 O 0 O];
%fleet profit
prof otcl=(p'*h otcl*10A6-lr cost otcl*e otcl)/10A6;
prof-otc2=(p'*h-otc2*10A6-lr-cost-otc2*e-otc2)/10A6;
prof-otc3=(p'*h-otc3*10A6-lr-cost-otc3*e-otc3)/10A6;
prof-otc4=(p'*h-otc4*10A6-lr-cost-otc4*e-otc4)/10A6;
prof-gill=(p'*h-gill*10A6-lr-cost-gill*e-gill)/10A6;
prof-long=(p'*h-long*10A6-lr-cost-long*e-long)/10A6;

-

-

-

-

-

%fleet size
Nboat_otcl=max(Nboat_otcl+theta_otcl*prof_otcl,O);
Nboat_otc2=max(Nboat_otc2+theta_otc2*prof_otc2,0);
Nboat_otc3=max(Nboat_otc3+theta_otc3*prof_otc3,0);
Nboat_otc4=max(Nboat_otc4+theta_otc4*prof_otc4,0);
Nboat_gill=max(Nboat_gill+theta_gill*prof_gill,0);
Nboat_long=max(Nboat_long+theta_long*prof_long,O);
% Catch proportionality
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propl= [1. 6

1. 0 1. 0 7. 5 1. OJ ' ; % 3 gears to total landings

Htran=(h_otcl*Nboat otcl+h otc2*Nboat otc2+h otc3*Nboat otc3+h otc4*Nb
oat otc4 .. .
+h_gill*Nboat_gill+h_long*Nboat_long);
H=Htran. *propl;
z_otcl=h_otcl ;
z_otc2=h_otc2;
z_otc3=h_otc3;
z_otc4=h_otc4;
z_gill=h_gill;
z_long=h_long;
for n=1:4
if H (n)
>
x (n) ; %; +r (n) . *x (n) ( (r (n) . /K (n)) . *x (n) . A2) +(alpha (n) . * (y (n) *y')) *I
HH(n)
= H(n);
H(n)
= x(n) ;% ;+r(n) .*x{n)( (r{n) ./K(n)) .*x(n) .A2)+(alpha(n) .*(y(n)*y'))*I;
beta(n)
max(H(n)/(HH(n)) ,0);
h_otcl(n)
beta(n)*h_otcl(n);
h_otc2(n)
beta(n)*h_otc2(n);
h_otc3(n)
beta(n)*h_otc3(n);
h_otc4(n)
beta(n)*h_otc4(n);
h_long(n)
beta(n)*h_long(n);
h_gill(n)
beta(n)*h_gill(n);
else
h_otcl(n)
h_otc2(n)
h_otc3(n)
h_otc4(n)
h_long (n)
h_gill (n)

h_otcl
h_otc2
h_otc3
h_otc4
h_long
h_gill

(n);
(n);
(n);
(n);
{n);
(n);

end
end

%stock dynamics
x=max (x+r. *y- ( (r. /K). *y. A2) +(alpha.* (y*y')) *I(h_otcl*Nboat_otcl+h_otc2*Nboat_otc2 ...
+h_otc3*Nboat_otc3+h_otc4*Nboat_otc4+h_gill*Nboat_gill+h_long*Nboat_lo
ng). *propl, 0);
%counters
biomass= [biomass, x'];
xbiomass= [biomass, x'] ' ;
y=xbiomass (1+ (5* (t-1)) : 5+5* (t-1));
effort otcl

[effort_otcl,

e otcl'
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l

i

harvest otcl
allboat otcl
profit otcl

[harvest_otcl, h_otcl'
];
[allboat_otcl, Nboat_otcl];
[profit_otcl, prof_otcl J;

effort otc2= [effort otc2, e_otc2'];
harvest_otc2=[harvest_otc2, h_otc2'];
allboat_otc2=[allboat_otc2, Nboat_otc2];
profit_otc2= [profit_otc2, prof_otc2];
effort otc3= [effort_otc3, e_otc3'];
harvest_otc3=[harvest_otc3, h_otc3'];
allboat_otc3=[allboat_otc3, Nboat_otc3];
profit_otc3= [profit_otc3, prof_otc3];
effort otc4= [effort_otc4, e_otc4'];
harvest_otc4=[harvest_otc4, h_otc4'];
allboat_otc4=[allboat_otc4, Nboat_otc4];
profit_otc4= [profit_otc4, prof_otc4];
effort gill= [effort_gill, e_gill'];
harvest_gill=[harvest_gill, h_gill'];
allboat_gill=[allboat_gill, Nboat_gill];
profit_gill= [profit_gill, prof_gill];
effort long= [effort_long, e_long'];
harvest_long=[harvest_long, h_long'];
allboat_long=[allboat_long, Nboat_long];
profit_long= [profit_long, prof_long];

zharvest_otcl=[zharvest_otcl,
zharvest_otc2=[zharvest_otc2,
zharvest_otc3=[zharvest_otc3,
zharvest_otc4=[zharvest_otc4,
zharvest_gill=[zharvest_gill,
zharvest_long=[zharvest_long,

z_otcl'];
z_otc2'];
z_otc3'];
z_otc4'];
z_gill'];
z_long'];

allprofits=[allprofits,
(prof_otcl+prof_otc2+prof_otc3+prof_otc4+prof_gill+prof_long)J;
end;
b=reshape(biomass,5,T+l) ';
zotcl=Nboat_otcl*reshape(zharvest_otcl,5,T+l)
zotc2=Nboat_otc2*reshape(zharvest_otc2,5,T+l)
zotc3=Nboat_otc3*reshape(zharvest_otc3,5,T+l)
zotc4=Nboat_otc4*reshape(zharvest_otc4,5,T+l)
zgill=Nboat_gill*reshape(zharvest_gill,5,T+l)
zlong=Nboat_long*reshape(zharvest_long,5,T+l)
hotcl=Nboat_otcl*reshape(harvest_otcl,5,T+l)
hotc2=Nboat_otc2*reshape(harvest_otc2,5,T+l)
hotc3=Nboat_otc3*reshape(harvest_otc3,5,T+l)
hotc4=Nboat_otc4*reshape(harvest_otc4,5,T+l)
hgill=Nboat_gill*reshape(harvest_gill,5,T+l)
hlong=Nboat_long*reshape(harvest_long,5,T+l)
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';
';
';
';
';
';

';
';
';
';
';
';

effortotcl=effort_otcl';
effortotc2=effort_otc2';
effortotc3=effort_otc3';
effortotc4=effort_otc4';
effortgill=effort_gill';
effortlong=effort_long';
TT=(hotcl+hotc2+hotc3+hotc4+hlong+hgill);
HARVEST=(propl*ones(l,t+l)) '.*TT;
EFFORT=[effortotcl effortotc2 effortotc3 effortotc4 effortgill
effortlong] ;
PROFIT=[profit_otcl' profit_otc2' profit_otc3' profit_otc4'
profit_gill' profit_long'];
%figure (1), title 'Hola',
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b, '-') ;title('Biomass');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(effort_otc1(2:t+l) ', 1 0 1 ) ;title('Effort from
otcl');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(effort_otc2(2:t+l) ', 1 0 1 ) ;title('Effort from
otc2');
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 4), plot (effort_otc3 (2: t+l) ', 'o'); title ('Effort from
otc3');
%figure (2), title 'Roundfish',
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 1) , plot (b (2 : t+l, 1) , ' - ');title ('Biomass of roundfish 1 ) ;
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotcl(2:t+l,1), 'o') ;title('Harvest from otcl');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,l), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,l), 1 0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3');
%figure (3), title 'Flatfish',
%SUBPLOT(2,2,1) ,plot(b(2 :t+ l,2), '-')
%SUBPLOT (2, 2, 2) , plot (hotel (2: t+l, 2),
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,2),
%SUBPLOT(2 ,2,4 ) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,2),
%figure (4), title 'Elasmobranchs',
%SUBPLOT(2,2,1) ,plot(b(2:t+l,3), '-')
elasmobranchs');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotc1(2:t+l,3),
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,3),
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,3),
%figure (5), title 'Pelagics',
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b(2:t+l,4), '-')
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotcl(2:t+l,4),
%SUBPLOT(2 ,2,3 ) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,4),
%SUBPLOT(2,2,4) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,4),

;title('Biomass of flatfish');
'o') ; title ('Harvest from otcl');
'o -r ') ;title('Harvest from otc2');
'o-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3');

;title('Biomass of
0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl');
0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2');
1
0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3');
1
1

;title('Biomass of pelagics');
1
0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl');
1
0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2');
1
0-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3');

%figure (6), title 'Pelagics',
%SUBPLOT(2,2,l) ,plot(b(2:t+l,5), '-') ;title('Biomass of all other');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,2) ,plot(hotc1(2:t+l,5), 1 0 1 ) ;title('Harvest from otcl');
%SUBPLOT(2,2,3) ,plot(hotc2(2:t+l,5), 1 0-r') ;title('Harvest from otc2');
%SUBPLOT(2,2 ,4 ) ,plot(hotc3(2:t+l,5), 'o-b') ;title('Harvest from otc3');
% plot(l:t-1, b(l:t-1,1), 1 0-r', l:t - 1, TT(2:t,1 ) ,'-ob')
%plot(allboat_otcl) ;title('allboat');
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